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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines market design and operation within the empirical context 
o f CO z markets. Six case studies are presented which describe business interactions 
during the design and operation o f the Kyoto Protocol, the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme and the United Kingdom’s Carbon Reduction Commitment. The 
case studies were developed through participant observation between O ctober 2006 
and June 2010. The research developed a conceptual framework for the study o f 
C 0 2 market design and operation. Network-level aspects o f C 0 2 market design and 
operation were captured by exchange, representational and normalising practices. 
Macro-level aspects o f C 0 2 market design and operation were captured by technical, 
temporal and uncertainty based considerations. The conceptual framework was used 
to analyse the six cases, exploring why CO, markets have not yet significantly 
influenced businesses’ behaviour. This research should help businesses and 
regulators to better understand the challenges faced during C 0 2 market design and 
operation. Market based approaches to environmental protection are receiving 
increasing interest in the marketing literature. The conceptual framework and six 
cases further the study o f what is actually happening during C 0 2 market design and 
operation, as opposed to previous approaches which have emphasised the intricate 
theoretical aspects o f C 0 2 market design.
KEYWORDS
Market Design, Market Operation, Climate Change, COz Market, Kyoto Protocol, 
European Emission Trading Scheme, Carbon Reduction Commitment
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Discussions o f C 0 2 markets involve a number o f technical terms which are often 
abbreviated. This dissertation avoids the use o f these abbreviations. However, for 
reference purposes with regards to other research and publications, the abbreviations 
are given below. Further guidance is available from the United Nations’ exhaustive 
list o f Climate Change related acronyms (United Nations, 2010: 107).
AMR Automatic Meter Reading, the level o f coverage o f AMR is one o f 
the Carbon Reduction Commitment’s Early Action Metrics.
CBI Confederation o f British Industry
CCA Climate Change Agreements. United Kingdom Climate Change 
regulation.
CCL Climate Change Levy. United Kingdom Climate Change regulation.
CCS Carbon Capture and Storage. A C 0 2 abatement technology.
CER Certified Emission Reduction Unit. A C 0 2 permit from the Kyoto 
Protocol.
COP Conference o f the Parties. Annual United Nations Climate Change 
negotiations.
co2c Carbon dioxide equivalent, the common metric for a number o f 
different greenhouse gasses’ Climate Change impacts.
CRC Carbon Reduction Commitment. United Kingdom C 0 2 market.
CTS Carbon Trading Scheme, an informal acronym for a C 0 2 market.
EAMs Early Action Metrics o f the Carbon Reduction Commitment. 
Namely, the level o f coverage o f Automatic Meter Reading (AMR)
and the level o f coverage o f the Carbon Trust Standard.
. . .
EUETS European Emissions Trading Scheme. European market for C 0 2.
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ETS [COJ Emissions Trading Scheme, an informal acronym for a C 0 2 
market.
GHG Greenhouse Gas. C 0 2 plus other greenhouse gases, which are 
normally expressed in equivalent C 0 2 emissions, or CO^.
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
kWh Kilowatt-hour /  unit o f energy consumption (1,000 kWh = lMWh)
LPG Liquid Petroleum Gas, an alternative low C 0 2 transport fuel.
MWh Megawatt-hour /  unit o f energy consumption (1,000 kWh = 
lMWh)
NAP National Allocation Plan: Assigns national emissions targets for 
each participant country within the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme.
NGO N on-Governm ental Organisation
PPM Parts per million, the measure o f atmospheric concentrations o f
c o 2
RGGI Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. State level C 0 2 market in 10 
states in USA.
ROCs Renewables Obligation Certificates
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WCC W orld Climate Conference
16
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background to the research
This dissertation examines market design and operation within the empirical context 
o f C 0 2 markets. Advocates o f market design state that “businesses can create markets 
where there were none, or fix  them when they go wrong. ” (Roth, 2007a: 118). Such approaches 
have been applied to the development of a diverse range o f markets, including those 
for radio frequency bandwidths, kidney transplants, sulphur dioxide reductions and 
even school places (Carmona et al., 2010; Coase, 1960, 1988; Dales, 1968; Demsetz, 
1966; Hurwicz, 1973; MacKenzie, 2009; McMillan, 2003; Myerson, 1979, 1983; Roth, 
2008). This research extends the literature discussed above by examining C 0 2 
market design and operation.
Proponents o f C 0 2 markets present a view o f Climate Change as a “marketfailure on 
the greatest scale the world has seen. ” (Stem, 2006: 25). This view conceptualises the 
market failure as arising from externalities imposed by C 0 2 emissions. It follows that 
the objective o f C 0 2 markets is therefore to monetise C 0 2 emissions and enable 
businesses to mitigate the risk o f Climate Change as part o f their profit maximisation 
objectives (MacKenzie, 2009). The C 0 2 market design provides business 
participants with target C 0 2 emissions. Participants then face the choice either to 
make the required C 0 2 reductions in-house, or to buy C 0 2 reductions from other 
market participants who made savings beyond their targets’ requirements. The 
market is designed to push C 0 2 savings to the cheapest reduction options available 
across industry, while still allowing all participants to comply with their reduction
18
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targets (Bebbington & Larrinaga-Gonzalez, 2008; Braun, 2009; Kolk et al., 2008; 
Lohmann, 2005, 2009; Okereke, 2007).
The selection o f the empirical research setting was guided by the insight that research 
on market design and operation is best undertaken through examinations o f markets 
in the making (Araujo, 2007; Araujo et al., 2008). This dissertation presents six case 
studies, each o f which describes business responses during the design and operation 
o f C 0 2 markets. The C 0 2 markets studied were the Kyoto Protocol, the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme and the United Kingdom’s Carbon Reduction 
Commitment. Collectively, these represented over 98% of the 2009 C 0 2 market by 
value (Kossoy & Ambrosi, 2010). The cases represented contemporary efforts in 
market design and operation, all o f which were less than 5 years old. Such 
contemporary investigations can expose mundane aspects o f market design and 
operation, which later sit ‘below the radar’ in established markets (Kjellberg & 
Helgesson, 2007b; Latour, 1987). Callon supports the claims that C 0 2 markets give a 
good empirical setting for the study o f market design and operation: “Carbon markets 
are an exceptionalfieldforfurthering our understanding of the ...forms of... economic, political and 
scientific activities [that constitute the market], their mutual relations and the challenges they are 
designed to meet” (Callon, 2009: 546).
COz markets have proven to be significant in terms o f their potential to mitigate 
Climate Change, the value o f the transactions made and their reach across the 
business community. C 0 2 markets traded an estimated total o f 7.4 billion tonnes of 
C 0 2 in 2009 (Kossoy & Ambrosi, 2010). This volume represented 24% of 2009’s 
estimated global C 0 2 emissions o f 31.3 billion tonnes (Olivier & Peters, 2010). In
19
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addition, the scale o f global C 0 2 trading has grown rapidly from $25 million in 1998 
to an estimated $144 billion in 2009 (Kossoy & Ambrosi, 2010; U N E P/G R ID  - 
Arendal., 2005). Finally, there is a direct link between C 0 2 markets and the business 
community, as the majority o f C 0 2 market participants are businesses. Phase II o f 
the European Emissions Trading Scheme covered around 10,500 sites within the 
European Union. The sites represented the industries o f electricity generation, iron 
and steel milling, mineral processing, pulp and paper production and general 
manufacturing (Europa, 2010; Sandoff & Schaad, 2009). The Carbon Reduction 
Commitment extended the coverage o f C 0 2 markets within the United Kingdom 
from the 921 European Emissions Trading Scheme sites to an estimated 5,000 
organisations, or 25,000-150,000 sites (DECC, 2007, 2009d). The Carbon Reduction 
Commitment affected commercial scale organisations such as large retailers, 
universities, local authorities, landlords, smaller manufacturers and office based 
organisations with multiple buildings.
The research presented in this dissertation includes the perspective o f the regulators 
and economists who developed the C 0 2 market design. However, this market 
design is also contrasted with descriptions of the actual operation o f C 0 2 markets 
developed by each case study. The descriptions o f C 0 2 markets in operation, or cin 
vivo’ as Callon refers to them (2009), provide a rich view o f the challenges faced by 
market designers, as well as detailed empirical descriptions o f how C 0 2 markets are 
operating in the real world. The research contributes to a growing body o f literature 
which deals with the design and operation of markets. In particular, this PhD  study 
investigates the current design and operation o f C 0 2 markets and attempts to explain
20
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a number o f significant failures o f C 0 2 markets to influence business behaviour 
(Engels, 2009; Spash, 2010).
The remainder o f  this chapter gives an introduction to the research presented in this 
dissertation. Section 1.2 introduces the research objectives and questions. Section
1.3 outlines the structure o f the dissertation. Section 1.4 concludes the chapter.
1.2 Research objectives and questions
This research aims to make two contributions to the marketing literature. Firstly, it 
develops a conceptual framework for the study o f COa market design and operation. 
Secondly, it applies this conceptual framework to an empirical analysis o f the design 
and operation o f C 0 2 markets.
The scientific, political and business communities widely accept the technical 
potential to manage C 0 2 emissions to a sustainable level. However, there is currently 
very little uptake o f these C 0 2 reduction options within the business community. In 
response to the lack o f business action on Climate Change, efforts to reduce C 0 2 
emissions have focussed upon developing C 0 2 markets. The objective o f these C 0 2 
markets is to monetise businesses’ C 0 2 emissions, thereby providing a financial 
incentive to reduce them. This research aims to describe C 0 2 market design and 
operation and to explain the discrepancies between the markets as they were 
designed versus their actual operation. Ultimately, the aim o f this research is to 
explore why C 0 2 markets have so far failed to significantly influence businesses’ 
behaviour.
21
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The research questions are introduced here in order to familiarise the reader with the 
aims o f the study. The full discussion o f the theoretical underpinnings for the 
research questions is explored in the literature review, which is presented in chapter 
2. Section 2.4.4 discusses the theoretical underpinnings o f the research questions 
which relate to network-level aspects of C 0 2 market design and operation. This 
research adopts a view o f markets as networks of actors engaged in exchange, 
representational and normalising practices (Kjellberg & Helgesson, 2007a). Research 
question one asked who the actors are that are involved in C 0 2 market design and 
operation. The identification of these actors was essential to the development o f rich 
and complete case studies. Research questions two to four examined actors’ 
exchange, representational and normalising practices and the translations by which 
they influenced each other as network-level aspects of C 0 2 market design and 
operation. Section 2.5.4 discusses the theoretical underpinnings o f the research 
questions which relate to macro-level aspects o f C 0 2 markets. Research questions 
five to seven examined technical, temporal and uncertainty-based considerations as 
macro-level aspects o f C 0 2 market design and operation.
Having introduced the research objectives and questions, the next section gives an 
overview o f the structure o f the rest of the dissertation.
1.3 Dissertation outline
This dissertation consists o f twelve chapters. Chapter one gives an introduction to 
the research topic and outlines the research objectives and questions, before 
summarising the structure o f the dissertation. Chapter two reviews the literature 
which is relevant to the research questions. Chapter two develops the research
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questions and proposes a conceptual framework for the study o f market design and 
operation which is used later in the analysis o f the case studies.
Chapter three describes the methods that were applied during the research. It begins 
with an exploration o f the researcher’s personal motivations and values and 
continues with an overview o f the epistemological and ontological underpinnings 
that guided the research design. This discussion is followed by a description o f how 
the research methods were chosen and how data were collected, reported and 
analysed. Chapter three closes with a section that describes the ethical provisions 
taken in order to protect research subjects.
Chapter four begins by giving context on the development o f Climate Change as a 
business issue and describes the potential C 0 2 reduction pathways that are available 
to business. Next, a description is given of how C 0 2 markets work, as compared to 
a C 0 2 tax or mandated C 0 2 reductions. The remainder of chapter four then gives 
detailed descriptions o f the C 0 2 markets which were relevant to this research. The 
C 0 2 markets covered are the global Kyoto Protocol, the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme and the United Kingdom’s Carbon Reduction Commitment. The 
United Kingdom’s Climate Change Agreements and the practice o f C 0 2 Offsetting 
are also introduced as important contextual aspects for the C 0 2 markets covered by 
the case studies.
Chapters five to ten present six empirical cases which describe C 0 2 market design 
and operation. In chapter five, the first case describes efforts to extend the Kyoto 
Protocol beyond its current expiration date o f the end o f 2012. Chapter six examines
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the operation o f phase II o f the European Emissions Trading Scheme. Chapter 
seven examines efforts to include aviation in phase III o f the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme. Chapter eight examines consultation responses by the business 
community to the launch o f the United Kingdom’s Carbon Reduction Commitment. 
Chapter nine examines the new accounting and reporting obligations introduced by 
the Carbon Reduction Commitment. Finally, chapter ten describes interactions 
resulting from the launch o f the Carbon Reduction Commitment.
Chapter eleven analyses the six case studies presented by the research. The chapter 
confronts the six case studies with the conceptual framework for the study o f market 
design and operation that is proposed at the end of the literature review.
Chapter twelve presents the research conclusions and implications. Firstly, an 
overview o f the results is given, dealing in turn with each research question. Next, 
the theoretical and managerial implications o f the research are given. Finally, the 
limitations o f the research are discussed and suggestions are made for future 
research.
1.4 Conclusion
This chapter has laid the foundations for the dissertation. The first section gave the 
background to the research, next the research objectives and questions were 
presented and finally an outline of the remainder o f the dissertation’s structure was 
given. Chapter two now summarises the results o f the literature review and presents 
a conceptual framework for the study o f C 0 2 market design and operation.
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the literature which has previously dealt with the research 
questions introduced in chapter one. The first section examines the nature of 
markets and provides a foundation for the discussion o f market design and 
operation. N ext a theoretical basis is developed for the examination o f C 0 2 markets. 
Discussions in the remainder of the chapter are split between network-level and 
macro-level aspects o f C 0 2 market design and operation. Firstly, network-level 
aspects o f exchanges, representations and norms are examined and corresponding 
research questions are developed. Secondly, macro-level aspects o f technical, 
temporal and uncertainty-based considerations are examined and corresponding 
research questions are developed. The last section o f the chapter combines this 
literature to give a conceptual framework for the study o f market design and 
operation that is later used to analyse the case studies.
2.2 The substance o f markets
The term ‘market’ is often used quite loosely within the marketing literature 
(Andersen & Ritter, 2008). Challenging this ambiguity raises ontological questions 
about the nature o f what is called the ‘market’ (Araujo et al., 2008). In order to 
analyse market design and operation, a more detailed description o f the substance of 
markets is required. A starting point in this examination o f markets is to argue that 
markets are institutional arrangements which facilitate the exchange o f goods (North, 
1990). However, this perspective tells us more about the purpose o f a market, rather 
than describing its substance. This section presents a number o f perspectives of the
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substance o f markets, before proposing a starting point for the development o f a 
conceptual framework for the study o f market design and operation.
Traditional economic analyses o f markets have tended to assume that there is litde 
interaction between buyers and sellers and that exchange will take place with relative 
ease. As early as the late 1960’s, there was an acknowledgement that marketing is less 
about pushing products onto passive buyers and is more an activity which is 
undertaken between organisations, persons and ideas (Koder & Levy, 1969). The 
network approach o f the Industrial Marketing and Purchasing (IMP) Group has 
further developed the insights given above (IMP, 2010).
The network approach emphasises that business markets are not a faceless topology 
o f atomised and individually insignificant firms (Easton & Araujo, 1994; La2onick, 
1991; Mouzas, 2006b). Instead, the network approach encourages businesses to 
acknowledge that markets operate through complex relationships between buying 
and selling organisations, where what is exchanged is often actually created through 
the interactions taking place (Easton & Hakansson, 1996; Hakansson, 1982; IMP, 
2010; Turnbull & Valla, 1986). Although companies are often individually significant 
actors within markets, they also rely on the resources and capabilities o f other actors 
to perform their operations (Easton & Hakansson, 1996; Gnyawali & Madhavan, 
2001; Hakansson & Ford, 2002). These interdependencies result in a view of 
markets as networks which involve continuing and frequently complex interactions 
that transcend inter-personal discussion or communication (Hakansson & 
Waluszewski, 2002, 2007; Ritter, 2000). Buyer-seller exchanges within the market are 
not simple, flat transactions based upon rational maximisation o f utility (Bagozzi,
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1975; Biggart & Delbridge, 2004). Instead, interaction within markets is a 
substantive process that involves the activities and resources o f  the actors in the 
network (Hakansson & Johanson, 1992; Hakansson & Snehota, 1995; Hakansson & 
Ford, 2002; Hakansson et al., 2009).
The view o f markets as networks highlights three paradoxes that businesses must 
take into account (Ford et al., 2003; Ford & Mouzas, 2008). Paradox one, the myth 
o f action, emphasises that relationships constrain the ability to act independently 
within the market. Each business’s actions will be subject to those o f others and 
there is a need to take account of the historical context and complex nature o f the 
network. Paradox two is ‘the myth of independence’ which refers to the challenge of 
developing objectives in the network. The second paradox makes the case that 
businesses should not place too much emphasis upon their individual objectives. 
Instead, they should acknowledge the need for simultaneous elements of 
cooperation, conflict, integration and separation within the business network. 
Finally, the third paradox is that o f ‘the myth of completeness’. This paradox states 
that most o f the resources and activities that may offer a firm an advantage are 
located outside o f the firm and are not under its control. Paradox three emphasises 
the need to acknowledge and leverage resources held externally to the business, 
through interaction in the network.
The literature presented above gives a network perspective o f markets that 
emphasises the importance o f interaction during the exchanges that take place in 
markets. This perspective is taken further by a field o f  marketing literature that 
examines ontological concerns relating to the market practices which actually
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constitute the day to day reality of the market. The market practice literature is 
compatible with a network view o f markets which emphasises connectivity and 
interdependence. The market practice literature gives an ontological emphasis to the 
network view o f markets, by emphasising the empirical description o f market 
practices. This view presents markets as networks o f actors engaged in empirical 
practices o f exchanges, descriptions o f the market and attempts to regulate it (Araujo, 
2007; Araujo et al., 2008; Kjellberg & Helgesson, 2006, 2007b, 2007a; Mouzas & 
Ford, 2009; Reverdy, 2010).
The view o f markets presented above is aligned with other conceptualisations of 
markets which are now discussed. Firstly, the view o f markets given above is aligned 
with research on international markets for environmental governance that proposes a 
‘war o f position’ based upon ‘material’, ‘discursive’ and ‘organisational’ pillars (Levy 
& Newell, 2002; Levy Sc Egan, 2003). The ‘material’ elements map to exchange 
practices, ‘discursive’ elements are related to descriptions o f the markets and 
‘organisational’ elements are linked to regulatory or normative efforts. Secondly, the 
view o f markets presented in the previous paragraph also incorporates the concepts 
of ‘regimes’ as persistent and connected sets of rules and practices that prescribe 
behavioural roles, constrain activity and shape expectations (Keohane et al., 1993) 
and Krasner’s clusters of norms, rules, principles and decision-making procedures 
(1983). Finally, the view o f markets adopted in this research also deals with the clues 
for coordination o f  behaviour that are embedded in pre-existing norms of 
interaction, as flagged by the theory of ‘focal points’ (Janssen, 2006; Schelling, 1960, 
1978; Sugden, 1995).
29
C 0 2 Market Design and Operadon
The view o f markets as networks of actors engaged in empirical practices of 
exchanges, descriptions o f the market and attempts to regulate it has been shown 
above to encompass much o f the wider literature that emphasises different, but 
arguably incomplete, perspectives of the substance of markets. This research adopts 
a view o f markets as networks o f actors that engage in three categories o f market 
practice o f ‘exchange’, ‘representational’ and ‘normalising’ practices (Hagberg & 
Kjellberg, 2010; Kjellberg & Helgesson, 2006, 2007b, 2007a). Exchange practices 
relate to the economic exchanges taking place within the market and the supporting 
activities which surround them. Representational practices are those which aim to 
depict markets and how they work. Finally, normalising practices are those which 
aim to introduce normative guidelines for how a market should work.
This section has presented a view o f markets as networks o f actors engaged in 
exchange, representational and normalising practices. The following section 
introduces the objectives and theoretical underpinnings o f C 0 2 markets.
2.3 CO2 markets
Any analysis o f market design and operation must take into account the objective of 
the market o f interest. The objective of C 0 2 markets, is “to bring [COJ emissions within 
the frame of economic calculation, by giving them a price (MacKenzie, 2009: 441) This 
statement leaves implicit that the ultimate objective behind monetising C 0 2 
emissions is to influence businesses to reduce their C 0 2 emissions and thus mitigate 
the risk o f  Climate Change. The mechanisms by which businesses’ C 0 2 emissions 
are monetised by C 0 2 markets are now discussed.
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0 O 2 markets provide participants with target C 0 2 emissions that ate lower than their 
current C 0 2 emissions. This target is then enforced through regulations which 
present each business with a choice either to make the required C 0 2 reductions in- 
house, or to buy C 0 2 reductions from other market participants who saved more 
C 0 2 than was required by their target. Through this market, it is hoped that C 0 2 
savings will be made at the cheapest reduction options available and then sold 
between participants, so that each is able to comply with their C 0 2 reduction targets. 
These ideas are neatly summed up by MacKenzie who describes C 0 2 markets as 
“markets in permits to emit C 02 gases or in credits earned by not emitting them” (MacKenzie, 
2009: 440). Details behind this description are given in chapter four, where C 0 2 
markets are described in detail and compared with the alternatives o f a C 0 2 tax or 
mandated C 0 2 reductions.
The next section discusses theoretical aspects o f market design and operation, 
starting with network-level aspects of markets.
2.4 Network-level aspects o f markets
The following three sections examine network-level aspects o f C 0 2 market design 
and operation in more detail. The discussion continues from the introductions 
presented in sections 2.2 and 2.3. Section 2.2 examined the substance o f markets and 
introduced a view o f markets as networks o f actors engaged in exchange, 
representational and normalising practices (Kjellberg & Helgesson, 2007a). Section
2.3 provided an introduction to the objectives and theoretical underpinnings o f C 0 2 
markets. These introductions support the following discussion, which further
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examines the view o f markets as networks o f actors engaged in exchange, 
representational and normalising practices, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Network-level aspects of C 02 markets
NB: Simplified version o f Figure 3 in Kjellberg and Helgesson (2007a: 151)
Descriptions




Sections 2.4.1 to 2.4.3 discuss the implications o f market practices and the 
translations between them for C 0 2 market design and operation. Section 2.4.1 
examines exchange practices. Exchange practices relate to the economic exchanges 
taking place within the market and the supporting activities which surround them. 
Exchange practices influence representational and normalising practices through 
translations o f ‘interests’ and ‘measurements’. Section 2.4.2 examines 
representational practices. Representational practices are those which aim to depict 
markets and how they work. Representational practices influence exchange and 
normalising practices through translations of ‘results’ and ‘descriptions’. Finally,
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section 2.4.3 examines normalising practices. Normalising practices are those which 
aim to introduce normative guidelines for how a market should work. Normalising 
practices influence exchange and representational practices through translations of 
‘rules and tools’ and ‘measures and methods of measurement’. The discussion of 
these practices and translations is supported by the examination o f relevant literature 
which explores their influence upon C 0 2 market design and operation. The 
discussion starts below by examining exchange practices.
2.4.1 Exchange in markets
The purpose o f markets is to facilitate the exchange o f goods (North, 1990). 
Exchange practices are at the heart o f markets and are the element o f market practice 
that is most often the focus o f research. Exchange practices are connected to 
representational and normalising practices through ‘interests’ and ‘measurements’ 
(Kjellberg & Helgesson, 2006, 2007b, 2007a). Interests drive exchange practices and 
inform efforts to influence a market’s representational and normalising practices. 
Interests are not specifically defined by Kjellberg and Helgesson, but they are 
discussed as “illustrating] how supportfor and resistance towards various [market] reforms [are] 
...influenced ... by the interests that the prevailing exchange practices endow various actors with. ” 
(Kjellberg & Helgesson, 2007a: 148). Later on in the paper “clashing interests” net said 
to be behind “intense normalising efforts” in some markets (Kjellberg & Helgesson, 
2007a: 153). Although interests are not specifically defined by Kjellberg and 
Helgesson, their use o f the term is consistent with the dictionary definition of 
interests as “a stake or involvement in an undertaking” (Pearsall, 1999: 737). 
Measurements are defined as descriptions o f exchange which feedback into
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representational practices, influencing how actors see the market. Accordingly, 
measurements describe how exchanges have altered the market and are °based on 
norms concerning what to measure (measuresj and how to measure (methods of measurement) ” 
(Kjellberg & Helgesson, 2007a: 149). Interests and measurements are now discussed.
Interests are im portant during the design and operation o f markets in a number of 
ways. Firstly, market operation can be hampered by the dominance o f established 
interests. For example, trade associations are often formed and controlled by the 
incumbents within an industry. These incumbents then use the trade association to 
voice their self interest, to share knowledge and to campaign against change 
(Vermeulen et al., 2007). Furthermore, economic interests have historically played a 
central role in the analysis of markets. For example, previous research concludes that 
shareholder’s economic interests are one of the primary drivers which determines the 
business response C 0 2 markets (Reid & Toffel, 2009). In contrast, the sustainability 
literature has long argued for greater attention to be paid to environmental and social 
interests o f non business stakeholders (Elkington, 1994; Elkington, 1997; Molisa & 
Wittneben, 2008). While it is important to acknowledge the other dimensions of 
markets, a robust treatment of economic interests is essential if adverse economic 
incentives are to be avoided. Rather than taking the economic system as a given, it 
has been argued that we are able to design it to achieve the ends which we define as 
desirable (Barnett, 1986, 2003; Hurwicz, 1973; McMillan, 2003; Roth, 2002, 2007a, 
2008). An example o f such arguments is that “environmental accounting helps transform 
environmental objects into commercial goods and services’ (Lohmann, 2009: 500). This 
argument illustrates the view that market design efforts must aim to structure 
incentives so that when participants act in a self-interested manner, desirable
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outcomes are still possible and economically attractive (Hurwic2, 1973; McKibbin & 
Wilcoxen, 2002; Myerson, 1979, 1986; Roth, 1982). Research on the United 
Kingdom s liberalised electricity markets, concludes that economic interests still drive 
generators to select the cheapest technology available, despite wider environmental 
interests. These low cost technologies are typically coal or gas fired power stations. 
Selection o f these technologies threatens to prevent the delivery o f the United 
Kingdom’s targets for renewable electricity generation and C 0 2 reductions. It is 
suggested that regulators, as market makers, need to reconsider the relationship 
between the environmental and economic interests at stake in the electricity market 
(Woodman, 2003). This rebalancing o f interests is the objective behind efforts to 
develop C 0 2 markets to monetise C 0 2 emissions and align environmental protection 
interests with business interests in profit maximisation.
The second exchange practice examined is the employment o f measurements. 
Measurements are descriptions o f exchange which feedback into representational 
practices. Measurements, or the lack of them, can impede market design and 
operation, since measurements form the basis upon which exchanges are undertaken. 
For example, measurements have offered some potential to overcome the adverse 
economic incentives faced by the market for renewable electricity. One o f the 
problems faced by the market for renewable electricity is that it is difficult to charge a 
premium for renewable electricity. The premium for renewable electricity is hard to 
justify, because it is impossible to match renewable electricity generated to that 
consumed. All renewable electricity produced is fed into the national gnd and mixed 
with electricity from other sources. A t the customer’s end, electricity is simply pulled 
from the grid and it is impossible to measure whether this electricity came from a
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renewable source or not. This presents problems in how to trace the electricity 
produced by renewable sources through to the customer who paid for it. W ithout a 
mechanism to overcome this challenge and measure the consumption o f renewable 
electricity, it becomes very difficult to charge a premium for renewable electricity. 
This complication necessitated the development of a market for green electricity 
certificates called Renewables Obligation Certificates (ROCs) (Rohracher, 2009). 
Renewables Obligation Certificates are purchased by the customer to prove that they 
paid for renewable electricity to be supplied to the grid. Even though another 
consumer may have actually used the renewable electricity, such a system prevents 
one unit o f  renewable electricity from being sold a number o f times. The United 
Kingdom’s government regulates the generation o f Renewables Obligation 
Certificates to ensure that only one ROC is issued per each unit of renewable 
electricity produced. Renewables Obligation Certificates also provide a purchaser 
with proof o f their green claims o f having paid for the generation o f an amount of 
renewable electricity equivalent to the purchaser’s consumption (Rohracher, 2009). 
A nother example of a problem of measurement, is the challenge o f measuring and 
making comparable the Climate Change impact of different activities which produce 
C 0 2 (Kolk et al., 2008; Levin & Espeland, 2002; MacKenzie, 2009). Guidelines have 
been developed in order to make different C 0 2 emitting activities commensurable. 
These guidelines specify the conversion factors and measurement techniques for the 
calculation and reporting o f C 0 2 emissions in an effort to make different C 0 2 
emitting activities commensurable. These examples illustrate the importance of 
measurement practices to market design and operation. The next section examines 
the role o f representational practices in markets.
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2.4.2 Representations o f markets
Representations o f markets are not only prerequisites for exchange, they are also 
significant results o f the exchange (Hardie & MacKenzie, 2007). However, 
representations are not uniform or stable and there are multiple versions o f markets, 
due to different representations developed by different actors (Finch, 2007; Ford et 
al., 2003; Henneberg et al., 2006; Leek & Mason, 2010; Weick, 1993, 1995). As such, 
representational efforts must be acknowledged as being negotiated, in flux and actor- 
specific. This means that representations are influenced by the agendas and biases 
held by different actors. The considerations presented above mean that 
representations are a discursive tool, rather than being ‘representational’ o f an 
external and stable environment (Geiger & Finch, 2010). Theoretically, 
representations could be linked to concepts such as ‘network theories’ (Johanson & 
Mattsson, 1992), ‘mental modes’ (Hodgkinson & Johnson, 1994; Hodgkinson, 1997). 
They could also be linked to the theoretical construct o f ‘network pictures’ that 
circumscribes the subjective interpretations and Hews o f individual business actors 
(Ford et al., 2003; Geiger & Finch, 2010; Henneberg et al., 2006; Henneberg et al., 
2010; Leek & Mason, 2010; Ramos & Ford, in press). In this research, however, 
representational practices are connected to exchange and normalising practices 
through ‘results’ and ‘descriptions’ (Kjellberg & Helgesson, 2006, 2007b, 2007a). 
Results drive exchange practices by influencing how market participants Hew the 
outcome o f their exchanges “Results [of measurements] act directly upon exchange practice, for 
example in the shape of costing calculations and evaluations o f marketing activities” (Kjellberg & 
Helgesson, 2007a: 150). Descriptions o f markets drive normalising practices by 
informing participants’ representations of the markets which they are seeking to 
regulate in some way. Results and descriptions are now discussed.
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Results o f representational practices drive exchange practices by influencing how 
participants view their exchanges. Representations “have a certain normative power” 
(Henneberg et al., 2010: 358). For example, the results o f different potential 
representations o f being late to collect a child from school have been shown to 
significantly influence the behaviour of parents (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000). In this 
example o f representations of late collection of children, it was decided that a fine 
would be introduced to discourage parents from collecting children late. 
Surprisingly, this new system did not have the desired affect and the incidence o f late 
collection by parents actually increased. One explanation for this was that, following 
introduction o f  the fines, the previous representation o f late collection as a ‘social 
taboo’ was replaced by fines, which were represented as ‘cheap childcare’ (Gneezy & 
Rustichini, 2000). Research also reveals that the way results are presented has an 
effect upon the ensuing decisions that is independent o f the decision variables 
themselves (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). For example, it has been shown that 
positive representations o f decisions, regarding gains, prom pt risk-averse behaviour. 
Negative representations however, regarding losses, prompt risk-seeking behaviour 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). These behavioural affects could be affecting the 
operation o f C 0 2 markets, since the majority of actions on Climate Change are 
negatively framed as responding to a risk.
Descriptions drive normalising practices by informing participants’ representations of 
the markets which they are seeking to regulate in some way. Previous research has 
examined how descriptions influenced the making and exchange o f a second-hand 
oil field (Finch & Acha, 2008). The research suggests that multiple versions o f an 
object are created through the descriptions developed by different actors, such as a
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‘spent oil field’, or one ready for secondary exploitation, a ‘second-hand oilfield’. 
These descriptions will have implications for attempts to apply calculations ahead of 
exchanges. Similar insights are given by Simakova & Neyland (2008) when they 
argue that marketing involves describing ‘constituencies’ o f relevant people and 
things that could be recipients o f a new offering. They argue that offerings will fail if 
they are without a compelling description articulating the case for the constituency’s 
existence and its need for the new offering. This is again similar to the claim that 
markets can be understood through a process based explanation of how actors 
recognise each other and attempt to pre-configure each other for certain desirable 
outcomes (Andersson et al., 2008). There is a paradox whereby markets rely upon 
instantaneous disentanglement o f context to produce a description o f a ‘good’ which 
can be the subject o f calculated exchange, while simultaneously preserving an 
entangled description o f the historic and current context surrounding the ‘product’. 
The product can be many goods simultaneously and at different points in its life. 
For example, the product o f a car could be described as any number o f goods, such 
as a new car, second-hand car, or a taxi (Araujo, 2007). In a similar manner, the 
description o f C 0 2 allowances by companies was a subject o f contest at the global 
level. Under existing accounting rules, C 0 2 allowances could either be described as 
‘intangible assets’, or as ‘financial instruments’. The choice o f description would lead 
to the application o f different international accounting standards which would 
significantly influence the corporate reporting requirements placed upon companies 
(Cook, 2009; MacKenzie, 2009). Finally, a further example o f the importance of 
descriptions within markets is German opposition to C 0 2 markets that is rooted in 
the description o f C 0 2 markets as involving ‘selling pollution’ (Engels, 2001; Roth, 
2007b). This is an example o f a market’s description impacting upon its operation.
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Having examined the importance o f representations in markets, the following section 
explores the influence o f market constitutions.
2.4.3 Constitutions o f markets
The constitution o f markets refers to the “system of values, norms, rules and other 
conventions that are shared by actors” (Mouzas & Ford, 2009: 495). Many markets, such as 
those for C 0 2, aim to bring benefits by simplifying complicated systems and making 
them accessible to non experts (Tenbrunsel et al., 2000). This process of 
simplification and standardisation is often embedded in different types o f rules which 
govern the operation o f markets (Mouzas, 2006a; Mouzas & Ford, 2009). 
Specifically, the rules embedded in a number of markets are designed to give a 
business cost to externalities. Externalities are costs resulting from the actions of 
businesses, but which businesses are not legally required to pay. For example, C 0 2 
emissions result in a number of externalities due to the costs imposed by Climate 
Change. C 0 2 markets are attempting to remove these externalities by giving a cost 
relating to businesses’ C 0 2 emissions (Bazerman & Hoffman, 1999; Jamieson, 2006). 
Market constitutions are held within normalising practices that are connected to 
exchange and representational practices through ‘rules and tools’ and ‘measures and 
methods o f measurement’ (Kjellberg & Helgesson, 2006, 2007b, 2007a). Rules and 
tools are used to perform and influence exchange practices. Measures and methods 
o f measurement influence representational practices. Rules and tools and measures 
and methods o f measurement are discussed below.
Rules and tools can be socially based (Fligstein, 1996; Fligstein & Dauter, 2007; 
Granovetter, 1985; White, 1981), but can also rely upon non-human actors to
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support calculative and other activities (Latour, 1992; Morgan, 2008). Examples of 
these non-human actors include information technology systems, physical arenas, 
such as trading floors and specialist models, such as the pricing models used in 
trading (Beunza et al., 2006). During market design and operation, rules and tools 
are often developed through institutional initiatives which establish new property 
rights, attenuate previously existing property rights and facilitate the exchange of 
these rights (Pearce, 2004). These mles and tools are o f particular importance to this 
research, since previous research has found that rules within regulations are 
significant drivers o f the business response to Climate Change (Kolk et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, market rules are required to deal with technicalities such as how to 
treat substitute goods. For example, the Kyoto Protocol includes six greenhouse 
gases: C 0 2, CH4, N 20 ,  HFCs, PFCs and SF6, but only one price for C 0 2 (UNFCCC, 
2005). Each o f these different gasses has a different global warming potential, so the 
designers o f C 0 2 markets have to decide how to develop conversion factors to allow 
other gases to be expressed in terms o f their ‘global warming potential’ which 
converts them into equivalent amounts of C 0 2 (MacKenzie, 2009). Another 
example o f the influence o f rules upon markets is the European Union’s treatment of 
taxes versus environmental regulations. Taxes are regulated by ‘unanimity’, but 
emissions trading counts as an environmental matter, managed through ‘qualified 
majority voting’ (Christiansen & Wettestad, 2003; MacKenzie, 2007). These rules 
meant that a C 0 2 tax would have been much harder to implement than a C 0 2 
market. A C 0 2 tax required unanimity, while a C 0 2 market could be formed through 
a ballot that reached a majority. Finally, decisions governed by rules o f the market 
emphasise the market itself, radier than the issue which the market is designed to 
tackle. It is therefore important to recognise that in basing a decision upon a set of
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market rules, there is a fundamental shift in the decision type, from one based upon 
absolute effectiveness, towards one based upon effectiveness relative to a reference 
point, i.e. the legislation (Tenbrunsel et al., 2000).
Measures and methods o f measurement influence representational practices. These 
calculative practices are partly social in nature and do not conform to purely rational 
considerations (Finch, 2007; MacKenzie, 2004). Furthermore, calculative practices 
don’t simply generate descriptions of the market; they also shape it (Azimont & 
Araujo, 2007; Callon & Muniesa, 2005). The tools which enable this market shaping 
to take place are referred to as market devices (Azimont & Araujo, 2010; Callon & 
Muniesa, 2005; Reverdy, 2010). One example of a market device is the shopping 
cart. Previous research has shown that the humble shopping cart has a significant 
influence upon consumer markets (Cochoy, 2008). During the shopping process, the 
shopping cart becomes a measurement tool, turning price based decisions into a 
volumetric constraint set by the size o f the cart. The cart also embeds some of the 
rules into the shopping process, for example by converting an individual buying 
experience into a collective one, with the cart acting as the hub for a "buying 
collective’ such as a family (Cochoy, 2008). It can be imagined how the size o f the 
cart, the layout o f the supermarket and the configuration o f packaging could affect 
market design and operation in this setting. For example, goods must fit in the cart, 
m ust be located on an aisle that the cart can fit down and must be identifiable from 
their packaging. Similarly, measures and methods of measurement are im portant in 
C 0 2 markets, as they set which C 0 2 emissions sources are included, how they are 
measured and can ultimately influence the actions which the market incentivises. For 
example, gas has been calculated to be a lower C 0 2 form o f energy than coal. This
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has contributed to the United Kingdom’s recent emphasis on the development o f gas 
fired power stations and protests at proposed sites for coal fired power stations.
This section brings to a close the discussion o f markets as networks o f actors 
engaged in exchange, representational and normalising practices (Kjellberg & 
Helgesson, 2007a). The following section discusses how this view o f the nature of 
markets influenced the development o f the research questions posed.
2.4.4 Network-level implications for research questions
The ultimate objective o f this study is to explore why C 0 2 markets have so far failed 
to have a significant influence upon businesses’ behaviour. This objective and the 
study’s research questions were introduced in chapter 1. This section now provides a 
more detailed discussion o f the study’s research questions which relate to network- 
level aspects o f C 0 2 market design and operation. Section 2.5.4 discusses the 
research questions relating to macro-level aspects o f C 0 2 market design and 
operation. The research questions discussed below were developed by considering 
the concepts presented in the previous sections o f this chapter. The four research 
questions (RQs) are discussed below.
RQ 1: W ho are the actors involved in C 0 2 market design and operation?
Research question 1 acknowledges that a network perspective o f COz market design 
and operation emphasises the interdependence between C 0 2 regulators and C 0 2 
market participants. The literature review has shown that current theories o f C 0 2 
market design place a disproportionate emphasis upon the desires and objectives of
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C 0 2 market regulators. This first research question aims to redress the balance by 
identifying the other network actors who are involved during C 0 2 market design and 
operation. These findings will contribute to a more detailed empirical understanding 
o f the networks which operate C 0 2 markets.
Research question 1 will ensure that a complete view o f the actors involved in C 0 2 
market design and operation is developed. Research questions 2 to 4 then aim to 
ensure that the full range o f each actor’s network practices are described and 
analysed. This research adopts a view o f markets as networks o f actors engaged in 
exchange, representational and normalising practices (Kjellberg & Helgesson, 2007a). 
These concepts and their implications for C 0 2 markets were discussed in sections 
2.4.1 to 2.4.3 and summarised in Figure 1. Research questions 2 to 4 aimed to 
examine market practices and the translations by which they influenced each other 
during C 0 2 market design and operation.
RQ 2: How do exchange practices affect C 0 2 market design and operation and 
what is their influence upon representational and normalising practices?
RQ 3: How do representational practices affect C 0 2 market design and 
operation and what is their influence upon exchange and normalising practices?
RQ 4: How do normalising practices affect C 0 2 market design and operation 
and what is their influence upon exchange and representational practices?
As discussed above, these research questions attempt to draw out a complete view of 
the three types o f market practices proposed by Kjellberg and Helgesson (2007a). 
Research questions 2 to 4 also consider the influence of the three types o f market
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practice upon each other, by examining the translations which link them. Figure 2 
summarises the links between Kjellberg and Helgesson’s (2007a) model and research 
questions 2 to 4. Research questions 2 to 4 are discussed below.
Figure 2: Linking research questions 2 to 4 and market practice theory
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Research question 2 examines the section of Kjellberg and Helgesson’s (2007a) 
model which relates to exchange practices. The first half o f the question seeks to 
understand how exchange practices affect C 0 2 market design and operation. The 
second half o f research question 2 looks at how exchange practices influence 
representational and normalising practices. This part o f the question focuses 
attention upon the two translations of: ‘measurements’, which link exchange 
practices to representational practices and ‘interests’, which link exchange practices 
to normalising practices.
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Research question 3 examines the section o f Kjellberg and Helgesson’s (2007a) 
model which relates to representational practices. The first half o f the question seeks 
to understand how representational practices affect C 0 2 market design and 
operation. The second half o f research question 3 looks at how representational 
practices influence exchange and normalising practices. This part o f the question 
focuses attention upon the two translations of: ‘results’, which link representational 
practices to exchange practices and ‘descriptions’, which link representational 
practices to normalising practices.
Finally, research question 4 examines the section o f Kjellberg and Helgesson’s 
(2007a) model which relates to normalising practices. The first half o f the question 
seeks to understand how normalising practices affect C 0 2 market design and 
operation. The second half of research question 4 looks at how normalising 
practices influence exchange and representational practices. This part o f the question 
focuses attention upon the two translations of: ‘rules and tools’, which link 
normalising practices to exchange practices and ‘measures and methods of 
measurement’, which link normalising practices to representational practices.
This section has provided a discussion o f the theoretical underpinnings for my 
research questions which relate to network-level aspects o f C 0 2 markets. The 
following section examines technical, temporal and uncertainty-based considerations 
as macro-level aspects o f C 0 2 market design and operation.
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2.5 Macro-level aspects o f markets
This section summarises the results o f a review o f the wider business and 
environmental literature concerning market design and operation and the empirical 
research setting o f C 0 2 and other environmental markets. Full results o f this review 
are given in Appendix three. Figure 3 summarises the results o f the literature review, 
giving a conceptual framework for the study o f macro-level aspects o f market design 
and operation. The technical, temporal and uncertainty based aspects which impact 
upon market design and operation are then introduced before being discussed in the 
following three sections.
This literature review was structured in two parts. Firstly, theoretical keywords of 
'market design’, 'market operation’, 'mechanism design’, ‘market creation’, ‘market 
formation’ and ‘market barriers’ were used to search for material related to market 
design and operation. The further keywords beyond 'market design’ and ‘market 
operation’ were added as they were identified in the literature. Secondly, empirical 
keywords of ‘carbon’, ‘C 0 2’, 'carbon market’, 'Climate Change’, 'global warming’, 
‘Kyoto’, ‘European Emissions Trading Scheme’, ‘EU ETS’, ‘Carbon Reduction 
Commitment’, ‘CRC’, ‘Climate Change Agreement’ and ‘CCA’ were used to identify 
literature that was relevant to the empirical setting. The key words were selected as 
general phrases relevant to Climate Change, together with the names and abbreviated 
names of the C 0 2 markets and other C 0 2 regulation covered by the research. Full 
results o f this review are given in Appendix three and a summary is made below.
The first level o f the search was performed through ‘Google Scholar’ (Google 
Scholar, 2010) and returned a manageable number of results that were relatively
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coherent as a group. There were 408 results for ‘market design’, 169 for ‘market 
operation’, 1,550 for ‘mechanism design’, 61 for ‘market creation’, 51 for ‘market 
formation’ and 90 for ‘market barriers’. The terms relating to the empirical setting 
were not checked within Google, as they were too broad for such a coarse filter. 
Initial attempts to search these empirical keywords returned unmanageable numbers 
o f results that were not coherent as a group. The results from the Google Scholar 
search were processed by making a brief review of the titles and abstracts of each 
paper. Any papers which were relevant to the research were read in full.
Next the search was repeated using the online database, ‘Business Source Premier’ 
(Business Source Premier, 2010). To supplement the search through Business 
Source Premier, all 4* journals and any 3* marketing journals were identified through 
the Association o f Business Schools (ABS) rankings (Association o f Business 
Schools, 2010). Where the Business Source Premier search did not cover these 
journals, a separate search was undertaken. The search used the Boolean function to 
identify ‘exact matches only’ in either the ‘article title’ or ‘abstract’ and restricted the 
results to only those from ‘peer reviewed journals’. This time, there were 193 results 
for ‘market design, 73 for ‘market operation, 283 for ‘mechanism design’, 43 for 
‘market creation’, 29 for ‘market formation’ and 49 for ‘market barriers’, ‘carbon’, 
‘C 0 2’ and ‘carbon market’ returned 8,413 results; ‘Climate Change’ and ‘global 
warming’ gave 3,910 results; ‘Kyoto’ gave 987 results, ‘European Emissions Trading 
Scheme’ and ‘EU ETS’ gave 61 results, ‘Carbon Reduction Commitment’ and ‘CRC’ 
gave 6 results, ‘Climate Change Agreement’ and ‘CCA’ gave 9 results. As a point of 
reference, a number o f searches for more common terms were performed, in order 
to check that the search settings were not too restrictive. Under the same settings,
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‘market’ returned 40,668 results and ‘relationship’ returned 23,959. This gave 
confidence that the search method was structurally correct, meaning that the low 
numbers o f results found were representative of a low level o f treatment o f market 
design and operation in the existing marketing literature. The coverage o f the search 
was extended to PhD dissertations through interrogation o f a database at 
Theses.com which carries listings back to the early 1700s. A second database o f PhD 
dissertations was searched at the Industrial Marketing and Purchasing G roup’s online 
database (IMP Group, 2010; Theses.com, 2010). Theses.com returned 11 
dissertations which warranted investigation, however their abstracts were sufficient 
to rule them out from being directly relevant to the research. The Industrial 
Marketing and Purchasing G roup’s database gave three dissertations which were in 
environmental fields, but not directly relevant to market design and operation. 
Finally, a search was made o f the policy related energy and Climate Change journals 
o f ‘Energy policy’, ‘Climate policy’, ‘Climatic change’, ‘Journal o f Cleaner Production’ 
and a ‘Wiley interdisciplinary review o f Climate Change’. These searches returned 
another 100 or so results which were reviewed and provided a number o f relevant 
articles.
The results o f this literature review were organised by summarising the material in 
Table 1. Table 1 shows that much o f the material could be subsumed within the 
network-level aspects o f market design and operation introduced in section 2.4. The 
right hand side o f Table 1 logged any aspects which did not fit within the exchange, 
representational and normalising practices identified as network-level aspects of 
market design and operation. This approach identified macro-level aspects which 
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Table 1 identifies a number of macro-level aspects of market design and operation 
that are discussed in the literature and which fall outside the practice based exchange, 
representational and normalising practices listed in the left hand columns o f the 
table. These macro-level aspects are listed in Table 2.










These outliers are external to the market being studied and influence all types of 
market practice. Table 2 lists all of the macro-level aspects o f market design and 
operation identified during the literature review. Inspection reveals that some of the 
macro-level aspects can be subsumed within others which are more generic. Three 
macro-level categories are proposed as technical, temporal and uncertainty based 
aspects o f market design and operation. Technical aspects include infrastructure 
limitations, resource limitations and the scarcity o f human capital. Temporal aspects 
could arguably be subsumed within technical aspects, but have been kept separate as 
they received considerable attention in the literature. Finally, uncertainty subsumes 
cognitive biases, informational asymmetries and lax enforcement. These macro-level 
aspects o f market design and operation are shown in Figure 3.
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Public goods and resource limits




The macro-level aspects of market design and operation are introduced below. Their 
development is described in more detail in the following three sections.
Firsdy, technical aspects o f market design and operation are ‘technological’ aspects 
and those due to ‘public goods and resource limits’. Technological aspects are 
immutable physical laws, or the limits of today’s technical capabilities. Public goods 
and resource limits relate to environmental constraints upon markets. Secondly, 
temporal aspects o f market design and operation are ‘windows o f opportunity’ and 
‘lock ins’. Windows o f opportunity acknowledge that the design and operation o f 
many markets will be subject to a time limit, after which there is little possibility to 
solve the problem, or meet the needs, which the market has been designed to tackle. 
The second temporal aspect o f lock ins relates to decisions which have an extended 
and irreversible impact. Finally, uncertainty based aspects o f market design and 
operation are ‘problem uncertainty’ and ‘cognitive biases’. Problem uncertainty is an 
im portant aspect o f market design and operation since it introduces uncertainty 
regarding the best or m ost expedient way to cope with the problem that the market is 
designed to tackle. Cognitive biases are frailties embedded in the human learning and 
decision making process which distort our views o f the world and are often 
subconscious.
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The following three sections provide detailed discussions o f the three macro-level 
aspects o f market design and operation. The discussion starts by examining technical 
aspects o f market design and operation.
2.5.1 Technical aspects o f markets
This section introduces theoretical and empirical examples o f technical aspects of 
market design and operation. Firstly, technological aspects, which are due to 
immutable physical laws and the limits of today’s knowledge and capabilities, are 
examined. Secondly, public goods and resource limits are analysed.
The first technological aspect o f market design and operation is commensuration, 
which relates to the reconciliation o f the physical and exchange technicalities of 
markets (Engels, 2005). For example, C 0 2 market design involves the definition of 
reporting baselines against which to measure progress. Reporting and monitoring 
techniques also had to be developed. Finally, these were often built into software 
and hardware which performed the reporting on an ongoing basis. Furthermore, at a 
more fundamental level, there are the technological challenges o f accurately 
determining and reflecting the cost o f environmental damage caused by C 0 2 and 
other pollutants (Bond & Houston, 2003; Watts et al., 1999). These technological 
assessments are at the heart o f target setting and reporting within C 0 2 markets.
Secondly, the objective of these markets is to foster changes in business behaviour. 
As such, the technological challenges o f reducing C 0 2 emissions through the 
development o f new technologies, or updates to existing ones, are important aspects 
o f the design and operation o f C 0 2 markets (Okereke, 2007; Shi et al., 2008). For
55
C 0 2 Market Design and Operation
example, technological aspects relating to infrastructure investment and maintenance 
are im portant during die design and operation of renewable electricity markets. 
These aspects include the complexity caused by challenges o f integrating renewables 
within the existing electricity generation and transmission system; the need for 
dispersed geographical application o f new technologies and electricity distribution 
network incompatibilities (Teppo, 2006; Tsoutsos & Stamboulis, 2005). A final 
technological aspect o f the market for renewable electricity is that there is a lack of 
large scale storage options for electricity (Walawalkar et al., 2007). Electricity 
production is forced to meet demand at an almost real time rate, which is difficult for 
renewables because they typically rely upon intermittent sources o f energy.
A further example o f technological aspects of market design and operation comes 
from an examination o f the potential development of markets for parking provision 
in urban areas. This literature suggests that there is potential for city planning 
authorities to move away from their typical planning policies which force developers 
to provide off street parking as a mandatory part o f their planning application. 
Instead an approach is suggested whereby municipalities accept in-lieu payments to 
support the development o f parking at central public sites instead. This parking 
space market would enable the development of areas where it is not possible to 
invest directly in onsite parking. This could lead to the development o f areas which 
were previously neglected due to the lack of potential for onsite parking, while still 
addressing the need for additional parking. An important technological aspect of 
these developments is that, within urban sites, certain changes o f use are less 
problematic than others. Therefore, the development o f a market based response to 
urban parking provision is hampered by the consideration that parking sites are hard
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to covert to and from m ost other uses and are therefore not attractive to developers 
(Barter, 2010). Another example of a technological aspect o f market design and 
operation deals with new markets for alternative transport fuels. Liquid Petroleum 
Gas (LPG) has significant potential to reduce automotive C 0 2 emissions, but faces 
the technological challenge that it is heavier than air. This characteristic o f Liquid 
Petroleum Gas introduces cost burdens in the form o f gas traps and other safety 
measures which are required before garages can work on cars powered by Liquid 
Petroleum Gas (Steenberghen & Lopez, 2008).
Finally, technological aspects can impede communication during market design and 
operation. For example, technological aspects of C 0 2 markets are the invisibility o f 
C 0 2; the distant impacts of Climate Change (geographically and temporally); the 
insulation o f m odem  humans from their environment; the delayed or absent
gratification for taking action on Climate Change and the inadequate signals
indicating the need to change (Moser, 2010).
The discussion now shifts to public goods and resource limits, which are the second 
technical aspect o f market design and operation. Public goods are examined since 
they are im portant technical aspects o f C 0 2 market design and operation. Resource 
limits are often the technical reason behind the development o f markets, without 
resource limits there would be no need for the development o f markets to protect
these resources or to allocate them efficiently.
Before discussing public goods, an important related issue o f externalities is 
mined, since the provision of public goods often also involves dealing with
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externalities. Certain new markets are formed in order to introduce business costs 
relating to what were previously ‘externalities’ (Owen, 2006). Externalities are costs 
o f consumption which do not fall with the actor responsible for their generation 
(Barrett, 2007; Coase, 1960, 1988; Dales, 1968; Demsetz, 1966). For example, before 
sulphur dioxide trading was introduced in the United States, companies did not bear 
a cost relating to their emissions of sulphur dioxide, even though these emissions 
imposed costs on others, through the formation o f acid rain (Webster, 1994). A 
further example is that die Stern Review estimated the social cost o f one tonne o f 
C 0 2 emissions to be an externality of $85 (Stern, 2006: xvi).
In discussions o f externalities, public goods are often o f parallel concern, but it is 
im portant to acknowledge that they are not the same as externalities. A public good 
is any good which is non-excludable and non-rival in its consumption (Cornes & 
Sandler, 1986; Groves & Ledyard, 1977; Hardin, 1968; Olson, 1965; Peattie & 
Ratnayaka, 1992). This means that public goods are available for everyone and their 
consumption by one actor does not prevent others from using them. Public goods 
are therefore subject to dysfunctional individual incentives which result in what 
Hardin (1968) terms the ‘tragedy of the commons’. When a resource is treated as a 
‘commons’, i.e. free to all, individual incentives for preservation o f the resource are 
insufficient, resulting in damaging behaviour by the collective group o f users (Hardin, 
1968). The problem is that the incremental benefit to each individual is higher in 
exploiting the public good, rather than acting to preserve it. A t the group level, this 
ultimately results in degradation o f the resource. This is in line with many 
observations o f commons or partial commons in die real world, for example over­
fishing, deforestation and overgrazing (Bazerman & Hoffman, 1999). In the case of
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C 0 2 markets, the scarce natural resource is the earth’s atmosphere which is unable to 
absorb C 0 2 at the rate at which it is currendy being released (Kjellberg, 2008; 
Lohmann, 2005).
It is possible to define a number o f types of public goods, with each being subject to 
varying degrees o f difficulty in their provision (Barrett, 2007). The first type of 
public good is a ‘single best effort’, whereby the public good can be provided by one 
action and then remains in place. These kinds o f public goods are easier to provide, 
since one actor can provide them and there is no need to uphold them on an 
ongoing basis. An example o f a single best effort is the Global Positioning System 
that was set up without global funding, but is available globally. Secondly, ‘weakest 
link’ public goods are defined as those requiring contributions from all parties. 
Global disease eradication programmes are efforts to provide ‘weakest link’ public 
goods. This is because one single country, the weakest link, can cause failure of the 
efforts. Finally, ‘aggregate effort’ public goods sit somewhere between single best 
effort and weakest link public goods, they can be provided by partial coalitions. 
Climate Change mitigation is an aggregate public good, it requires all major emitters 
to contribute to the efforts, but small emitters do not need to be included to make 
the effort successful. Climate Change mitigation is an example o f an effort to 
provide a good which is both an externality and a public good (Schelling, 1992). 
Firsdy, Climate Change is an externality, since businesses do not typically recognise a 
cost related to their emissions o f C 0 2. O f course, this is changing in regions and 
industries which are covered by C 0 2 markets. Secondly, Climate Change is caused 
by an excess o f C 0 2 in the atmosphere. The production o f C 0 2 is a public good, as 
anyone can emit C 0 2 and doing so does not prevent others from also doing so.
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Were C 0 2 a locally bounded pollutant, it could be managed at the national level, a 
much easier exercise than the global response required (Vaughan et al., 2009).
This section has discussed the technical aspects of market design and operation. In 
the following section, the influence of temporal aspects o f market design and 
operation are examined.
2.5.2 Temporal aspects o f markets
This section discusses temporal aspects of market design and operation. Temporal 
aspects o f market design and operation are ‘windows of opportunity’ and ‘lock ins’. 
Windows o f opportunity are important since the design and operation o f many 
markets will be subject to a time limit, after which there is little possibility to solve 
the problem, or meet the needs, which the market has been designed to tackle. The 
second temporal aspect relates to decisions which have long-term impacts due to the 
lock ins which they create. Lock ins are decisions which have an extended and 
irreversible impact. Windows of opportunity and lock ins are now discussed.
Windows o f opportunity arise from the consideration that markets are often formed 
in response to a problem or need that is subject to some form o f time constraint. 
For example products may decay, relevant events may pass, or thresholds may be 
breached. Windows o f opportunity acknowledge diat the design and operation of 
many markets will be subject to a time limit, after which there is little possibility to 
solve the problem, or meet the needs, which the market has been designed to tackle. 
Accordingly, an important aspect of C 0 2 market design and operation is the time 
taken for new low C 0 2 technologies to be taken up by the energy sector. C 0 2 in the
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atmosphere is measured in terms o f the concentration level, which is effectively 
cumulative, since C 0 2 has a long atmospheric lifespan. The Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC), states that “the projected concentration of C 02 in the year 2100 
ranges from 540 to 970 ppm, compared to about 280 ppm in the pre-industrial era and about 368 
ppm in the year 2000... Projections result in an increase in globally averaged suface temperature of
1.4 to 5.8°C over the period 1990 to 2100....the projected rate of warming is very likely to be 
without precedent during at least the last 10,000 years.” (IPCC, 2001: 1). Taking into 
account the steep projected increases in C 0 2 levels and their time effects, the next 20 
to 30 years are critical in mounting a response to Climate Change. If  it is assumed 
that it takes 50 years to transform the energy sector, and if action is delayed until 
2020, then an emissions reduction rate o f 2.5% per year would lead to an 
atmospheric concentration o f C 0 2 at around 540 parts per million. This level is 
aligned with consensus around safe levels of Climate Change. A further 20 year 
delay o f action would lead to C 0 2 concentrations of 730 parts per million and a 40 
year delay to concentrations exceeding 1,000 parts per million (Vaughan et al., 2009). 
These delays are less than the life span o f many investments currently being made in 
facilities such as oil refineries or power stations.
Lock ins can arise from the reluctance of businesses to write off infrastructure before 
the end o f its operating lifetime. For example coal fired power stations have a 40 
year life, so there is a lock in for decisions taken today to invest in new coal fired 
power stations. This example o f a 40 year lock in is comparable to the timeframe 
discussed above for the required reductions in C 0 2 emissions targeted by C 0 2 
markets (Meinshausen & Hare, 2008). Thus lock ins relating to decisions taken today 
will significantly influence the outcome of efforts to mitigate Climate Change.
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Typical contributing factors which underpin these lock ins are the limited capacity of 
firms and the emergent nature o f technical developments as being open ended and 
path dependent (Bengtson et al., 2009; Conejero & Farina, 2003; Miller & Olleros, 
2007; Miller et al., 2008). Furthermore, time delays may be present between taking 
action and realising the anticipated benefits o f that action. One such example is the 
delay in climate impact o f reducing C 0 2 emissions. This is because o f the long 
atmospheric lifetime o f C 0 2 (Moser, 2010).
These examples illustrate that C 0 2 markets can only mitigate Climate Change within 
a window o f opportunity o f around 20-30 years and that there are lock ins which 
hinder action inside that timeframe (Teppo, 2006; Tsoutsos & Stamboulis, 2005). 
The next section examines the influence o f uncertainty upon markets.
2.5.3 Uncertainty in markets
This section discusses literature which identifies uncertainty based aspects o f market 
design and operation. Uncertainty based aspects are ‘problem uncertainty’ and 
‘cognitive biases’. Problem uncertainty is an important aspect o f market design and 
operation, since it introduces uncertainty regarding the best or m ost expedient way to 
cope with the problem that the market is designed to tackle. Cognitive biases are 
frailties embedded in the human learning and decision making process which distort 
our views o f the world and are often subconscious. Problem uncertainty and 
cognitive biases are now discussed.
Problem uncertainty exists when the market participant is “unsure of the best or most 
expedient way to cope with [their] problem” (Ford & Mou2as, 2010: 958). For example,
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problem uncertainty can be due to the emergent nature o f innovation (Miller & 
Olleros, 2007; Miller et al., 2008). Emphasis o f the open ended and emergent nature 
o f innovation helps to highlight that uncertainty is an inevitable aspect o f market 
design and operation. Literature also refers to uncertainty regarding the anticipated 
development or enforcement of the market design (Levy & Kolk, 2002; Okereke, 
2007; Shi et al., 2008; Sutherland, 1991). Such regulatory uncertainty can arise from 
property rights which are ambiguously defined, difficult to verify, expensive to 
enforce, or poorly linked to the environmental benefit which they are trying to 
protect (Murtough et al., 2002). Furthermore, inconsistencies in the responses of 
national authorities are sources of uncertainty of market participants during the 
operation o f C 0 2 markets (Conejero & Farina, 2003; Shi et al., 2008). O ther markets 
can also introduce uncertainty, for example the investments in low C 0 2 
infrastructure which are sought by C 0 2 markets can be affected by fuel prices. A rise 
in fossil fuel prices will incentivise efficiency investments, which will also reduce C 0 2 
emissions (Sutherland, 1991). Therefore, C 0 2 markets are affected by uncertainty 
regarding price movements in other markets. The examples above show how 
uncertainty can be an important aspect of the design and operation o f C 0 2 markets. 
This problem uncertainty also often drives irrational behaviour in decision making 
and such cognitive biases are examined in the remainder o f this section.
Cognitive biases relate to the human response to uncertainty. Cognitive biases are 
frailties embedded in the human learning and decision making process which distort 
our views o f the world and are often subconscious. Cognitive biases are important 
during the design and operation o f environmental markets. This is because 
environmental markets are often designed to help prevent the breaching of
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subjective thresholds relating to levels of harm. Setting these thresholds requires the 
definition o f both physical and subjective limits. For example, an area will flood if 
severe weather events exceed the capacity o f rivers, but whether this flooding is seen 
as acceptable or normal is subject to social and cognitive processes. This is relevant 
to C 0 2 market design and operation, since the ultimate purpose o f  these markets is 
to avoid such thresholds. For example, the objective o f the United Nations’ C 0 2 
market o f the Kyoto Protocol, is to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere 
at a level that will prevent dangerous human interference with the climate system” (Meze- 
Hausken, 2008; UNFCCC, 2005). In other words, the whole C 0 2 market is built 
upon a need to avoid a subjective, uncertain, threshold defined as ‘dangerous’ 
Climate Change. It is this kind o f uncertainty which makes cognitive biases 
im portant aspects o f C 0 2 market design and operation.
The calculative, social and representational aspects o f markets all rely upon processes 
o f cognition and sense making under conditions of uncertainty. In this area there has 
long been a stream of literature challenging the assumptions o f perfect information 
and the feasibility of strictly rational economic decisions (Bazerman & Hoffman, 
1999; Bazerman et al., 2001; Brunsson, 1982; Kahneman et al., 1982; Neale & 
Bazerman, 1985; Scheytt et al., 2006; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Wade-Benzoni, 
1999). W hat follows is an examination o f how uncertainty drives biases in cognition 
and decision making. This is relevant because these biases help to explain the affects 
o f uncertainty during market design and operation.
Particularly relevant to markets targeting environmental protection, are cognitive 
deficiencies relating to human understanding o f  our influence on the natural
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environment. Naturalism is the tendency to weigh damage done by humans to the 
environment as more serious than that done by nature. For example, naturalism 
results in a perception that even if Climate Change is real, dangerous and 
preventable, there is less need to cut emissions if humans did not cause the problem 
(Baron, 2006). The bias o f naturalism is linked to the ‘polluter pays’ bias which 
captures observations that actors intuitively feel they should clean up their own 
waste. This leads to the idea that it is better to undo the harm you have caused than 
to do more good through a different action unrelated to your original actions; this is 
the ‘undoing bias’ (Baron, 2006). With Climate Change, there is a debate over 
whether to mitigate or adapt. The undoing bias would suggest that people would be 
keener to mitigate (undo) the problem, rather than adapt to the changes it brings 
about. Schelling argues that money spent upon mitigation would be better spent 
upon investment to develop local economies in the developing world, i.e. people 
should overcome their undoing bias (Schelling, 1992).
Timing also has an important affect upon cognitive biases. There is evidence of 
cognitive biases which are triggered by the inter-temporal aspects o f problem solving. 
These biases relate to decision making regarding future benefits. Research has 
shown that decisions regarding future gains lead actors to discount the future more 
than would be justified on a purely rational basis. This leads to excessive discounting 
o f future benefits which become disproportionately undervalued when compared to 
benefits available in the present day (Bazerman & Hoffman, 1999, \X^eber, 2006). 
Thus actions to mitigate Climate Change are often perceived as unattractive because 
they incur immediate costs in order to create future benefits which are excessively 
discounted before being taken into account. The full extension o f excessive
65
C 0 2 Market Design and Operation
discounting leads to inter-generational discounting, where decision makers end up 
burdening future generations (Bazerman & Hoffman, 1999). This is important, since 
it demonstrates that temporal aspects relating to the market can lead to systematic 
biases in decision making processes.
Actors’ engagement with markets often involves an assessment o f the risk of action 
versus inaction. A special issue in the journal ‘Climatic Change’ called ‘Thinking 
about global warming’ has dealt with this issue at length (Baron, 2006; Oppenheimer 
& Todorov, 2006; Sunstein, 2006; Thompson, 2006). Research suggests there are 
two mechanisms by which actors recognise risk. The first is ‘risk as f e e l i n g '  and 
requires real world experience as input. Risk as feeling is intuitive, automatic and fast 
(Loewenstein et al., 2001). Risk as feeling uses ‘system V thought, which is often 
used when actors approach information overload, or in situations o f uncertainty 
(Bazerman & Malhotra, 2006). Risk recognition also occurs through ‘system 2’ 
thought (Weber, 2006), which could be called ‘risk as thinking’. ‘System 2’ thought is 
conscious, reasoned and based upon analysis. Some of the slow uptake of and 
resistance to C 0 2 markets can be explained by acknowledging that Climate Change is 
an example where ‘risk as feeling’ does not flag a significant problem, but ‘risk as 
thinking’ does. That Climate Change does not trigger a ‘system 1’ /  ‘risk as feeling’, 
type o f response could be explained by the ‘availability heuristic’ which suggests that 
people weigh risks by the ease with which examples of resulting harm can be 
visualised or recalled (Kahneman et al., 1982; Sunstein, 2006; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1973). There is a large body of research suggesting that the relative lack of concern 
about Climate Change is due to a lack of availability of examples o f harm resulting 
from Climate Change and the difficulty of visualising the complex, non-tangible,
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scientific and indirect chains o f cause and effect at play. In other words, the lack of 
availability o f examples o f harm resulting from Climate Change can at least partly be 
explained by the somewhat unique nature of C 0 2 as a pollutant. C 0 2 is invisible, 
odourless and has no direct health impacts; it does not create harm that is 
immediately apparent. These empirical findings are consistent across the United 
States (Boykoff, 2008; Jamieson, 1991, 2006; Kellstedt et al., 2008); the European 
Union (Dunlap & Saad, 2001; Hersch & Viscusi, 2006; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003); 
and the developed world as a whole (Leiserowitz, 2006; Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; 
Oreskes, 2004). Although ‘system T thought tends to dominate actors’ risk 
perceptions, it is argued that important and complicated decisions are best made 
using ‘system 2’ thought (Weber, 2006). Furthermore, previous research reveals that 
the way problems are presented has an effect upon the resulting decision which is 
independent o f  the decision variables themselves (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). It 
has been shown that positive framing of decisions, regarding gains, prompts risk 
averse behaviour; while negative framing o f decisions, regarding losses, prompts risk- 
seeking behaviour (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
The next two paragraphs examine cognitive biases which lead to distorted views o f 
others. These cognitive biases are home team betting, parochialism, egoism and 
egocentrism. They are important during market design and operation, since they 
affect the interactions between different parties.
There are a number o f biases leading actors to make self-serving choices at either the 
personal or group level. This section discusses a number o f these biases and how 
they are relevant to C 0 2 markets. ‘Home team betting’ is where people tend to
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predict the outcome they would like to see. These predictions are not rational, they 
are influenced by tendencies to pay more attention to and remember evidence 
pointing to the desired outcome, at the expense of other contradictory material 
(Viscusi & Zeckhauser, 2006). Linked to this is ‘parochialism’, where group 
members will favour their group at the expense o f outsiders and possibly themselves 
(Baron, 2006; Schwartz-Shea & Simmons, 1991). Parochialism can lead groups to 
under spend on solutions when they feel that they will not benefit from this 
investment. It can also lead to distortions in judgements o f fairness. For example, 
during C 0 2 market design and operation, developing nations see reductions in 
emissions by the big polluters (i.e. the developed world) as fairest, while developed 
nations favour equal reductions for all (Baron, 2006). The principle rationale given by 
the United States’ for not ratifying the Kyoto protocol was that India and China were 
not required to cut their C 0 2 emissions (Viscusi & Zeckhauser, 2006).
Finally, achieving agreement in conflicts and disputes relies upon consensus at two 
levels (Farber & Bazerman, 1987; Markovits, 2004). Firstly, an agreement must 
overcome the inherent ‘egoism’ of actors who seek to serve their self interest, 
weighing personal benefits resulting from coordination, against the costs to the 
group resulting from defection from the agreement. Overcoming egoism depends 
upon an actor being concerned for the interests of others. An example o f egoism 
during market operation is the problem faced during the allocation o f C 0 2 permits 
for phase I o f the European Emissions Trading Scheme. National governments 
allocated generous numbers of permits to their national industries and thus 
collectively contributed to the over allocation o f permits, leading to a price crash at 
the end o f phase I o f the European Emissions Trading Scheme. In this case, short­
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term nationalistic concerns overrode longer-term environmental concerns at the 
heart o f C 0 2 markets (Hopwood, 2009). The second hurdle is ‘egocentrism’, where 
actors often have different views upon what the common interest is. Egocentrism is 
a bias which is particularly rampant in situations o f uncertainty over causes or affects 
(Bazerman, 2006). Thus agreement must be based upon recognition o f the value of 
others’ perceptions o f the nature o f the common interest, as well as its importance 
relative to personal interests. Egocentrism can be observed in the development of 
the C 0 2 market o f the European Emissions Trading Scheme. During the allocation 
of C 0 2 permits to each country, some argued for allocations to be by emissions per 
capita, while others called for the metric to take into account per capita income 
(Bailey, 2010). These contrasting calls for allocations by ‘emissions per capita’ versus 
‘income per capita’ represented egocentrism, since actors could not agree upon a 
shared definition o f the common interest.
Bazerman emphasises that rather than caused by a desire to manipulate situations, 
cognitive biases are inherent in processes o f decision-making and become 
increasingly common in situations o f uncertainty.
2.5.4 Macro-level implica tions for research questions
The ultimate objective o f this study is to explore why C 0 2 markets have so far failed 
to have a significant influence upon businesses’ behaviour. This objective and the 
study’s research questions were introduced in chapter 1. Section 2.4.4 discussed the 
research questions relating to network-level aspects o f C 0 2 market design and 
operation. This section provides a more detailed discussion o f the study’s research 
questions which relate to macro-level aspects o f C 0 2 market design and operation.
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The research questions discussed below were developed by considering the concepts 
presented in sections 2.5.1 to 2.5.3. The three research questions (RQs) are listed 
below and then discussed.
RQ 5: How are technical considerations affecting C 0 2 market design and operation?
RQ 6: How are temporal considerations affecting C 0 2 market design and operation?
RQ 7: How are uncertainty-based considerations affecting C 0 2 market design and operation?
The literature review o f macro-level aspects of C 0 2 market design and operation did 
not identify a theory which could encompass all of the different concepts which were 
discussed. Instead, a conceptual framework for the study o f macro-level aspects of 
C 0 2 market design and operation was proposed, as illustrated in Figure 3 and 
discussed in sections 2.5.1 to 2.5.3. The links between the conceptual framework 
and the macro-level research questions are now discussed.
Firsdy, research question 5 aims to identify how technical considerations are 
affecting CO z market design and operation. Research question 5 is intended to focus 
attention upon the ‘technological’ aspects of C 0 2 market design and operation and 
‘public goods and resource limits’ which were discussed in section 2.5.1. Secondly, 
research question 6 aims to identify how temporal considerations are affecting C 0 2 
market design and operation. Research question 6 is intended to focus attention 
upon the ‘windows of opportunity’ and ‘lock ins’ which were discussed in section 
2.5.2. Finally, research question 7 aims to identify how uncertainty-based 
considerations are affecting C 0 2 market design and operation. Research question 7
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is intended to focus attention upon the ‘problem uncertainties’ and ‘cognitive biases’ 
which were discussed in section 2.5.3.
This section has provided a discussion o f the theoretical underpinnings for the 
research questions which relate to macro-level aspects o f C 0 2 market design and 
operation. The following section reviews the conceptual framework which was 
developed during this literature review.
2.6 A conceptual fitamework for the study o f COz markets
This chapter has developed a conceptual framework for the study o f C 0 2 market 
design and operation. The conceptual framework presents network-level and macro­
level aspects o f C 0 2 markets, which are now discussed.
Network-level aspects o f C 0 2 market design and operation were discussed in section 
2.4. Firstly, exchange practices relate to the economic exchanges taking place within 
the market and the supporting activities which surround them. Exchange practices 
are connected to representational and normalising practices through ‘interests’ and 
‘measurements’. Secondly, representational practices are those which aim to depict 
markets and how they work. Representational practices are connected to exchange 
and normalising practices through ‘results’ and ‘descriptions’. Finally, normalising 
practices are those which aim to introduce normative guidelines for how a market 
should work. Normalising practices are connected to exchange and representational 
practices through ‘rules and tools’ and ‘measures and methods o f measurement’.
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Macro-level aspects of C 0 2 market design and operation were then discussed in 
section 2.5. Firsdy, technical aspects of market design and operation were captured 
by ‘technological’ aspects and those due to ‘public goods and resource limits’. 
Technological aspects are immutable physical laws, or the limits of today’s 
knowledge and capabilities. Public goods and resource limits relate to environmental 
constraints upon markets. Secondly, temporal aspects of market design and 
operation are ‘windows of opportunity’ and ‘lock ins’. Windows o f opportunity are 
im portant aspects since the design and operation o f many markets will be subject to 
a window of opportunity, after which there is litde possibility to solve the problem, 
or meet the needs, which the market has been designed to tackle. The second 
temporal aspect relates to decisions which have long-term impacts due to the lock ins 
which they create. Lock ins are decisions which have an extended and irreversible 
impact. Finally, uncertainty based aspects o f market design and operation are 
‘problem uncertainty’ and ‘cognitive biases’. Problem uncertainty is an important 
aspect o f market design and operation since it introduces uncertainty regarding the 
best or m ost expedient way to cope with the problem that the market is designed to 
tackle. Cognitive biases are frailties embedded in the human learning and decision 
m a k i n g  process which distort our views of the world and are often subconscious.
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This conceptual framework is used later to analyse the market and macro-level 
aspects o f  C 0 2 market design and operation which were described in the six 
empirical case studies.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter started by examining the nature of markets, providing the foundation 
for a discussion o f market design and operation. Next, a theoretical basis was 
provided for the examination o f C 0 2 markets. The remainder o f the chapter then 
examined network-level and macro-level aspects of market design and operation. 
The last section o f the chapter provided a conceptual framework for the study of 
market design and operation that will be used later to analyse the case studies. 
Chapter three now describes the development of the research methods that were 
applied during the research.
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3 METHODOLOGY
3.1 Introduction
This chapter opens with descriptions o f how axiological, epistemological and 
ontological stances were taken into account during the design and deployment of the 
research methods. The first section discusses the influence o f an axiological stance 
which is driven by a desire to understand the environmental challenges faced by 
businesses. The next two sections give a treatment of a critical realist epistemology 
and how it fits with an ontological stance that prioritises a network-level viewT of the 
world. The second half o f this chapter details the reasons for selecting a case study 
research method and explains how data were collected, reported and analysed. The 
chapter closes by explaining how ethical issues were managed during the research.
3.2 Axiology
The researcher is a British male in his late twenties; he grew up in a rural village of 
around 2,000 people. During his childhood he spent a lot o f time outdoors and 
developed a strong connection with the natural world that is still im portant to him 
today. At school he studied physical sciences and mathematics, leading him to read 
mechanical engineering at university. Linking back to his interest in the 
environment, he chose to focus his studies upon the development of renewable 
power. His final year dissertation was on wind and biomass power; assessing the 
United Kingdom’s target of producing 10% of electricity from renewables by 2010. 
At the time, the researcher concluded that the renewables target was not on track. In 
fact, the latest figures show that in 2008 only 5.5% of the United Kingdom’s 
electricity came from renewable sources (DECC, 2009b). This was the researcher’s
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first experience o f the challenges associated with developing regulation to incentivise 
the business response to environmental challenges.
While at university, the researcher worked for a manufacturing company, completing 
a number o f summer placements. These placements were in an engineering 
environment, developing energy efficiency projects on the shop floor. These 
projects demonstrated that the business and management elements o f the projects 
were more challenging than their technical aspects. This led the researcher to change 
the focus o f his studies. He completed his bachelor’s degree in Mechanical 
Engineering. However, he chose to study an MSc in management instead of 
continuing his engineering studies to Master’s level. The MSc in Management 
represented an intellectual wrangle for the researcher, challenging many of his 
positivistic assumptions about problem solving and the nature o f the world. While 
studying management, he continued to work on issues related to the environment, 
making his dissertation on the development of the 5 year strategy of a leading 
sustainable energy consultancy. Later he went on to work for this company and then 
a second sustainable energy consultancy in the same field. Following employment at 
these two consultancies, he worked for a major energy company in their 
headquarters, where he helped to develop projects for their renewables division and 
Climate Change policies for the core operations of their business. During the last 2 
years of his PhD research, the researcher returned to the consultancy environment, 
supporting companies in their responses to the development o f CO z markets.
Although there is an established and accepted technical potential for managing C 0 2 
emissions to a sustainable level, the researcher has repeatedly observed that the
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business world is falling to tackle Climate Change on any meaningful scale. A point 
o f particular interest is the development of a number o f C 0 2 markets, because C 0 2 
markets have gained some traction in the business world. Thus the researcher chose 
to examine the design and operation o f C 0 2 markets.
The researcher’s values are underpinned by a belief that environmental protection 
represents an im portant challenge for society. His research is driven by a desire to 
understand these environmental challenges. During his training in mechanical 
engineering, he originally developed positivistic beliefs about the potential types of 
solution to environmental challenges. However, the experiences described in the 
previous paragraph have led him to relax his positivistic views o f the world and 
instead his research approach is now consistent with a critical realist epistemology. 
Epistemological issues are discussed in the following section.
3.3 Epistemology: Critical realism
Epistemological stances relate to “assumptions about how we can come to know the world” 
(Easton, 2002: 108). Historically, positivism has dominated marketing research, with 
claims that theory must be based upon “a classified and systemised body of knowledge... 
organised around one or more central theories and a number of general principles... usually expressed 
in quantitative terms... [and consisting of] knowledge which permits the prediction and, under some 
circumstances, the control of events. ” (Buzzell, 1963: 33). This view o f theory stems from 
approaches originally taken in physical sciences. While certain elements of markets 
obey positivistic rules, positivism struggles to deal with the human aspects of social 
sciences. Marketing researchers have attempted to capture social elements of 
markets through the epistemological stances of relativism and realism. Relativism,
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sometimes referred to as constructivism, stresses that “no meaningful interpretation of 
[the] world can be made that does not involve some form of human processing” (Peter, 1992: 74). 
Relativism therefore stresses that even if there is an external reality, it will be 
impossible to do anything other than construct an interpretation o f it through theory 
(Muncy & Fisk, 1987). Realism differs from the relativist perspective, in that it 
advocates attempts to develop knowledge of an external reality, while acknowledging 
that our knowledge will always be fallible and open to challenge and revision (Hunt, 
1990). The rest o f this section provides a discussion o f the epistemological stance of 
critical realism, which guided the selection of research methods.
Critical realism is a theory o f knowledge that stresses the ‘embeddedness’ o f actions 
within a stratified social reality (Hedstrom & Swedberg, 1998; Pawson & Tilley, 
1997). Eight ‘signposts’ have been developed to summarise the key aspects o f a 
critical realist mode o f enquiry, these signposts are discussed below (Sayer, 1992). 
Critical Realism acknowledges that reality is not entirely socially constructed and that 
the world exists independently o f our knowledge o f it. It follows that knowledge of 
this independent reality is fallible and theory laden. As we develop knowledge, it will 
progress incrementally, upon the existing theory base. However the development of 
knowledge will also be subject to discontinuous developments and /o r  revisions. 
Critical realism recognises that the world is differentiated and stratified and that 
events or regularities are underpinned by a specific context and set o f objects which 
are both physically and socially constituted. The social aspects o f objects are concept 
dependent and as such, we must seek to understand their meaning in order to explain 
their affects. Finally, critical realism acknowledges that research is a social process 
and that the design of this process will influence the knowledge obtained. It is
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acknowledged that it is impossible to be a passive observer. It follows that, in order 
to explain and understand social phenomena, it is necessary to evaluate them 
critically (Sayer, 1992).
These insights from critical realism guide researchers in social science to explore the 
mechanisms acting and the contexts in which they sit, seeking generative 
explanations o f causation, as illustrated below (Easton, 2010; Sayer, 1992).
Figure 5: Summary of critical realist causal explanation
(Easton, 2010; Sayer, 1992)
ENTITIES...
Constituted of: ...which activate...
• Structures . . .  MECHANISM(s)...
Linked by up to
two types of relation: ...leading t o ...
• N ecessary






A critical realist epistemology emphasises the importance o f generative modes of 
causation and also the critical role of the researcher in attempting to understand the 
external world. The following explanation o f causation draws upon Easton’s review 
of critical realism in case study research (Easton, 2010). The first building block of a 
causal explanation is to describe the relevant entities. Entities will be made up of 
multi-layered structures, the representation o f which will influence the findings of the 
research. Furthermore, these levels of structure are not simply additive, their 
combination leads to the ‘emergence’ of new aggregate characteristics which are 
greater than the sum of their parts. For a set of entities to be coherent, they must be
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linked by necessary relations. For example a ‘seller’ cannot exist without a ‘buyer’. 
Full description o f the entities is likely to also draw upon their contingent relations. 
For example, the ‘buyer’ and ‘seller’ may use the same electronic data interface 
system. This contingent relationship would help explain the exchange between 
‘buyer’ and ‘seller’, but is not a necessary relation for definition o f the two entities. 
Finally, each entity will be subject to powers and liabilities. For example, amongst 
other things, the seller has the power to set the asking price o f their goods and is 
subject to the liabilities o f being undercut in price, or running out o f stock. The 
combination o f these entities can trigger certain mechanisms, leading to effects /  
events.
The critical realist mode o f explanation is in contrast with the positivistic approach of 
seeking to identify regularities and taking their identification to be the objective of 
research (Easton, 2000, 2010; Sayer, 1992). Positivists concentrate upon the 
empirical domain, while critical realists would recommend we try to probe back 
through another two domains in Bhaskar’s model (Bhaskar, 1978).
Table 3: The domains of the ‘real’, ‘actual* and ‘empirical*









Experiences X X x
In stepping from the domain o f the ‘empirical’ to that o f the ‘actual’, the researcher 
must acknowledge that his /  her experience of the event is shaped by his /  her
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interpretation, giving an experience that is unique to him /  her and the context he /  
she sits within. The second leap, from the ‘actual5 to the ‘real5, requires recognition 
that events are a product o f mechanisms that may or may not combine to produce 
the event observed.
It could be said that positivists are ‘correlationists5, striving to create a black box 
model o f regularities; while relativists could be seen as ‘scholars o f meaning5 and 
critical realists could be seen as ‘explanationists5. In this way, critical realism does not 
reject the existence of an external reality, but primarily seeks to explain, rather than 
quantify it. Furthermore, critical realist explanations do not reject the importance of 
meaning; meaning can be part of the generative modes o f causation which are 
sought. As such, critical realism is best suited to the research objective to describe 
and explain market design and operation. The following sections discuss the 
suitability o f critical realism to a network-level ontology and a case study research 
method.
3.4 Ontology: Network approach
Ontological concerns relate to “assumptions about how the world is” (Easton, 2002: 108). 
An ontological stance of a network approach is closely linked to the epistemology of 
critical realism which underpins the research. Critical realism emphasises both 
‘context5 and ‘mechanism5 in seeking to explain observations (Pawson & Tilley, 
1997). This is aligned with a view of the world as a network consisting of 
interconnected and interdependent elements. The term network is used as a 
metaphor to capture this connectivity. The network draws in the ‘context5 in which 
organisations need to respond to C 0 2 markets and as such it facilitates the
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development o f the generative forms o f explanation explored in the previous section 
(Easton & Araujo, 1994; Lazonick, 1991; Mouzas, 2006b).
Furthermore, the advantage o f a network ontology is that it emphasises the 
interconnectivity among actors, moving beyond analysis o f dyadic relationships and 
on to a higher aggregation level. The literature review provides a discussion of the 
network perspective of business marketing. This literature emphasises that research 
on markets should not take exchange as given. Instead exchange should be viewed 
as created within a network of interaction between organisations that are 
interdependent, embedded within time and subject to the constraints and 
opportunities imposed by their position within the industrial network (Easton & 
Hakansson, 1996; Ford et al., 2003; Ford & Mouzas, 2008; Hakansson, 1982; IMP, 
2010; Turnbull & Valla, 1986). The literature review explores a theory o f markets 
that extends the network perspective by emphasising market practices as constituting 
the reality o f business markets and marketing (Araujo, 2007; Araujo et al., 2008; 
Kjellberg & Helgesson, 2006, 2007b, 2007a). This view presents markets as 
networks o f actors engaged in empirical practices o f exchanges, descriptions o f the 
market and attempts to regulate it (Kjellberg & Helgesson, 2006, 2007b, 2007a).
Assuming that the world is a network o f interconnected organisations led to the 
development o f cases which emphasised empirical observation. Each case aimed to 
describe interaction between different actors, taking account of interdependencies, 
time and the rules o f the game which conditioned exchanges (Mouzas & Ford, 2009). 
This empirical focus encouraged by a network-level ontology was well suited to the 
development o f rich case studies and to the inclusion of wider context which was
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important to critical realist explanations. Accordingly, the study o f COz market 
design and operation was an exercise in examining inter-organisational dynamics and 
the affect o f contextual aspects that were both social and resulting from the natural 
world. In summary, the ontological stance adopted guided the researcher to seek 
explanations which were situated outside or between, rather than within, 
organisations.
Having examined epistemological issues, the discussion now switches to the 
justification o f the selection o f a case study research method.
3.5 Research method: Case study research
3.5.1 Research method selection
This section starts by providing a justification for the use o f a case study research 
method. Next follows a detailed description of the rationale for the data collection 
methods. The third section explains how the cases were selected and reported. 
Finally, the chapter closes with a discussion of how the cases were analysed.
Selection o f the research method required consideration o f the research objectives 
and questions, as well as the epistemological and ontological orientations behind the 
research. Firstly, in terms o f the type research questions posed, the objective was to 
describe and explain the design and operation o f C 0 2 markets. Secondly, the 
epistemological stance was that of a critical realist perspective. Finally, the research 
design coupled die epistemological stance of critical realism with a network ontology 
that drew in the wider network context and mechanisms which were important for 
critical realist modes o f inquiry.
C 0 2 Market Design and Operation
A case study research method was well suited to the research objectives and 
epistemological and ontological stances. Yin defines a case study as “an empirical 
enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomena and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2003: 13). This is 
aligned with Easton’s definition of case study research as “a research method that involves 
investigating one or a small number of social entities or situations about which data are collected 
using multiple sources [to] develop a holistic description through an iterative research process” 
(Easton, 2010: 2). These definitions highlight that the case study research method 
seeks valid explanatory knowledge suitable for the generative forms o f explanation 
required by critical realism (Easton & Araujo, 1997; Easton, 2000; Remenyi et al., 
2002; Tsoukas, 1989; Yin, 2003). Furthermore, case studies draw in the wider 
context that is important in developing critical realist types o f explanation (Halinen & 
Tomroos, 2005; Knox-Hayes, 2009; Perry, 1998). The research design also had to 
acknowledge that the researcher had little control within the empirical domain of the 
C 0 2 markets. This was due to the researcher’s position, his influence relative to the 
scale o f the efforts underway and the high number o f degrees of freedom in the 
situation. Furthermore, ethical considerations dictated that while data were collected 
through participant observation, the researcher was only to fulfil the role of his 
employment and not to manipulate the situation for the purpose o f his research. As 
such, the case study methodology suited the ambition to describe and explain 
empirical examples o f the design and operation of C 0 2 markets. The researcher did 
not require, or have, the same type of controlled environment that would be suitable 
for positivistic natural experiments which are typically more linear and less context 
dependent. Finally, the contemporary nature of the research made it suited to the
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case study methodology. Easton (2000) gives the example that a case study can be 
preferable to a history, since a case study’s contemporary nature allows for further 
data to be collected as explanations evolve.
Having introduced the case study research method and justified its selection, the 
methods o f  data collection employed are now discussed.
3.5.2 Data collection
Use o f a case study m ethod does not predetermine the methods o f data collection to 
be used. This section explains the choice o f data collection methods and outlines 
how data were collected through participant observation supplemented by access to 
other sources o f data.
Participant observation involves the researcher in “gathering] data by participating in the 
daily life of the group or organisation he [ / she] studies” (Becker, 1958: 652). The use of 
participant observation fits with the objective of describing and explaining empirical 
examples o f the design and operation o f C 0 2 markets. Participant observation is 
most commonly used when attempting to build understanding o f an organisation or 
problem, rather than to investigate positivistic types of relationships between 
variables. Participant observation tends to generate large quantities o f detailed 
description and is well suited to being reported through the development of case 
studies. However, participant observation has been interpreted in different ways by a 
number o f different researchers. Becker’s definition above is informed by a relatively 
positivistic view  o f participant observation that views it more as a full blown research 
method, rather than as a means of data collection. Becker advocates four steps to a
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participant observation research project. These start with the selection and definition 
o f problems, concepts and indices. Next, the frequency and distribution of 
phenomena is tabulated. Following this tabulation, social system models are 
constructed. Finally, the results are analysed and presented. These 
recommendations suggest a positivistic epistemology is behind Becker’s approach to 
participant observation, which is further suggested through his call for the use of 
‘quasi-statistical’ support for findings, reaching conclusions that are ‘essentially 
quantitative’.
The use o f participant observation in this research is better aligned with treatment of 
participant observation as a mediod o f data collection (Vinten, 1994; Yin, 2003). 
This definition o f participant observation sees the researcher in “a special mode of 
observation [which involves] assuming] a variety of roles within a case study situation and may 
actually [involve] participation] in the events being studied. (Yin, 2003: 93) ”. Furthermore, 
the use o f participant observation by this research can be classified as ‘participant as 
observer’ in a continuum through from ‘complete participant’, ‘participant as 
observer’, ‘observer as participant’ to ‘complete observer’ (Belk, 1990; Gold, 1958). 
This specific type o f participant observation involves complete submersion o f the 
researcher in the role they are undertaking. This mode o f participant observation 
also reveals the researcher’s function as a researcher to their peers in the participant 
role. This avoids some o f the ethical challenges associated with the complete 
observer role, where research is carried out coverdy. Acting in the ‘participant as 
observer’ role also buys some affordances for the researcher, in that they can 
dedicate effort to their research without jeopardising relationships. The ‘observer as 
participant’ and ‘complete participant’ modes of participant observation give the
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opportunity to make more structured observations and to avoid the need for such 
committing participation in terms of time and the development o f required expertise. 
However, since the participant observation role formed the researcher’s formal 
employment, it was not necessary to minimise commitments in terms o f dedicating 
time or developing expertise. The ‘participant as observer’ role also gave access to 
data that would have been difficult to access in other ways (Azimont & Araujo, 
2010). The research subjects were very busy. While the researcher was paid to help 
them in their responses to C 0 2 markets, they had time to meet him frequently and 
had significant incentives to engage him and share meaningful insider data. The 
relationship was as beneficial for them as it was for the researcher. However, had the 
researcher focussed upon being purely an observer, he would have been granted only 
a limited number o f arm’s length interviews and would not have been invited to 
audits by the regulator, or been privy to the sensitive insider information which was 
shared routinely as part o f his employment.
Participant observation was one of three potential modes o f data collection which 
were considered. The second option for data collection was to interview 
representatives from companies active in C 0 2 markets, rather than actually 
participate in the design and operation of these markets. This option was ruled out 
for a number o f reasons. The primary consideration was that such a request would 
result in interviews being granted with the communications team within 
organisations. Because o f the need to assess the credibility o f participants, the option 
o f interviewing communication team members was a problem. Assessments of 
credibility can be made in a number of ways (Becker, 1958). Firstly, by considering 
whether the participant in question had reasons to lie or conceal certain data.
CO, Market Design and Operation
Secondly, it was necessary to consider whether vanity or convenience led the 
participant to distort presentations of their role in the events being studied. Finally, 
it was also important to ask whether the participant was actually party to the actual 
events being studied. These considerations flagged first that communications teams 
had an interest in presenting a favourable impression o f the business which they 
represented. The second concern was that the communications teams were not 
actually party to the events being studied. Hence participant observation was seen as 
being more attractive than interviewing the communications teams from businesses.
The third option for data collection was to perform an analysis o f publicly available 
data. One such source of data are the reports of the Carbon Disclosure Project 
(Carbon Disclosure Project, 2009). The Carbon Disclosure Project collects and 
publishes C 0 2 emissions data from the top 500 global businesses. Research has 
previously used the Carbon Disclosure Project to study C 0 2 markets, see for 
example the work o f Kolk, Levy and Pinkse (2008). However, given that the 
researcher already had direct access to allow participant observation, it was decided 
that participant observation as a fully fledged member o f the group would give the 
richest data (Becker, 1958; Palsson, 2007; Vidich & Shapiro, 1955). Sources such as 
the Carbon Disclosure Project would be used to supplement, rather than replace, 
data from participant observation.
In further justifying the selection of participant observation as the primary method of 
data collection, it is useful to acknowledge that participant observation is most 
appropriate in situations which meet four conditions (Jorgensen, 1989). Firstly, the 
research concerned human meanings and interactions, as viewed from the insider’s
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perspective. Secondly, the phenomenon of market design and operation was 
observable within the everyday setting of the researcher’s employment. Thirdly, the 
research settings were sufficiently bounded in time and space to allow the generation 
o f a coherent case study. Finally, as discussed earlier in this chapter, the research 
objective and questions were appropriate for investigation using a case study method.
Within the participant observation role, it is essential to consider whether 
volunteered or directed statements are most suitable for the research being 
undertaken (Becker, 1958). Volunteered statements made directly in the ‘public’ 
research setting are likely to be more accurate in situations where the participant is 
freely expressing themselves and isn’t party to significant controls such as group 
norms, confidentiality concerns or personal promotion within a group. However, 
directed statements, those made in response to questioning, can be more useful 
where the types o f responses given would be less likely to be made in public or 
undirected settings. With regards to the specific setting o f research on C 0 2 market 
design and operation, the researcher was part o f the team which aimed to generate 
the business response to C 0 2 markets. The researcher held longstanding
professional relationships with the research participants. Furthermore, all work was 
bounded by confidentiality agreements and there was the time available to undertake 
extensive periods o f participant observation. All o f these considerations meant that 
volunteered public statements within the teams were most likely to be transparent. 
The primary concern for the participants was that we prepare their response to the 
C 0 2 markets. The research was not kept secret, but was not discussed on a day to 
day basis.
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Another consideration was that in order to undertake successful participant 
observation, the researcher must be able to speak the language o f the group which 
they are researching (Vinten, 1994). The researcher has a degree in Mechanical 
Engineering, having specialised in renewable energy. He has also studied an MSc in 
Management, where he made placements with the director o f a leading sustainable 
energy consultancy. The two languages which were relevant to the research setting 
were what could be called cMBA-speak’ and a mix o f ‘Engineer-Environmentalist 
speak’. For example, the researcher was able to discuss the potential fungibility of 
RG GI credits with EUAs post Kyoto; or the need to ensure additionality during the 
assessment of the potential NPV of a CER offset project within the CDM. The 
understanding o f the difference between energy and power, the conversion o f energy 
consumption into C 0 2 equivalent and the ability to understand the technical aspects 
o f C 0 2 markets was also important. The researcher’s academic training and 
professional experience allowed him to converse with different stakeholders in terms 
with which they were familiar and which reinforced his ‘insider status’. This helped 
him to build trust and to foster the open exchange of data and experiences.
Another consideration is that there is a risk that the presence o f the researcher during 
participant observation may change the phenomenon which they are studying 
(Vinten, 1994). This risk was minimised, since the researcher’s role was one that was 
common within business and therefore did not create a new role that would distort 
the situation. The researcher also refrained from manipulating events in order to 
further his research agenda. Finally, although the research was not covert, it was not 
discussed on a day to day basis. These considerations helped to minimise the impact 
of the research upon the research setting.
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Finally, data collection did not rely solely upon participant observation. Additional 
alternative sources o f data were used to support the development o f the cases. Yin 
(2003) sees participant observation as being one of six sources o f evidence for data 
collection. The other five being documentation, archival records, interviews, direct 
observation and physical artefacts. Examples of the types o f supplementary data 
accessed are given in Table 4. Appendix four also gives an example o f the exact 
types o f data accessed, by listing the data accessed during the development o f case 
study six.
The participant observation role enabled access to a wide range o f documentation. 
Much o f this documentation was available publicly, but not widely accessed. For 
example, the Environment Agency’s consultation documentation for the launch of 
the Carbon Reduction Commitment was available publicly. However, without being 
directly involved in the consultation process, the documentation would have been 
very difficult to access, since it was not widely circulated or reported on outside of 
the industry. The development of the case studies drew upon 180 reports, the 
majority being regulatory guidance specifying the details behind the design o f each 
C 0 2 market. The research also made use of a number o f sources o f documentation 
that were not publicly available. Emails, proposals, strategy documents, audit reports 
and trading statements all informed die development of the case studies. These were 
accessed through the participant observation role and held in case study libraries. 
Furthermore, a large amount of email documentation was drawn upon during the 
development o f the case studies. The participant observation roles lasted from 
October 2006 until June 2010. Over this three and a half year period, the researcher 
sent and received around 5,000 emails in total.
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Table 4: Types of data sources used to supplement participant observation
NB: Table format based upon the six sources of data proposed by Yin (2003)
DATA SOURCE EXAMPLE NUMBER
1. Documentation -  Regulatory guidance. 180 reports




— Proposals and strategy documents. 15 proposals 12 strategy documents
— Audit reports and trading statements. 8 audit reports 50 trading statements
-  Government and industry training 
events and mailing lists.
10 training events 
140 emails from 3 
mailing lists
2. Archival records -  European Emissions Trading Scheme 
compliance records.
Archived records back 
to scheme’s start in 2005
3. Interviews — Semi-structured interviews building 
specific aspects of cases not accessed 
through participant observation.
15, primarily during 
development of case 2
— Semi-structured interviews to review 
any confidentiality or accuracy issues in 
case study drafts.
18, across all cases
4. Direct 
observation
— Not applicable. All observation was 




observation — Employment by CO2 market 
participants.
Employment by 5 CO2 
market participants. 
Oct 2006 to Jun 2010, 
see Table 5 for details.
6. Physical 
artefacts -  Online regulatory compliance accounts.
2 EU ETS accounts 
2 CRC accounts
— Business intranet based CO2
management and reporting systems.
3 proprietary systems 
2 in-house systems
-  Spreadsheet CO2 calculation tools. 15 excel based sheets
Certain regulatory communications were sent out as letters, such as the
announcement o f the commencement of the Carbon Reduction Commitment. 15
such letters were drawn upon during the development o f the case studies. 15 
proposals by C 0 2 market service providers and 12 strategy documents were also
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accessed through the participant observation role. Furthermore, 10 industry or 
government training events were attended and 3 email lists provided 140 email 
updates during the development o f the case studies.
Archival records were o f less importance to the case studies, because o f the 
contemporary nature o f the research subject. The only C 0 2 market that had any 
significant trading history at the start of the research was the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme. For this C 0 2 market, access was granted to archival records o f the 
case participants, giving historical data on compliance and trading back to the start o f 
phase I o f the European Emissions Trading Scheme in January 2005.
Although not the primary mode of data collection, semi-structured interviews were 
used in two ways. Firstly, data were collected in 15 instances through semi­
structured interviews where the participant observer role didn’t allow access to the 
data of interest. One example o f such an occasion was when the researcher wished 
to make a prolonged visit to Manufacturer Alpha’s production site during his 
development o f case study two. In this instance he set up a number of semi­
structured interviews with the relevant site staff and visited the site for a number of 
days. Secondly, 18 semi-structured interviews were used to check the case studies in 
two ways. The researcher gave each case study to staff in the case organisation to be 
checked for accuracy and for any breaches o f confidentiality. This review of each 
case study was carried out through a semi-structured interview. Where necessary, the 
case studies were revised in light of the feedback received.
The methods o f participant observation which were employed have been already 
been discussed at length. Data were collected between October 2006 and June 2010
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through employment by five C 0 2 market participants. Specifically, data were 
collected and recorded using a research diary to log observations and insights while 
undertaking the participant observation role. At certain times the researcher also 
used his company email to record observations. This was because the standard mode 
o f working in the office was at a laptop, meaning that taking research notes 
electronically was less intrusive than writing a hard copy diary. As an example, 
appendix four gives details of the interactions which took place the during 
participant observation which developed study six. Case study six dealt with a 
manufacturer’s response to the first phase of the Carbon Reduction Commitment. 
During the data collection the researcher managed a Carbon Reduction Commitment 
steering team within Manufacturer Beta. This steering team met seven times 
between January 2009 and June 2010. The steering team consisted o f the Head of 
Environment in the Corporate Sustainability team, Heads o f Sustainable 
Development at the business unit level, a member of the Corporate Legal Team, the 
UK Company Secretariat, the manager of the UK real estate database, the UK’s 
central Energy Procurement Manager, a trading specialist from the Corporate 
Treasury team and finally, the Carbon Consultancy Project Director and Data 
Analyst. A further 39 separate meetings were held outside o f the 7 steering team 
meetings. Many o f these meetings involved one or more member o f the steering 
team; however they also included an associate in the Corporate Sustainability team, 
an associate within the Corporate Legal team, the Head of Property within the 
Corporate Legal team, the Group Property Director, the U K  Finance Director and 
the UK Managing Director. Furthermore, weekly project meetings were held with 
the Carbon Consultancy Project Director and Data Analyst. External to
Manufacturer Beta, the researcher also met with the bureau provider (bill checking
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service) key account manager six times and attended an Environment Agency 
training session and two industry training sessions. Further details of all participant 
observation roles are given in Table 5 in the next section.
Physical artefacts were the final sources of data flagged by Yin (2003). A number of 
internal and external C 0 2 reporting systems were accessed during the development 
o f the case studies. These systems had to be updated in light o f developments in the 
design and operation o f C 0 2 markets. The development o f these systems was one of 
the major streams o f business effort in response to the C 0 2 markets, as discussed in 
cases four and five. Through the participant observer role, the researcher was 
involved in the development and use of these systems. Firstly, the researcher had 
direct access to a number of regulatory compliance accounts. These were two 
European Emissions Trading Scheme accounts and two Carbon Reduction 
Commitment Accounts. Secondly, access was granted to business intranet based 
C 0 2 management and reporting systems. Three of these were proprietary software 
systems that were either considered or actually subscribed to, two further systems 
were extensions of internal Health, Safety and Environment reporting systems. 
Finally, 15 spreadsheet based C 0 2 calculation and reporting tools were accessed 
during participant roles. For example, during the development o f case study six, a 
site survey questionnaire was used to ascertain how many sites were covered by the 
Carbon Reduction Commitment and what energy supplies were present at each site. 
A template for collecting half hourly meter data was used to collect registration data. 
These two sources o f data were then combined into a Carbon Reduction 
Commitment registration template. Where these systems had different types of user 
account, the researcher was granted administrator level access rights.
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This section has explained the choice of data collection methods and outlined how 
data were collected through participant observation supplemented by access to other 
sources o f data. The next section discusses how data were reported.
3.5.3 Data reporting
This section starts by reviewing the justifications for the selection o f a case study 
research method as a means o f capturing and reporting the empirical data. Then a 
justification o f the selection o f an empirical domain o f the design and operation of 
C 0 2 markets is given. Next the content of each o f the six cases is summarised and 
an explanation of how and why each was selected is given. Finally, the steps taken 
during the drafting and reporting of the cases are described and justified.
A case study research method is well suited to the research objectives of describing 
and explaining empirical examples of the design and operation o f C 0 2 markets. This 
is because the case study research method fits with the epistemological stance of 
critical realism by providing rich descriptions which can support the development of 
generative explanations of causality which are important for critical realist modes of 
inquiry. Furthermore, case studies fit with the network ontology since they include 
the wider network context that influences business decisions. A full justification for 
the selection o f a case study research method is given in section 3.5.1. Following the 
selection o f a case study research method, it was important to choose an empirical 
domain for the research that would be suitable for the study o f market design and 
operation. This selection o f the empirical domain o f the research was the first step 
in choosing the case studies. The choice o f empirical domain was guided by the 
insight that research on market design and operation is best undertaken through
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examinations o f markets in the making. This is because such contemporary 
investigations can expose mundane aspects of markets as they are formed which will 
later sit ‘below the radar’ in established markets (Kjellberg & Helgesson, 2007b; 
Latour, 1987). C 0 2 markets represent one example of such efforts. N one of the 
developments covered in the six case studies are more than 5 years old and a number 
o f them are yet to take place, so they represent contemporary efforts in market 
design and operation. Callon supports the argument that C 0 2 markets give a good 
empirical setting for the study o f market design and operation: “Carbon markets are an 
exceptional field for furthering our understanding of the ... forms of ... economic, political and 
scientific activities [that constitute the market], their mutual relations and the challenges they are 
designed to meet” (Callon, 2009: 546). The remainder o f this section is dedicated to a 
summary o f the content of the six case studies and an explanation o f how and why 
they were selected.
Having selected a case study research method and an empirical setting for the 
research, the next challenge was to decide how many cases to use and whether to 
focus upon a single unit of analysis or to use an embedded design. As discussed 
previously, the objective was to make an empirical study o f C 0 2 market design and 
operation. The case studies cover contemporary global, regional and national C 0 2 
markets. All of these markets were either in their first trial period or close to being 
launched. These C 0 2 markets were: the Global Kyoto Protocol, the Regional 
European Emissions Trading Scheme and the United Kingdom’s Carbon Reduction 
Commitment. Two important contextual developments were also examined, due to 
their influence upon these C 0 2 markets. These were firstly, the United Kingdom’s 
energy tax relief regime, the Climate Change Agreements. Climate Change
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Agreements offer a discount on the United Kingdom’s Climate Change Levy. 
Secondly, details are also given on the quasi C 0 2 market practices involved in C 0 2 
offsetting. These considerations gave a multiple case design with six cases; each 
linked by the overall context o f the design and operation o f C 0 2 markets. Each case 
is summarised in Table 5 and introduced in more detail later on in this section.
The next section examines the scope of the research with regards to C 0 2 markets. 
The research gives six case studies describing business responses during the design 
and operation o f the global Kyoto Protocol, the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme and the United Kingdom’s Carbon Reduction Commitment. Collectively, 
these represented over 98% of the 2009 C 0 2 market by value (Kossoy & Ambrosi, 
2010). In terms o f temporal scope, the research started in October 2006 and 
continued until June 2010. Furthermore, through the participant observer role the 
researcher was granted access to case data back to 2005. These timeframes fitted 
with the timeframe o f the European Emissions Trading Scheme which ran a practice 
phase (phase I) from 2005 to 2007. The European Emissions Trading Scheme then 
entered the first compliance period, which runs from 2008 through to 2012 (phase 
II). Phase II o f the European Emissions Trading Scheme mirrors the Kyoto 
Protocol’s commitment period and is the European Union’s mechanism for 
delivering the Kyoto Protocol’s C 0 2 reduction targets. The Kyoto protocol is yet to 
be extended beyond the end of 2012, but the European Union has already setup 
phase III of the European Emissions Trading Scheme to run for 5 more years, until 
the end of 2018. The final C 0 2 market which was examined was the United 
Kingdom’s Carbon Reduction Commitment. This C 0 2 market was launched in 
April 2010, following a consultation period which closed in October 2009. The
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Carbon Reduction Commitment targets the next tier down o f energy users, 
commercial companies which are not covered by the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme which is more industrial in its focus. Thus the research covers the important 
temporal scope o f the past, present and future phases of C 0 2 markets.
The links between each o f the three C 0 2 markets examined is now illustrated, leading 
into an explanation o f the order o f presentation o f the case studies. Figure 6 
illustrates the links between the different C 0 2 markets and Table 5 summarises the 
content o f each case study.
Figure 6: Links between C02 markets and cases
European Emissions 
Trading Schem e developed  
to manage European 
obligations underthe Kyoto 
Protocol.
Carbon Reduction 
Commitment developed to 
bring commercial energy 
users outside of the 
industrial sco p e  of the 
European Emissions 












(case studies 2 & 3)
C02 MARKET 1: 
The Kyoto Protocol
(case study 1)
The first C 0 2 market examined was the Kyoto Protocol which is international in 
scope. The link between the Kyoto Protocol and the European Emissions Trading
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Scheme is that the Kyoto Protocol has been ratified by the European Union. Phase 
II o f the European Emissions Trading Scheme was developed to match the 
compliance timeframe o f the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol is set to expire in 
2012 and case study one gives a treatment o f attempts to extend the Kyoto Protocol 
into a second phase. Case study one also provides important context for the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme. Case study two details Manufacturer Alpha’s 
response to phase II o f the European Emissions Trading Scheme. Case study three 
gives an energy supplier’s response to the proposed inclusion o f aviation in phase III 
o f the European Emissions Trading Scheme. Case studies two and three give 
important contextual information for cases four, five and six which examine the 
United Kingdom’s Carbon Reduction Commitment. The Carbon Reduction 
Commitment extends the coverage of C 0 2 markets within United Kingdom beyond 
the industrial facilities targeted by the European Emissions Trading Scheme and into 
commercial organisations which represent the next tier down o f energy users.
The purpose o f the case studies is to support an analysis o f C 0 2 market design and 
operation. Each case study is an empirical description o f efforts during the design 
and operation o f a C 0 2 market. The contents o f each case study are summarised in 
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Case study one examined efforts to extend the global C 0 2 market of the Kyoto 
Protocol beyond its current end in 2012. Data were collected between October 2006 
and December 2008 through participant observation as a policy analyst. This work 
was first carried out at a leading sustainable energy consultancy in the United 
Kingdom. Data collection continued through participant observation as an Energy 
Efficiency and Climate Change Analyst at a large multinational energy company. 
This case study described the processes whereby changes to the Kyoto Protocol were 
made through structured annual negotiations. These were called the 'Conference of 
the Parties’ (COP) negotiations. The case describes the results of three of these 
negotiations: COP 12 which was held in Nairobi in December 2006, COP 13 which 
was held in Bali in December 2007 and COP 14 which was held in Poznan in 
December 2008. Data access was granted through participant observation of 
business efforts to track anticipated developments in the Kyoto Protocol. The case 
describes the stances o f International Governance Bodies, Governments, Businesses 
and Non-Governmental Organisations with regards to the extension o f the Kyoto 
Protocol. The case described the responses of international governance bodies such 
as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, The G8 group of 
countries and the European Union. The case also described national policy 
responses from Brazil, China, India and the United States. Businesses’ interactions 
with the extension of the Kyoto Protocol were examined through the responses of 
HSBC Bank, BASF and Tesco Pic. Finally, the case examined Non-Governmental 
Organisations’ stances through a Climate Change coalition called Stop Climate Chaos 
and an organisation called the World Business Council for Sustainable Development.
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The second case study described phase II of the C 0 2 market o f the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme. The link between cases one and two was that the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme could be viewed as a 'child’ o f the Kyoto 
Protocol. Phase II o f the European Emissions Trading Scheme was designed to 
deliver European obligations under the Kyoto Protocol’s commitment period of 
2008-2012. Data were collected between January and June 2009 through participant 
observation as a Carbon Consultant supporting Manufacturer Alpha. The case 
described the interactions o f Manufacturer Alpha during their participation in phase 
II o f the European Emissions Trading Scheme. These interactions included an audit 
from the Carbon Trust that was designed to flag C 0 2 reduction opportunities. The 
case study also drew upon interactions with independent verifiers, the Department of 
Energy and Climate Change and the Environment Agency. These concerned 
management o f Manufacturer Alpha’s participation in the United Kingdom’s Climate 
Change Agreements and the European Emissions Trading Scheme. Finally, the case 
examined the influence o f Manufacturer Alpha’s capital appraisal process and 
operational key performance indicators upon engagement with the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme.
Case study three described efforts to extend the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme to cover the aviation industry in its third phase which was due to start in 
2013. The case study details the response of a large multinational energy company, 
NRG, to these changes in the European Emissions Trading Scheme. Data were 
collected through participant observation as an Energy Efficiency and Climate 
Change analyst at NRG. The temporal scope o f the case study was from April to 
December 2008. The case study described the interactions between different parts
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of NRG  and a European Trade Association ‘EUTA’ that was active in a niche of the 
aviation industry. These interactions took place during the development o f an 
offering that bundled aviation fuel with C 0 2 permits equivalent to those which 
would be emitted during the burning o f the fuel. The case also described the 
influence o f N R G ’s relationships with regulators of other anticipated C 0 2 markets 
upon the extension o f the European Emissions Trading Scheme. Finally, consumers’ 
views o f C 0 2 offsetting were examined, since they significandy influenced the 
response o f N RG  to their inclusion within phase III o f the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme.
Case studies four, five and six described the launch o f another C 0 2 market, the 
United Kingdom’s Carbon Reduction Commitment. If  the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme is a ‘child’ o f the Kyoto Protocol, then the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment could be its ‘grandchild’. The Carbon Reduction Commitment targets 
the next tier down o f energy users. These represent commercial companies which 
are not covered by the European Emissions Trading Scheme which is more focussed 
upon industrial scale operations.
Case study four described a manufacturer’s and trade association’s responses to the 
launch o f the United Kingdom’s C 0 2 market, the Carbon Reduction Commitment. 
Data were collected between January and October 2009 through participant 
observation as a Carbon Consultant supporting Manufacturer Beta. Firstly, 
Manufacturer Beta’s submission to the Environment Agency’s consultation process 
was described. Secondly, die public response o f the Confederation of British 
Industry was also described. These responses were then compared witii the outcome
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of the consultation process and the final structure o f the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment was given.
Case study five described the new accounting and reporting obligations introduced 
by the Carbon Reduction Commitment. Data were collected between January 2009 
and June 2010 through participant observation as a Carbon Consultant hired by 
Retailer Gamma. Interactions involved Retailer Gamma and the Environment 
Agency, as well as Retailer Gamma’s Energy Suppliers and their Bureau Provider 
who checked the accuracy o f Retailer Gamma’s energy bills. Firstly, the case 
described the process o f registration with the Environment Agency for participation 
in the Carbon Reduction Commitment. Next the case described the implications of 
participation in the Environment Agency’s annual C 0 2 auction. Thirdly, the process 
o f preparing and submitting the Footprint and Annual Reports was described. 
Finally, the case examined the league table publication and the recycling payments 
generated by the Carbon Reduction Commitment.
Case study six detailed the response of Manufacturer Beta and its energy supply and 
reporting network to the launch o f the Carbon Reduction Commitment. Data were 
collected between January 2009 and June 2010 through participant observation as a 
Carbon Consultant hired by Manufacturer Beta. The case described the influence of 
the Carbon Reduction Commitment upon Manufacturer Beta’s relationships with 
their Energy Suppliers, bill checking service provider and their Carbon Consultant, 
who prepared their accounts for the different C 0 2 markets in which Manufacturer 
Beta participated. The case study ends with a description o f Manufacturer Beta’s
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final choice between die Carbon Reduction Commitment service offerings put to 
them by their Energy Suppliers, Bureau Provider and other third parties.
The drafting o f the cases is possibly one of the tougher challenges in case study 
research. Each case must be individually crafted to tell the empirical story, while still 
preserving commonality in certain aspects and structures to allow cross case 
comparisons to be made (Tsoukas, 1989; Yin, 2003). The cases are presented in an 
order which preserves the historical sequence of the design and operation of C 0 2 
markets. This helps to preserve the temporal narrative for analysis later on. 
Furthermore, the cases follow a somewhat standardised form, in that they each start 
by introducing the business network and then progress to introduce each 
organisation. Once the network has been described, the case episodes are discussed 
in detail. This discussion is kept rich and detailed in two ways. Firstly, contextual 
material describing the structure o f the C 0 2 markets is given in section 4.7, allowing 
each case to focus upon the network interactions taking place. Secondly, rich cases 
were developed by supplementing case narration with graphics, tables and figures to 
illustrate the phenomena being studied (Borghini et al., 2010). The final 
consideration was that cases were drafted and redrafted on an ongoing basis. This 
was because case studies are well suited to further development as explanations 
evolve and necessitate further data or elaboration o f certain aspects of the case 
(Easton, 2000). The cases were continuously presented and improved through 
presentation as competitive papers at the annual conferences of the Industrial and 
Marketing Purchasing Group in 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 (Veal & Mouzas, 2007, 
2008a; 2009, 2010a) as well as a 2008 IMP journal seminar (Veal & Mouzas, 2008b). 
Furthermore, reviewers’ comments during the development o f two papers containing
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the case studies gave useful feedback to improve the quality o f the cases. Cases one 
and three were published in the Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing and 
Industrial Marketing Management respectively (Veal & Mouzas, 2010b; Veal & 
Mouzas, 2011).
This section has reviewed the justifications for the selection o f a case study research 
method. It then justified the selection of the empirical domain o f the design and 
operation o f C 0 2 markets. Next, the content o f each o f the six cases was 
summarised and an explanation given of how and why each was selected. Finally, the 
steps taken during the drafting and reporting the cases were described and justified. 
The next section describes how the cases were analysed.
3.5.4 Data analysis
Data analysis involves the researcher making sense o f their empirical observations by 
confronting them with theory (Easton, 2000; Ragin & Becker, 1992; Yin, 2003). 
More specifically, data analysis is a process o f “examining, categorising, tabulating, testing 
or otherwise recombining evidence to draw empirically based conclusions” (Yin, 2003: 126). This 
section explains how data analysis was conducted during the present research.
The use of a conceptual framework allowed the researcher to adopt a theoretical 
orientation that guided data analysis efforts towards data which was theoretically 
relevant (McKinney, 1950; Ragin & Becker, 1992; Yin, 2003). The conceptual 
framework for the study o f C 0 2 market design and operation that was employed by 
this research is given in Figure 4 on page 73. The development o f the conceptual 
framework allowed the researcher to make a matrix of categories and place empirical
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evidence within the resulting array (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Emphasis was placed 
upon the explanatory power o f the conceptual framework, rather than upon 
traditional issues o f classification, such as categories being mutually exclusive, jointly 
exhaustive and at the same level of generality (Bowker & Star, 1999; Marradi, 1990; 
Nowotny, 1971). The primary objective in developing the conceptual framework 
was not to create a set o f labels; instead it was to assist in developing explanations 
during data analysis. During explanation building, the conceptual framework was 
used to analyse data by helping to structure and build explanations and is therefore 
consistent with what Elman would call an ‘explanatory typology’ (Elman, 2009; Yin, 
2003). Explanatory typologies are “multidimensional conceptual classifications based on 
explicitly stated theory ” (Elman, 2009: 121). The use o f such an ‘explanatory typology’ 
and how it differs from ‘descriptive’ or ‘classificatory’ typologies, is presented in 
Table 6.
Table 6: Three sorts of typology and their uses









Defines ‘types’ to use 
as descriptive 
characterisations.
Assigns cases to 
types.
Places data in 
relevant cells to 




W hat constitutes this 
type?
What is this a case 
of?
How can theory 
explain my 
observations?
As illustrated above, the conceptual framework employed by this research is less 
concerned with identifying types and instead focuses upon providing a means of 
identifying and analysing the theoretical aspects o f C 0 2 market design and operation 
identified in the data (Elman, 2009; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2003).
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During the earliest stages of data analysis, a research diary was used to record 
observations and insights while undertaking the participant observation role (Yin, 
2003). This early stage o f data analysis was facilitated by careful selection of the 
research setting, allowing participant observation through the researcher’s 
employment. This was in response to the consideration that data analysis during case 
based research should draw upon prior expert knowledge in the field o f the case 
study (Yin, 2003).
Early stage data analysis involved the interplay between observations logged in the 
research diary and prehminary versions of the conceptual framework, allowing 
iterative changes to the cases and the conceptual framework. To supplement the 
research diary, a case study database was employed that enabled the handling o f rich 
data from multiple sources o f evidence. The case study database contained a wide 
range o f empirical data from the six sources listed in Table 4 and was kept distinct 
from the case reports. Initially, the case database was arranged so that material was 
split into six sections which corresponded to each o f the six cases. As the cases 
matured and became more stable in their structure, the case database was then 
further divided on the basis o f the data’s fit with the conceptual framework. The 
conceptual framework was then used to re-present and summarise the empirical 
material from the research diary, case database and case reports, as presented in 
chapter 11 and section 12.2. In this way, the conceptual framework developed 
explanations which were based upon a mix o f within-case and cross-case analysis 
(Bennett & Elman, 2006; George & Bennett, 2005; Numagami, 1998). The 
conceptual framework also allowed the researcher to triangulate different sources of
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data to build explanations about C 0 2 market design and operation (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994).
Much like the development of the case reports, data analysis was an iterative process 
that was influenced by peer review. During the write-up o f the dissertation in 2010, 
early versions o f the data analysis were presented as part o f three conference papers 
and one lecture to the Institute for Sustainable Energy and Environment at the 
University o f Bath (Veal & Mouzas, 2010a, 201 Od, 2010c). However, although data 
analysis was an iterative process, there had to be some measure o f when to stop. 
Data analysis was halted when it was found that further efforts yielded no 
incremental knowledge in relation to the study’s research questions (Yin, 2003).
This section has given an account of the data analysis methods employed by the 
present research. The final section o f this chapter now discusses how ethical issues 
were managed during this research.
3.6 Research ethics
This section details the efforts taken in order to ensure appropriate ethical practises 
were followed at all stages o f the research. The ethics guidelines o f the Economic 
and Social Research Council were followed, as laid down in their ‘Research Ethics 
Framework’ (Economic and Social Research Council, 2009). This framework was 
chosen, as the 36 page guideline is comprehensive and well tested. Although the 
framework was used to structure the ethical precautions taken, it was cross-checked 
with other treatments o f ethics, such as Patton’s five part ethics framework (Patton,
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1990) and other similar works (Homan, 1991; Oliver, 2003; Wiles et al., 2006). These 
frameworks confirmed the comprehensive nature of the ESCRC’s guidelines.
The ESRC defines research ethics as “referring to the moral principles guiding research, from 
its inception through to completion and publication of results and beyond” (Economic and Social 
Research Council, 2009: 7). The ESRC gives a checklist o f issues which would 
normally be considered to involve more than a minimal level of risk. While much of 
the checklist wasn’t relevant to the research, for example guidance relating to 
research on children, or involving deception, there were two issues which were 
flagged as constituting a potentially significant risk. These were the issues regarding 
treatment o f ‘sensitive topics’ and ‘confidential information’. Climate Change policy 
and responses within a company are a sensitive and sometimes confidential topic. 
They involve financial data such as operating costs, energy costs and strategic plans 
for future action. The level o f sensitivity of secondary data was also examined with 
reference to the ESRC’s three-level scale of sensitivity. Most of the data was found 
to fall into the first category o f lowest sensitivity. However, some was found to 
potentially be in the highest category, due to the potential to use or combine the data 
in other circumstances or situations to infer confidential or sensitive information.
These checks highlighted the need for a rigorous treatment o f ethics in the research. 
The following section uses the ESRC’s six high-level considerations for research 
ethics to highlight precautions taken during the research (Economic and Social 
Research Council, 2009: 23-26).
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Firstly, the ESRC stipulated that research must be designed and carried out to ensure 
integrity and quality. This chapter aims to meet diis need, by carefully laying out the 
objectives and methods o f the research. Furthermore, periodic review meetings with 
the PhD supervisor and annual progress review meetings with a review panel aimed 
to deliver high quality research o f value to the academic and business communities.
Secondly, the ESRC stressed that the research purpose, methods, participation 
requirements and risks and intended possible uses of the research must all be made 
explicit from the outset. These issues are dealt with in detail in the ‘sample research 
agreement’ given in Appendix one and the ‘sample statement of informed consent’ in 
Appendix two.
The research agreement was signed by a medium to high-level Operations or 
Communications Manager on behalf of the company as a whole. This research 
agreement laid out the details of data collection, the expected research participants, 
document sharing protocol, data ownership and research timeframe. T’he research 
agreement also gave a detailed treatment of issues of anonymity, confidentiality and 
commercial and security sensitive information. This satisfied the third criterion of 
the ESRC, that confidentiality and anonymity must be preserved.
The statement o f informed consent was signed by all research participants. It 
introduced the research and its objectives, the proposed audience of the research, 
how data would be shared within the respondent’s company, detailed what research 
participation involved, gave reassurances of confidentiality and anonymity, stressed 
that participation was voluntary and could be terminated at any time and gave full
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contact details of the researcher, encouraging the participant to contact them with 
any questions they may have had. This met the fourth ESRC criterion that research 
participants must participate voluntarily, without any coercion.
The fifth criterion was that harm to research parties must be avoided. In the sense 
of physical harm, there was little risk. However, the researcher took care that all site 
visits included a health and safety briefing and that suitable personal protective 
equipment was worn. For example during plant visits, ear defenders and safety boots 
were necessary. Potential harm through accidentally releasing confidential data was 
avoided through the research agreement, with the failsafe that any publications 
resulting from the research were first given to the case company, ahead of 
publication, so that they could check them for any sensitive information.
The ESRC’s final criterion was that partiality and conflicts o f interest must be made 
explicit during the research process. This was not a significant concern for the 
research, but two issues were dealt with. Firstly, as a consultant, the researcher was 
party to sensitive information that was not suitable for publication. The conflict was 
managed through careful choice of case studies and the details laid out in the 
research agreement. The company names, and to some extent their industry, were 
also anonymised to help overcome this challenge. The second challenge in this area 
was the conflict between the researcher’s interests as a consultant and employee, 
versus those related to his research role. In a few rare circumstances, it was not clear 
whether the researcher was working, or making a case study for the research. If a 
visit were classed as being for research purposes, there was a risk o f giving away too 
much Tree consultancy’ and thus disadvantaging the consultancy employing the
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researcher. However, it was also important to make sure that adequate time was set 
aside for research purposes. This conflict in interests was managed by discussing it 
with the researcher’s manager and agreeing with him what he was comfortable with 
in terms o f research access and time spent. During the research it was also less of an 
issue than imagined at the outset, because much o f the data collection for the 
research was contextual information for the work as a consultant. So long as the 
correct research agreements were in place, the employment and research efforts were 
often complementary. This arrangement was facilitated by setting up the research 
agreement with the researcher’s employer and the case companies in good time 
before the start o f the research.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter has explored how the researcher’s values have influenced his views on 
the nature o f the world, how he understands and theorises about it to develop 
knowledge and the uses that he eventually aims to put that knowledge to. The 
chapter started by tackling axiological issues relating to how the researcher’s values 
influenced the research. Next a treatment o f the researcher’s critical realist 
epistemology was given, exploring how it fitted with an ontological stance that 
prioritised a network-level view of the world. The second half o f this chapter then 
detailed reasons for selecting a case study research method and explained how data 
were collected, reported and analysed. The chapter closed by explaining how ethical 
issues were managed during the research.
Chapter four now examines wider sustainability issues and the energy supply 
industry. Chapter four then gives a history o f the evolution o f Climate Change as a
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business issue and introduces the logic which underpins the C 0 2 markets. The 
remainder o f the chapter is then dedicated to a detailed introduction to each o f the 
C 0 2 markets, ahead o f their discussion in die six case studies which follow chapter 
four.
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CHAPTER 4:
CONTEXT AND INDUSTRY DEFINITION
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4 CONTEXT AND INDUSTRY DEFINITION
4.1 Introduction
This chapter gives the contextual aspects relevant to C 0 2 market design and 
operation. The chapter starts by examining how these markets have been influenced 
by trends in wider sustainability issues and in the energy supply industry. Next, the 
chapter gives a history o f the evolution o f Climate Change as a business issue. 
Subsequently, the logic which underpins the C 0 2 markets is introduced. This 
introduction compares C 0 2 markets with the alternatives o f a C 0 2 tax, or mandated 
C 0 2 reduction targets. Subsequently, the chapter outlines the structure o f the three 
C 0 2 markets examined by this research. These C 0 2 markets were the global Kyoto 
Protocol, the regional European Emissions Trading Scheme and the United 
Kingdom’s Carbon Reduction Commitment. The chapter also introduces the 
practice o f ‘offsetting’ and the United Kingdom’s ‘Climate Change Agreements’ in 
order to support the analysis o f these C 0 2 markets. These final sections give the 
context required for the development of the case studies which each describe specific 
episodes during the design and operation o f C 0 2 markets.
4.2 The relevance o f sustainability
This section introduces trends in sustainability as wider context to the development 
o f C 0 2 markets. The business community is currently facing calls to acknowledge 
the sustainability impacts o f their operations. However, these calls are not always 
coherent, because ‘sustainability’ is still a contested term, the meaning o f which is not 
standardised between different organisations. The most commonly quoted definition 
o f sustainability is the Brundtland definition, which defines sustainability as meeting 
the needs o f the present generation without compromising the ability of future
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generations to meet their own needs (Brunddand, 1983). This is a high-level 
definition which does not refer to how the stated objective should be achieved. The 
Brunddand definition s reference to the protection of the needs o f future generations 
is much easier to grasp, given the summary of global population trends shown in 
Figure 7. Estimates o f global population by the United Nations show that until 
around 1800AD, the global population was roughly constant at less than 1 billion 
people (United Nations, 2004, 2008). In the 200 years following 1800AD, the global 
population has grown to its current level of around 6 billion. The United Nation’s 
current mid-level projection is a global population o f 9 billion people by 2050. This 
rapid increase in the global population has placed unprecedented demands upon the 
natural systems o f the planet, changing the relationship between nature and society.
Figure 7: Global population trends
Based upon data from United Nations (United Nations, 2004, 2008)
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Operational sustainability metrics generally encompass the three dimensions of
‘people’, ‘profit’ and ‘planet’ (Elkington, 1994; Elkington, 1997). One example of
such a metric is the guidance for managing sustainable development within British
Standard 8900, which defines sustainable development as “..an enduring, balanced
approach to economic activity, environmental responsibility and socialprogress” (BSI, 2006: 1). In
line with these three core dimensions, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) collects
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and reports data on business sustainability performance (GRI, 2010a). The GRI 
gives dimensions o f sustainability which split ‘economic’, ‘environmental’ and ‘social’ 
performance down into two further levels of detail, as illustrated in Table 7. The 
economic dimension o f sustainability includes the traditional business metrics of 
economic and market performance, but also pulls in indirect economic impacts on 
third parties. The environmental dimensions o f sustainability largely relate to 
protection o f natural resources, such as materials, water and biodiversity. The 
environmental dimensions also pull in relationships within the supply chain and the 
lifecycle impacts of goods. Finally, social dimensions o f sustainability relate to labour 
practices, human rights, society and product responsibility.
Table 7: Setting the scope of sustainability
1) ECONOMIC Economic 1. Economic 3. Indirect 
Performance Economic
2. Market Presence Impacts
2) ENVIRONMENTAL Environmental 1. Materials 6. Suppliers
2. Energy 7. Products &
3. Water services
4. Biodiversity 8. Compliance
5. Emissions, 9. Transport 
effluents, a waste 10. Overall
3) SOCIAL Labour Practices 
& Decent Work
1. Employment 4. Training &
2. Labour/Manageme Education 
nt Relations 5. Diversity &
3. Occupational opportunity 
Health & Safety
Human Rights 1. Investment & 5. Prevention of 
Procurement Forced & 
Practices Compulsory
2. Non-discrimination Labour
3. Freedom of 6. Complaints & 
Association & Grievance 
Collective Practices 
Bargaining 7. Security Practices
4. Child Labour 8. Indigenous Rights
Society 1. Community 4. Anti-Competitive
2. Corruption Behaviour
3. Public Policy 5. Compliance
Product
Responsibility
1. Customer Health & 3. Marketing 
Safety Communications
2. Products & Services 4. Customer Privacy 
Labelling 5. Compliance
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The dimensions o f sustainability given above are acknowledged by the majority of 
businesses, but not yet integrated into business decision making. Businesses 
approach sustainability as a risk management issue, consequendy it has become 
standard practice to produce ‘Corporate Responsibility Reports’. Examples of such 
reports are IBM’s report (IBM, 2009), GlaxoSmithKline’s report (GSK, 2009) and 
the Global Reporting Initiative’s summary reports which cover the returns o f 493 
companies (GRI, 2010b). These reports highlight some changes in business 
practices. However in the vast majority of cases they present pilot projects and 
incremental changes which leave the core of the businesses unchanged. In other 
words, while businesses recognise the need to respond to the challenge of 
sustainability, they have yet to make any fundamental changes in business practice. 
This is the context within which business responses to C 0 2 markets sit. The 
following section examines another trend which is pressuring businesses to reduce 
C 0 2 emissions, this time due to trends in the energy supply industry.
4.3 The relevance o f the energy supply industry
Many C 0 2 markets define their target participants through a threshold o f minimum 
energy consumption, thus targeting large scale industrial users of energy. At the 
same time, industrial energy costs have risen sharply over the past 20 years. Both of 
these considerations necessitate an examination o f die energy supply industry, as 
context to the study of C 0 2 market design and operation. Electricity, gas and oil are 
the fuels most frequendy used for business operations, hence these are chosen as the 
focus for the discussion. Reference to Figure 8 shows the price o f electricity, gas and 
oil since 1990.
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Figure 8: Industrial energy prices since 1990
Industrial electricity and gas prices: Median for EU 15 & G7 countries (DECC, 2010) 
Global oil price: Country prices, weighted by estimated export volume (EIA, 2010)















Industrial energy costs are important contextual aspects of C 0 2 market design and 
operation. Significant amounts o f managerial attention and effort have been directed 
at managing rising energy costs in the past ten years. While the drive to reduce 
energy costs is often aligned with efforts to reduce C 0 2 emissions, there are 
dynamics whereby energy management can be seen to compete with C 0 2 for 
managerial attention. These trends in the energy supply industry are related to the 
next section, which gives a history of the evolution o f Climate Change as a business 
issue.
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4.4 The evolution o f Climate Change as a business issue
Climate Change is an issue which can be traced back to the 1950s. For two examples 
o f Climate Change timelines, see Depledge and Lamb (2003) or Grubb (2005). The 
challenge when examining C 0 2 market design and operation is that Climate Change 
has only become a mainstream business concern since around 2000. Most o f the 
history o f Climate Change negotiations is a political story, where business 
involvement in the debate often focussed upon efforts to discredit Climate Change 
science. One example o f such efforts was Exxon’s sponsorship o f the ‘Competitive 
Enterprise Institute’ (CEI, 2010). The CEI famously denied Climate Change existed 
and then subsequently denied human causality. Exxon was a prominent sponsor of 
their work, but cut the funding in 2007 (Littlemore, 2007). The first case study 
explains how the CEO of Exxon opened the 2007 CERA Energy Conference by 
acknowledging the realities o f Climate Change. There are now very few businesses 
which publicly deny that Climate Change is happening or that human influence is the 
major cause o f the changes. Businesses are now entering a new phase where they 
acknowledge the need for action to reduce C 0 2 emissions and to engage with C 0 2 
markets. Figure 9 gives a periodisation of Climate Change from the point o f view of 
the business community. Periodisation can be useful in helping to divide a 
continuous time sequence into manageable and individually significant segments. 
Attempts to avoid making arbitrary subdivisions were undertaken by using intrinsic 
criteria to identify meaningful periods. This is because extrinsic factors are less likely 
to be linked to the processes and events o f interest (Besserman, 1996). Harrison 
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C 0 2 Market Design and Operation
In period one, Climate Change first emerges as an issue. During period two, global 
negotiations develop the Kyoto Protocol as the first proposed C 0 2 market. Period 
three relates to the emerging global, regional and national C 0 2 markets and is dealt 
with in the case studies. Period tiiree ends in 2012, when the global COz market of 
the Kyoto Protocol comes to an end. Finally, period four starts in 2013 and relates 
to future commitments targeting a full global C 0 2 market. This periodisation gives a 
wider context for the scope of the case studies, as illustrated in Figure 11.
The research draws upon data collected between 2006 and 2010, encompassing the 
compliance period of the Kyoto Protocol, phases I and II o f the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme and the qualification period and first phase o f the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment. The research also deals with negotiations over the 
extension o f the Kyoto Protocol post 2012 and phase III of the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme.
The case studies do not deal specifically with the development of scientific consensus 
regarding Climate Change’s causes which has emerged over the past two decades. 
Instead, the political and technical conclusions o f these debates are outlined in this 
chapter. The leading authority on Climate Change, the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), released the following statement in 2001: ‘The Barth's climate 
system has demonstrably changed since the pre~industria! era. fiuman activities have increased the 
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases and aerosols. Tin increasing body of observations gives 
a collective picture of a warming world and other changes in the climate system. ” (IPCC, 2001: 4). 
This opinion is now widely accepted and even previous sceptics have stopped 
questioning the science of global warming. Exxon is famous for its past rejection o f
125
C 0 2 Market Design and Operation
Climate Change. Yet in his opening speech at the 2007 CERA Energy Conference, 
the CEO of Exxon broke this stance saying: “So, we know our climate is changing, the 
average temperature of the earth is rising and greenhouse gas emissions are increasing.. .despite the 
uncertainties, it is prudent to develop and implement sensible strategies that address these risks... ” 
(Tillerson, 2007). This research focuses upon C 0 2 market design and operation. 
The researcher takes the consensus that Climate Change is real and man-made as a 
‘given’. However, should a reader wish to further examine this discussion, there are a 
large number o f detailed technical treatments of Climate Change. The following 
sources are recommended starting points (Damro et al., 2008; IPCC, 2001; Stern, 
2006; UNEP/GRID -A rendal, 2005; UNFCCC, 2005; World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development, 2005).
When responding to Climate Change, the choice at the highest level is between 
mitigation (prevention) and adaptation (responding). The two approaches are both 
valid. Mitigation is necessary to stabilise atmospheric C 0 2 levels, while adaptation 
will be required to cope with changes that have already occurred and that we are 
locked into. A further refinement of the research scope is that the research focuses 
upon Climate Change mitigation. The justification for this is twofold. Firstly, many 
of the most ‘knotty’ problems of tackling Climate Change are embedded in the 
challenge o f mitigation, due to the global aspects o f C 0 2 management. In contrast, 
adaptation efforts, such as building defences against rising sea levels, can be tackled 
locally and present less o f a challenge because the benefits are tangible and locally 
contained. These ideas are linked to ‘problems of the common’ and ‘public goods’ 
which are given full treatment in section 2.5.1 in the literature review. Secondly, the 
empirical subject of the research is C 0 2 market design and operation. C 0 2 markets
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target emission reductions through giving businesses a means to ‘monetise’ their COz 
emissions. The development of C 0 2 markets represents an attempt to foster 
mitigation, rather than adaptation, meaning that mitigation is also the most 
empirically relevant challenge to C 0 2 markets. Examples of such mitigation options 
are given in the following section.
4.5 C02 reduction pathways: The end game for COz markets
So far this chapter has examined trends in sustainability and the energy supply 
industry, leading into a presentation of the history of Climate Change as a business 
issue. It has also been clarified that the scope o f this research is Climate Change 
mitigation, rather than adaptation. This is because mitigation is the primary objective 
o f C 0 2 markets. As further context for C 0 2 market design and operation, an 
introduction is now given to the commonly accepted actions that could mitigate 
Climate Change, by stabilising C 0 2 concentrations at acceptable levels. These are the 
actions which C 0 2 markets aim to incentivise.
A wide number o f reports detail the range of possible responses to mitigate Climate 
Change (Pacala & Socolow, 2004; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2006; Stem, 2006; World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development, 2005). These reports recommend a 
portfolio o f similar actions to reduce C 0 2 emission rates to acceptable levels. Pacala 
and Socolow’s (2004) recommendations for action are illustrative of the types of 
responses called for, they are outlined in Figure 10. Pacala and Socolow call for 
action on seven fronts in order to flatten the projected business as usual C 0 2 
emissions. The seven ‘wedges’ identified are: the development o f renewable 
electricity and fuels, increased energy efficiency, increased energy conservation,
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switching to lower C 0 2 content fuels, deployment of extra nuclear power, forest and 
soil management and C 0 2 capture and storage. C 0 2 markets will need to span all of 
these fields, since none o f the seven wedges offers abatement potential significant 
enough to mitigate Climate Change on its own.
Figure 10: Seven wedges to flatten business as usual growth in C 02 emissions
Adapted from Pacala and Socolow (2004)
1) Renewable electricity and fuels
2) Energy efficiency
3) Energy conservation
4) Lower C 0 2 content fuels
5) Nuclear power
6) Forest and soil management
7) CQ2 capture and storage
Flat em issions path
Year205520051955
Further to the development of these C 0 2 reduction options, there is also agreement 
that action now will be cheaper than the resulting costs o f inaction. In other words, 
it will be cheaper to manage C 0 2 emissions now, rather than to let them develop 
unchecked. One o f the influential reports in this area is the Stem Review which was 
released by the British Government in 2006. The Stern Review concluded that the 
costs of mitigating Climate Change would be around 1 /o o f GDP and that these 
WOuld be small relative to the costs and risks that will be avoided (Stern, 2006). The
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following section compares C 0 2 markets with their alternatives o f a C 0 2 tax or 
mandated COz reductions.
4.6 A comparison o f COz markets with the alternatives o f a COz tax or 
mandated C02 reduction targets
C 0 2 markets are the m ost common mechanism used by regulators to encourage 
businesses to engage with Climate Change mitigation. By giving a price to C 0 2 
emissions and a corresponding market for C 0 2 emission reductions, businesses can 
reduce their C 0 2 emissions as part of their financial planning. During C 0 2 market 
design and operation, the objective is “to bring [COJ emissions within the frame of economic 
calculation, by giving them a price” (MacKenzie, 2009: 441). This section introduces C 0 2 
markets and illustrates the logic that regulators present in order to explain their 
preference of a market based response, as opposed to the alternatives of a C 0 2 tax or 
mandated C 0 2 reduction targets.
At the highest level, the guiding principle used for the design of C 0 2 regulation is to 
minimise the costs of reducing C 0 2 emissions, thus achieving compliance at the 
minimum cost to the economy and society as a whole (DEFRA, 2007). To this end, 
two key design criteria are: the avoidance o f unnecessary regulatory burdens and 
achieving flexibility that allows business as much freedom as possible in modes of 
compliance (DEFRA, 2007). Table 8 illustrates the main three potential mechanisms 
for regulation o f C 0 2: namely a tax, mandate, or C 0 2 markets.
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Table 8: C 02 markets compared with the alternatives of a tax or mandate
Regulatory options
Factory A:
Cost o f  reducing 
CO2 emissions 
through changes to 
plant = £ 5 0 /tonne
Factory B:
Cost o f reducing CO2 
emissions through 
changes to plant = 
£10/tonne
Tonnes 
Cost borne by CO2 
industry saved
1) Tax:
Fixed cost o f 
£XX/tonne CO2 
emitted.





Factory B makes CO2  















Fixed reduction o f 
CO2 mandated across 
industry. E.g. 20 
tonnes split evenly 
between factories A 
and B.
10 tonnes CO2 saved 
in-house at a cost of 
£500
10 tonnes CO2 saved 









target set for whole 
industry (e.g. 20 
tonnes). Market 
decides best mode o f  
compliance.
High cost o f CO2 
reductions at 
Factory A means 
compliance comes 
through buying 10 
tonnes CO2 from 
the carbon market 
(in this case bought 
from Factory B).
Low cost of abatement 
justifies 20 tonnes CO2 
saved in-house at a 
cost o f £200. 10 
tonnes used for 
compliance. 10 tonnes 
sold to carbon market 






As illustrated above, a straight tax on C 0 2 faces the criticism that at the outset it is 
not possible to predict the level of C 0 2 savings to be generated. A tax also fails to 
introduce any flexibility for compliance, neglecting the different costs of C 0 2 
abatement faced by different businesses. The second option for C 0 2 regulation, a 
mandate, equally shares a C 0 2 reduction target across each site. This does set a 
predictable reduction in C 0 2 emissions; however the total cost across industry is not 
minimised, since there is no flexibility to trade emission reductions across sites. 
Finally, a C 0 2 market, enabling C 0 2 emissions trading, is a system which sets an 
industry wide C 0 2 reduction target and provides a market for C 0 2 savings. C 0 2 
savings achieved beyond the emissions cap at one site can be sold into the market as 
emissions permits, to be purchased by sites with a C 0 2 reduction cost higher than 
the market price. In the example shown in Table 8, Factory B makes all the C 0 2
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reductions required and sells the excess to Factory A. Theoretically, within the 
emissions trading design, the scale o f emission cuts is predictable at the outset and 
the cost o f compliance is minimised, because emission reductions are pushed to the 
sites with the cheapest C 0 2 abatement options.
The next section discusses the mechanisms by which businesses’ C 0 2 emissions are 
monetised by C 0 2 markets. C 0 2 markets provide participants with target C 0 2 
emissions that are lower than their current COz emissions, as illustrated in Figure 13. 
This target is enforced through regulations which present the business with a choice 
of either making the required C 0 2 reductions in-house, or buying C 0 2 reductions 
from other market participants who have saved more C 0 2 than was required to meet 
their target. Through this market, it is hoped that C 0 2 savings will be made at the 
cheapest reduction options available across industry and then sold between 
participants, so that each is still able to comply with their C 0 2 reduction targets. In 
line with the discussions above, this research adopts a definition of C 0 2 markets as 
“markets in permits to emit C 02 gases or in credits earned by not emitting them” (MacKenzie, 
2009: 440).
For further reading on the alternatives to a C 0 2 market, see Haug et al. (In press), 
Levin and Espeland (2002), McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2002), Sanden and Azar 
(2005), or Wittneben (2009) who all compare C 0 2 markets with their alternatives of a 
C 0 2 tax or mandated C 0 2 reductions. Dealing specifically with the technicalities of 
introducing a price for C 0 2 emissions, thirteen options are presented by Aldy, 
Barrett and Stavins (2003) and then compared along their environmental outcomes, 
dynamic efficiencies, cost-effectiveness, distributional equity, flexibility and the levels
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of incentive introduced for participation and compliance. Furthermore, Kolk and 
Pinkse (2004) provide a classification of business Climate Change strategies, setting 
out of six types o f response and contrasting them with a market based response.
Having introduced how C 0 2 markets work, the following section describes the 
global Climate Change network and introduces each C 0 2 market.
4.7 Introducing the C02 markets
4.7.1 An overview o f C02 markets
The businesses described in each case study faced a number of C 0 2 markets, as 
illustrated in Figure 11. The following sections describe each C 0 2 market in what is 
broadly a chronological order of developments.
Figure 11: A timeline of C02 markets
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The first section introduces the C 0 2 market of the Kyoto Protocol. Next the quasi 
C 0 2 market for CC 0 2 offsets’ is examined, as it was important context for the
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examination o f the extension of the European Emissions Trading Scheme. The third 
section introduces the C 0 2 market of the European Emissions Trading Scheme. In 
the fourth section, the United Kingdom’s ‘Climate Change Agreements’ are 
introduced as context to the United Kingdom’s Carbon Reduction Commitment. 
The chapter closes with an introduction to the United Kingdom’s C 0 2 market, the 
Carbon Reduction Commitment.
Since C 0 2 markets are designed to introduce financial incentives for business change, 
it is im portant to examine their trading history. Figure 12 summarises the trading 
history o f the C 0 2 markets covered by the case studies developed by the research.
Figure 12: Prices in C02 markets
EU EUTS price from ECX (2010), CER price provided by trade association on 
anonymous basis, CRC price from DECC (2009c)
 EU ETS price — -CER price  CRC price
30
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£'12/ tonne CO, during 
phase I. (Price in EUR 
unpredictable due to future 
exchange rate.)
0
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The CER price refers to the price of Certified Emission Reduction Units, which are 
linked to C 0 2 reduction projects approved as part of the Umted Nation’s Kyoto 
Protocol. These projects allow mitigation efforts to take place in developing
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countries, with the C 0 2 credits generated being sold back towards compliance with 
Kyoto Targets, or used to meet up to 8% of the target set under the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme. CERs are traded to match the compliance period o f the 
Kyoto Protocol o f 2008-2012. There was some trading of credits in 2007, as these 
were sold ahead o f their delivery from 2008 onwards. The EU ETS price is the price 
o f COz credits within the European Emissions Trading Scheme. These credits were 
first traded during phase I of the European Emissions Trading Scheme, which 
spanned 2005 to 2007. Credits from phase I of the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme were not allowed to be taken across into phase II of the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme. Once industry realised that too many credits had been 
allocated in phase I, the price of the credits crashed, as actors tried to sell their 
surplus credits before they expired at the end of December 2007. The over 
allocation during phase I explains the European Emissions Trading Scheme’s price 
crash in December 2007. The price crash was followed by a sudden recovery, when 
new credits were issued for phase II in January 2008. Finally, the price of Carbon 
Reduction Commitment credits has been given, but is not realised until the scheme 
starts in April 2011. The Carbon Reduction Commitment scheme credits will be 
priced in pounds, since the scheme is specific to the United Kingdom. For the 
duration o f phase I o f the Carbon Reduction Commitment, the price of credits will 
be set at £12 per tonne. In following years, once the reporting mechanisms have 
been set up, the price will be set by the market during an auction which will be held 
each April.
The remainder o f this chapter is dedicated to introducing each o f the C 0 2 markets in 
more detail.
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4.7.2 CO2 market 1: The Kyoto Protocol
The only global C 0 2 market is that o f the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol sets 
an emission reduction target for 37 industrialised countries, plus the European 
Union’s member states and is enacted at the national level through signatory 
governments (UNFCCC, 2005). The reduction target “adds up to a total cut in 
greenhouse-gas emissions of at least 5% from 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008-2012” 
(UNFCCC, 2005). This is held within the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that is an earlier treaty which sets out the principles 
of collaboration and refers targets and legal issues back to the Kyoto Protocol 
(UNFCCC, 2006a). The Kyoto Protocol is guided by scientific research from a wide 
body o f scientists, who collaborate through the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change mediates research 
from climate scientists representing 194 countries. There are three working groups 
within the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, namely Working Group I 
which deals with "The Physical Science Basis of Climate Change”, Working Group II with 
"Climate Change Impacts, A.daptation and Vulnerability” and Working Group III with 
"Mitigation of Climate Change" (IPCC, 2007). The findings o f the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change steer the reduction targets adopted and thus influence the 
function o f the C 0 2 markets, by impacting upon government allocations of C 0 2 
credits and target setting. It took decades and multiple stages of negotiations to 
create the Kyoto Protocol, as illustrated in Figure 9. The negotiations over the future 
of the Kyoto Protocol are discussed in the first case study which examined the 
ongoing negotiations that aims to extend the Kyoto Protocol beyond its scheduled 
end in 2012. The Kyoto Protocol forms the basis for the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme. The following section introduces the practice o f offsetting, because
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it was contextually important during negotiations to extend the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme.
4.7.3 Offsetting: A quasi C02 market (context for extension o f
the European Emissions Trading Scheme)
‘Offsetting’ is the process whereby individuals or businesses, not covered by a legally 
binding C 0 2 market, purchase and destroy CO, permits. By destroying one C 0 2 
permit, businesses claim to have offset one tonne of C 0 2. The claim to have offset a 
tonne o f C 0 2 follows from the consideration that the destroyed permit is no longer 
available for another business to use for C 0 2 market compliance. The reduced 
supply o f permits should theoretically force another business seeking to comply with 
the C 0 2 market to save an extra tonne of COz in-house, or to buy another permit 
from the C 0 2 market, which in turn would force another business to save a tonne of 
C 0 2. Offsetting can thus be defined as the purchase and destruction of C 0 2 permits 
outside o f a legally binding C 0 2 market. Offsetting is important when examining 
C 0 2 markets, as a number of businesses are considering offsetting as part o f their 
response to Climate Change. The practise of offsetting is often confused with 
emissions trading within formal C 0 2 markets, although the two are distinct and 
significantly different. Offsetting is deemed to be environmentally dubious, for 
reasons outlined below and explored in more detail in case study thiee.
Offsetting brings a number of complications not faced by those covered by a legally 
binding C 0 2 market, such as the European Emissions Trading Scheme. Firsdy, there 
is no legal requirement for the strict verification processes used within the legally 
binding C 0 2 markets. Secondly, as offsetters are not able to sell any C 0 2 reductions
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made in-house back into the C 0 2 market, the capital efficiency of emissions trading 
does not apply to offsetting. Offsetters are routinely only able to choose the cbuy’ 
option given in Figure 13. Reductions in-house, the ‘make’ option, do not enable 
offsetters to monetise their C 0 2 savings, since they do not have access to sell into the 
C 0 2 market. Given its lack of verification, plus the fact that offsetting can short- 
circuit the market mechanism at the heart of the capital efficiency of emissions 
trading, offsetting is often met with scepticism and accusations of £gteen-wash’. 
Offsetting often faces criticisms that it is a cheap way of tabling green claims, 
without taking any action to ‘make’ emissions savings by reducing COz emissions in- 
house. It is important to understand the dynamics o f offsetting, because in case 
study three, issues with offsetting significantly influenced the business response to 
the inclusion of aviation within the European Emissions Trading Scheme.
4.7.4 CO2 market 2: The European Emissions Trading Scheme
The European Emissions Trading Scheme is the primary initiative within the 
European Union which aims to deliver European obligations under the Kyoto 
Protocol. The European Emissions Trading Scheme covers around 10,500 sites 
across the European Union (Europa, 2010). Phase II of the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme is set to mirror the timing of the Kyoto Protocol’s compliance 
period from 2008 -  2012 (Braun, 2009; Delay & Grubb, 2008). Phase I o f the 
scheme was a three year preparatory period, designed to prepare Europe ahead o f the 
Kyoto Protocol going live in 2008. The European Emissions Trading Scheme 
covers approximately 45% of the total C 0 2 emissions of the European Union and 
targets an 8% reduction in emissions by the end of 2012 (Sandoff & Schaad, 2009). 
The scheme targets large industrial users of energy, such as manufacturing sites,
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power generation sites and large buildings with high heating demands. The 
qualification threshold for the European Emissions Trading Scheme is that any site 
with aggregated combustion facilities of more than 20MW will be included (DTI, 
2004). 20MW is a measure of the power of installed equipment. To give an idea of 
scale, the aggregated power o f a medium sized hospital’s boilers would be around 
20MW. Each site within an organisation that breaks this threshold must participate 
in the scheme, meaning that large businesses are likely to have multiple sites included 
within the European Emissions Trading Scheme. The emission reduction target set 
by the European Emissions Trading Scheme cascades first to member states, then to 
industry sectors and finally to individual sites. In phases I and II, the C 0 2 market 
developed by the European Emissions Trading Scheme included the electricity, iron 
and steel, mineral processing, pulp and paper and manufacturing industries, as 
illustrated in Figure 13.
Under the scheme, each individual site is allocated an allowance of C 0 2 permits. If 
their allowances are less than their actual C 0 2 emissions, then sites must decide 
whether to ‘make’ the C 0 2 reductions in-house or ‘buy’ the savings required from 
the C 0 2 market. This structure o f the European Emissions Trading Scheme runs 
until the end of 2012 and is the subject of case two which examines a manufacturer’s 
response to the European Emissions Trading Scheme. After 2012 there is 
uncertainty over whether there will be another global C 0 2 regime and if so, what 
form it will take. The European Union is active in these debates and has already put 
forward a plan to extend the European Emissions Trading Scheme beyond 2012. 
Phase III o f the European Emissions Trading scheme will be expanded in scope to
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include aviation, petrochemicals, ammonia and aluminium production, as well as 
Carbon Capture and Storage demonstration facilities (Europa, 2008).
F igure 13: C ascade of the Kyoto protocol to individual sites w ith in  the 
E uropean  Em issions T rad ing  Scheme
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International: Signatories to Kyoto Protocol set target o f 
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The European Union has also made changes to the scheme’s qualification criteria in 
order to exclude some smaller sites where it feels that the admdnistrative burden 
outweighs the potential C 0 2 savings. The threshold for inclusion in the scheme in 
phase III has been revised upwards from 20MW to 35MW of installed combustion 
plant. A further threshold will allow some sites to be excluded if their C 0 2 emissions 
in the three years leading to 2013 were each less than 25,000 tonnes (Europa, 2008). 
These developments are dealt with in case study three, which examines an energy
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supplier s response to aviation s future inclusion within the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme.
4.7.5 An energy tax: The United Kingdom’s Climate Change
Agreements (context for the Carbon Reduction Commitment)
The United Kingdom’s Climate Change Levy was introduced in 2001 and targets 
industrial, commercial, agricultural and public sector uses o f electricity, natural gas, 
oil and coal for lighting, heating and power. The Climate Change Levy is a tax which 
is charged at a flat rate per unit o f energy used and is designed to be revenue neutral 
to the government (HMRC, 2010). The payments are recycled back to industry 
through a cut in employers’ national insurance contributions and support for energy 
efficiency and low carbon technologies. The levy is not a C 0 2 market, but it is a 
means by which companies recognise a cost relating to their COz emissions. The 
levy is an important contextual aspect for the United Kingdom’s C 0 2 market, the 
Carbon Reduction Commitment. Businesses within the United Kingdom that are 
covered by the European Emissions Trading Scheme are often also subject to 
Climate Change Agreements. Climate Change Agreements arise from applications 
for partial exemption from the Climate Change Levy7.
At the time o f introduction of the Climate Change Levy, industry argued that 
companies should not be penalised if they were energy intensive and /or exposed to 
international competition. The argument was that, for such industries, the national 
tax would put them at a disadvantage to international competitors. In response to 
these pressures, the government set up Climate Change Agreements, whereby energy 
intensive industries could apply for up to an 80% discount on the Climate Change
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Levy. The government specified that, to be eligible for the discount, energy intensive 
industries must sign up to sector-level and site-level targets for challenging energy 
efficiency or C 0 2 reductions. The sector-level target is administered through the 
relevant trade association and is recognised through a certificated scheme called a 
‘Climate Change Agreement’. The Department o f Energy and Climate Change 
reported in 2009 that 36 out of 52 sectors met dieir reduction targets and that 8,973 
sites within the United Kingdom had applied for and were managing an ongoing 
Climate Change Agreement (DECC, 2009a).
4.7.6 CO2 market 3: The United Kingdom’s Carbon Reduction
Commitment
The Carbon Reduction Commitment is a C 0 2 market within the United Kingdom. 
It is administered by the Environment Agency and started in April 2010. The 
Environment Agency developed the Carbon Reduction Commitment in order to 
bring the next tier o f energy users, those not covered by the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme or the United Kingdom’s Climate Change Agreements, into a 
national C 0 2 market. It is anticipated that the Carbon Reduction Commitment will 
save approximately 4.4 million tonnes of C 0 2 per year by 2020 (DECC, 2009d). 
This saving represents approximately 3% of the projected 2020 UK  total C 0 2 
emissions o f 146.2 million tonnes C 0 2 (DEFRA, 2006).
Participation in the Carbon Reduction Commitment is determined by electricity 
consumption Airing the qualification year of 2008. Electricity usage was chosen to 
measure the threshold for qualification, since large industrial companies targeted by 
the European emissions trading scheme and Climate Change Agreements tend to use
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primary forms o f energy such as coal, oil and gas; while medium scale energy users in 
the commercial sectors tend to use electricity to run their operations. An 
organisation must participate in the Carbon Reduction Commitment if their 2008 
electricity consumption through an industrial class o f electricity meter breaks a 
threshold o f 6000MWh. This threshold represents an annual electricity expenditure 
of approximately £500,000. The Carbon Reduction Commitment targets the highest 
United Kingdom parent company, meaning that a company with multiple sites in the 
United Kingdom would need to compare their total electricity consumption across 
all sites to the qualification threshold.
The Carbon Reduction Commitment will extend the number of sites within the 
United Kingdom covered by a C 0 2 market from 921 European Emissions Trading 
Scheme sites to an estimated 5,000 organisations, or 25,000-150,000 sites (DECC, 
2007, 2009d). The Carbon Reduction Commitment will affect organisations such as 
large retailers, universities, local authorities, landlords, smaller manufacturers and 
office based organisations with multiple buildings. These organisations will be legally 
required to participate in the C 0 2 market of the Carbon Reduction Commitment as 
of April 2010. As well as a C 0 2 market, the Environment Agency has introduced a 
number o f novel mechanisms within the Carbon Reduction Commitment s 
structures, as summarised in Table 9 and explained in more detail below.
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Table 9. Key elements of the Carbon Reduction Commitment as per the draft 
order released for consultation mid 2009
(DECC, 2009c, 2009d; Environment Agency, 2009)
Key mechanism Details
1. A market price for C 0 2 emissions. Priced at £12/tonne C 0 2 for the first 
phase. Set by Environment Agency 
auctions after 2013.
2. Public league table on emission 
reduction performance.
Published annually for all 5,000 
participants.
3. Recycling payments (rebates) given 
on purchased C 0 2 allowances with 
penalties or bonuses set by league 
table performance.
Rebate starts at ± 10% of expenditure 
in the Environment Agency auction, 
rising to ± 50% by 2015.
The first feature o f the Carbon Reduction Commitment, a market price for C 0 2 
emissions, is common to other C 0 2 markets. However, from there on, no previous 
C 0 2 market has included the other features of the Carbon Reduction Commitment. 
Firstly, there will be a public league table which ranks each participant’s year on year 
cuts in absolute C 0 2 emissions. The public league table introduces a significant 
reputational driver for C 0 2 reductions. Secondly, a further financial driver for 
emissions reductions is introduced, since there will be bonuses for league table 
leaders and penalties for laggards. These bonuses and penalties will be administered 
through a rebate called a Recycling payment made by the Environment Agency. In 
the first year o f the scheme, the rebate will be ± 10% of expenditure in the 
Environment Agency’s April C 0 2 permit auction, rising to i  50 /o by 2015.
The timing o f the Carbon Reduction Commitment is now discussed. Figure 11 
illustrates how the Carbon Reduction Commitment is split into phases and runs to a 
United Kingdom tax year o f April to March. Phase I is a three year preparatory
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phase, running through from April 2010 until March 2013. Phase I starts with a 
single year that does not include an auction of C 0 2 permits. In this year the only 
obligation is to report C 0 2 emissions. This is because one year’s worth o f data will 
be required to make year on year comparisons and to support participants’ 
preparation o f their forecast emissions for the coming year. For the remainder o f 
phase I, the price o f C 0 2 permits will be fixed at £12/tonne and there will be no 
limit on how many an organisation can purchase. After this three year practice 
phase, each phase runs for five years and the price o f C 0 2 permits will be set during 
an Environment Agency auction to be held each April. A secondary market for 
inter-organisational trading o f C 0 2 allowances is also likely to develop.
At die beginning of each phase, companies must submit a footprint report which 
represents 100% o f their emissions within the United Kingdom. This is used to 
calculate any exemptions, for example carving out Climate Change Agreement and 
European Emissions Trading Scheme C 0 2 emissions. The footprint report is then 
used as an ‘energy map’ of the company over the coming phase. During each phase, 
participants must collect their emissions data for included emissions sources and 
submit them in the form o f an annual report. The Carbon Reduction Commitment 
is based upon self reporting, whereby companies are expected to complete their 
annual submissions and submit them online to the Environment Agency registry. 
These are not checked upon submission, instead a participant can expect to be 
audited at random by the Environment Agency at a frequency o f approximately once
per phase.
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It is inevitable that companies already covered by the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme and /o r  the United Kingdom’s Climate Change Agreements will overlap 
with the coverage o f the Carbon Reduction Commitment. However, C 0 2 credits 
from each market will not be interchangeable. There will be some minimal potential 
to convert permits from the European Emissions Trading Scheme into Carbon 
Reduction Commitment Permits, although even this will be governed by a minimum 
price for the permits created. This minimum price is to avoid creating adverse 
incentives due to potential price differences between the schemes. The Environment 
Agency has acknowledged these overlaps and gives two rules to help avoid any 
double counting o f C 0 2 emissions. Firstly, any company which has more than 25% 
of its emissions covered by a Climate Change Agreement will be exempt from the 
Carbon Reduction Commitment. This follows the logic that if companies have 
significant coverage by Climate Change Agreements, then they are likely to be large 
enough to be industrial type companies, which are not the target o f the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment. They will also already be following best practice in energy 
management as part o f the maintenance of their Climate Change Agreement. 
Secondly, any qualifying processes covered by the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme will be exempted from coverage by the Carbon Reduction Commitment. 
Together, these provisions mean that although one site may be covered by a number 
o f C 0 2 markets, no one emissions source will be ‘double counted’ by being in more 
than one C 0 2 market. As an example, a large boiler at a site may be covered by the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme, while electricity use in a number of offices 
and production areas may be covered by the Carbon Reduction Commitment.
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4.8 Summary
This chapter has given the contextual information required to support the case 
studies developed by this research. The chapter started with an examination of 
trends in wider sustainability issues and in the energy supply industry. Next the 
chapter gave a history of the evolution of Climate Change as a business issue. The 
discussion then moved on to introduce die logic which underpinned these C 0 2 
markets. C 0 2 markets were compared to their alternatives o f a C 0 2 tax or mandated 
C 0 2 reduction targets. Finally, die chapter closed by outlining the structures of each 
C 0 2 market. These three C 0 2 markets were the global Kyoto Protocol, the regional 
European Emissions Trading Scheme and the United Kingdom’s national Carbon 
Reduction Commitment. The chapter also introduced the practice o f ‘offsetting’ and 
the United Kingdom’s ‘Climate Change Agreements’, since they gave important 
context to the C 0 2 markets covered by the research.
Chapters five to ten which follow give six case studies that describe C 0 2 market 
design and operation.
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CHAPTER 5: 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS (CASE 1)
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5 CASE 1: EXTENDING THE GLOBAL C 02 MARKET OF 
THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
5.1 Introduction
The Kyoto Protocol developed the first and only global C 0 2 market. This first case 
examines efforts to extend the Kyoto Protocol beyond its expiration date o f the end 
of 2012. Data were collected through participant observation between October 2006 
and December 2008. Participant observation was first undertaken as a Policy Analyst 
at a leading sustainable energy consultancy in the United Kingdom and then 
completed as an Energy Efficiency and Climate Change Analyst at a large 
multinational energy company.
This case describes the processes whereby changes to the Kyoto Protocol were 
negotiated through annual negotiations. These negotiations were structured by the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The negotiations took 
place at what was called the "Conference o f the Parties5 (COP). The case describes 
the results o f three o f these Conferences of the Parties: COPs 12, 13 and 14. The 
second half of the case examines the stances of international governance bodies, 
governments, businesses and Non-Governmental Organisations with regards to the 
extension o f the Kyoto Protocol. This case drew upon the responses o f international 
governance bodies such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, The G8 group o f countries and the European Union. The case also draws 
upon national policy responses from Brazil, China, India and the United States. 
Businesses5 interactions with the extension of the Kyoto Protocol were examined 
through HSBC Bank’s, BASF’s and Tesco Pic’s responses. Finally, the case describes
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Non-Governmental Organisations’ stances through a Climate Change coalition called 
'Stop Climate Chaos’ and an organisation called the World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development.
This case was designed to give a macro-level illustration o f the responses o f key actor 
groups to the challenge o f forming C 0 2 markets. This examination o f the Kyoto 
Protocol was also important because it gave the framework for the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme, which was set up to deliver European commitments 
under the Kyoto Protocol.
5.2 The business network during phase I  o f the Kyoto Protocol
Phase I o f the Kyoto Protocol which runs from 2008 to 2012, was the first and only 
global C 0 2 market. As such the Kyoto Protocol was at the centre o f global 
negotiations regarding coordination in response to Climate Change. These 
considerations made the Kyoto Protocol the logical starting point in examining C 0 2 
market design and operation. The global network o f the Kyoto Protocol is 
illustrated in Figure 14. This network consisted of governments, international 
governance bodies, businesses, Non-Governmental Organisations and research 
organisations (GlobeScan, 2006). The interactions of each o f these actors are 
discussed in the next section o f this case.
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Developments in the Kyoto Protocol were important to multinational businesses and 
their engagement with C 0 2 markets. These businesses were seeking forward 
visibility on what would happen to the Kyoto Protocol when the first phase expired 
at the end o f 2012. Uncertainty regarding the future o f the Kyoto Protocol post 
2012 was identified in Cambridge Energy Research Associates’ C 0 2 market analysis 
as one o f the major risks with regard to the future profitability o f businesses’ C 0 2 
mitigation projects (CERA, 2007).
Negotiations regarding the structure and objectives of the Kyoto Protocol were 
ongoing and took place each year at the Conference of the Parties (COP). COP 12 
was held in Nairobi in 2006, COP 13 in Bali in 2007 and COP 14 in Poznan in 2008. 
The Kyoto Protocol was set to run until the end o f 2012 and negotiations to extend 
it started at COP 12 in 2006. However, progress on extending the Kyoto Protocol 
was stalled and by the end of COP 14 in November 2008, no agreement had been 
reached.
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There were a number of discussions at each Conference o f the Parties. This case 
focuses upon the part of die discussion which looked to extend the Kyoto Protocol 
beyond 2012. As will be illustrated in the case, the COP negotiations were generally 
met with disappointment. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) summed up 
progress as having agreed “a tentative date for beginning negotiations and no timeframe for 
concluding them” (BBC News, 2006). The decision was thus deferred to COP 13 and 
COP 14 in 2006, 2007 and 2008 respectively. There were successive failures to agree 
upon an extension to the Kyoto Protocol at each of these COP meetings. This case 
now gives representative examples of recommendations for action post 2012, as put 
forward by each group of C 0 2 market actors identified in Figure 14.
5.3 Interactions to extend the Kyoto Protocol beyond 2012
5.3.1 International governance bodies
The m ost influential international governance body with regards to Climate Change 
was the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
This was a United Nations administered treaty that set out the framework which 
underpinned the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 2006a). The objective of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, was to “stabilise greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that will prevent dangerous human interference with the 
climate system” (UNFCCC, 2005). The United Nations Framework Convention’s 
published mandate public for COP 12 was illustrative of their approach to tackling 
Climate Change. The mandate for the discussion was published as “The Conference of 
the Parties, at its eleventh session by its decision 1 /  CP. 11, resolved to engage in a dialogue, without 
prejudice to any future negotiations, commitments, process, framework or mandate under the 
Convention, to exchange experiences and analyse strategic approaches for long-term cooperative action
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to address Climate Change that includes, inter alia, the following areas: advancing development goals 
in a sustainable way; addressing action on adaptation; realising the fu ll potential of technology, 
realising the fu ll potential of market-based opportunities” (UNFCCC, 2006b). As detailed in 
the quote above, the United Nations Framework Convention saw Climate Change as 
part o f sustainable development and requiring action on adaptation, not just 
mitigation. They also regarded technology and the market based opportunities 
offered by C 0 2 trading as being essential. Looking to the United Nations as a whole, 
the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon, had been vocal about the threats of 
Climate Change. Fie stated "the dangerposed by war to all of humanity and to our planet, is at 
least matched by the climate crisis and global waiming." (Bone, 2007). The G8, consisting of 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United 
States, was another international organisation that showed interest in issues of 
Climate Change. Both, the United Kingdom and Germany were strong advocates of 
extending the Kyoto Protocol beyond 2012 during their presidencies of the G8 
council (Mulholland, 2007).
5.3.2 Governments
This section deals with the interests, attitudes and recommendations o f different 
governments with regard to Climate Change and the extension of the Kyoto 
Protocol. The case first examines the governments represented by the European 
Union, next follows an examination of the United States and finally the case gives a 
discussion o f the responses o f the governments of the developing world.
The European Union was a progressive region on Climate Change. It set up the C 0 2 
market o f the European Emissions Trading Scheme to manage its commitments
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under the Ivyoto Protocol and has set ambitious targets for C 0 2 emission reductions. 
In January 2007 the new energy and Climate Change package set “a series of ambitious 
targets on greenhouse gas emissions and renewable energy and aims to create a true internal market 
for energy and strengthen effective regulation. The Commission believes that when an international 
agreement is reached on the post-2012 framework this should lead to a 30% cut in emissions from 
developed countries by 2020. To further underline its commitment the Commission proposes that the 
European Union commits now to cut greenhouse gas emissions by at least 20% by 2020, in 
particular through energy measures” (Europa, 2007). The European Union was looking to 
lead on the issue o f Climate Change and was prepared to accept different standards 
for developed and developing countries. As stated above, the European Union’s 
target was for developed countries, implying developing countries would have less 
stringent targets than those adopted by Europe.
Within the United States, the Bush administration took a protectionist stance, 
choosing not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. The principle rationales for the United 
States’ stance were: the poor design of the controls, the overall expense o f the Kyoto 
Protocol and concerns about international competitiveness given that China and 
India were not required to cut emissions (Viscusi & Zeckhauser, 2006). However 
there had been increased action on Climate Change in the United States. Global 
Insight's Global Climate Change Service (2007) stated that recent developments in 
the United States were mounting pressure on the government to take a decisive 
stance on actions to address C 0 2 emissions. These were occurring at federal, 
regional, state and local levels of government. At the federal level there was a court 
case suing the Environmental Protection Agency to recognise C 0 2 as a pollutant 
under the Clean Air Act of 1970. There was also the Lieberman-McCain Climate
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Stewardship Act which looked to establish C 0 2 emissions limits for “electricity 
generation, transportation, industrial and commercial sectors, representing about 85% of total GHG  
emissions. ” (Global Insights, 2007). California was a leader in the United States; it had 
financial penalties for C 0 2 intensive transport fuel, progressive emission standards 
for cars sold in the state and a number of other linked measures. California was also 
looking to link its proposed C 0 2 market to the European Emissions Trading Scheme 
and was pushing hard for Federal action. Thus the picture from the United States 
was one o f recent progressive action against a past history of procrastination and 
protectionism. The movement was growing from the state level upwards. As a 
thermometer to American interest in the issue, A1 Gore’s documentary about Climate 
Change, A n  Inconvenient Truth’, won two Oscars at the 2007 ceremony. One link 
between parties in the United States who valued Climate Change action on pure 
environmental terms and traditionally sceptical groups was the issue of energy 
security. President Bush started to link the two issues, stating “I  want to make sure that 
the goal I  set by reducing gasoline usage by 20 percent over a 10-year period is a realistic goal. I  
know it's a necessary goal: it's necessary for national security purposes; it's necessary for economic 
security purposes; and it's necessary in order to be good stewards of the environment. ” 
(Whitehouse.gov, 2007). This portrayal linked Climate Change, energy security and 
economic security, removing some of the previous emphasis o f Climate Change as a 
purely environmental issue.
In the developing world, governments were nervous o f action on Climate Change in 
case it created obstacles to economic growth. This desire to protect economic 
growth tended to lead to intensity based targets, which aimed for energy efficiency, 
instead o f targets for absolute reductions in C 0 2 emissions. As an example, Russia
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only joined the Kyoto Protocol once it became clear that the decline in Russian 
industry meant it would easily meet targets to cut against a baseline o f 1990 
emissions. In China there were targets to “reduce the amount of energy [used] to generate 
each dollar of national income by 20 percent between 2006 and the end of the decade” (Planet Arc, 
2007b). However China had not set any targets for absolute reductions in C 0 2 
emissions. India had regulation in place to encourage renewable electricity 
generation, but had not yet set any targets for C 0 2 reductions or announced an 
ambition to develop or join a C 0 2 market. Some developing world governments 
looked to the developed world for support on Climate Change, with opinions such as 
that o f President Lula of Brazil being commonly encountered: "The wealthy countries are 
very smart, approving protocols, holding big speeches on the need to avoid deforestation, but they 
already deforested everything," (Planet Arc, 2007a). In the negotiations on extending the 
Kyoto Protocol, Brazil put forward the Brazilian Historical Responsibility proposal. 
This called for “A nnex I  [developed] countries with the longest histories of industrialisation and 
hence greatest cumulative contributions to global warming since 1840, to be allocated the most 
stringent emissions targets. Non A nnex I  [developing! countries would not be assigned targets in the 
first instance but would be drawn into the process in subsequent commitment periods when their 
share of historical emissions crossed a threshold.” (Nordhaus, 2006; The Australia Institute, 
2004). Developing countries took a protectionist stance, seeing the extension of the 
Kyoto Protocol as potentially threatening their economic development.
5.3.3 Businesses
In his open letter to the United Nations Global Compact, Jurgen Hambrecht, the 
Chairman o f the chemical company BASF said ‘We have to ensure that we deploy the most 
cost-efficient technologies first and get maximum climate protection at a minimum price a n d - most
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importantly — without distorting competitiveness. ’’(BslSF, 2007). This statement was aligned 
with Tesco s statement on their website that (<Tesco supports the UK Government's 
commitments to the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change. Tesco is committed to reducing its energy 
consumption and emissions of greenhouse gases responsible for Climate Change. We welcome the 
Government's initiatives to develop the renewable energy industry and are actively looking at the 
possibility of using energy from these sources” (Tesco, 2007). These quotes were 
representative o f the business community. Businesses were making efforts to be 
seen as aware of Climate Change and to be seen to support C 0 2 markets. However, 
they commonly looked to governments to take the lead, as they argued the need for 
regulation to force their hand before they could justify action to their shareholders. 
Further evidence o f this stance comes from a report signed by the CEOs of global 
companies in a World Business Council for Sustainable Development report. The 
report was titled cCEO Climate Policy Recommendations to G8 Leaders’ and was 
signed by 150 companies including Alcoa, British Airways, British Petroleum, EDF, 
EO N , Lafarge, Petrobras, Renault, RioTinto and Vattenfall. The report called for 
“the [COJ market to ...facilitate the linkage of explicit or implicit carbon values established at 
various national and regional levels, with the ultimate aim of establishing a deep and liquid 
international market for carbon that takes into account international competitive pressures.” 
(World Business Council for Sustainable Development, 2008: 7). The report also 
highlighted the need for “information metrics and methodologies such as common carbon 
accounting standards... data calculation tools and disclosure processes... to create a level playing field 
for all.” (World Business Council for Sustainable Development, 2008: 19). Finally, 
cniphasis was placed upon the need for regulation to enable business action, business 
cannot fully capitalize on these new opportunities in an international policy vacuum: strong
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leadership from all governments, particularly those of the major economies, is essen tia l(World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development, 2008: 9).
However, aside from the calls for a level playing field and the need for regulation to 
lead, businesses were starting to interact on the basis o f revised assumptions with 
regards to C 0 2 markets. For example, insurance companies were taking seriously the 
potential that coal fired power stations would be hit hard by future C 0 2 markets. 
Furthermore, some companies were introducing screening values for the price of 
C 0 2 at the project appraisal stage, in preparation for anticipated C 0 2 markets. The 
objective o f these screening values was to ensure that projects which passed 
investment hurdles would remain viable once a C 0 2 market was in place. The 
screening values used by individual businesses cannot be disclosed due to 
confidentiality reasons. However, there was a useful reference point which was the 
United Kingdom’s “shadow price of carbon... for... policy and investment appraisals across 
government in the UK” (Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs, 2007: 7) 
This policy set the shadow price for C 0 2 at £ 2 5 /tC 0 2  i*1 2007 (Department for 
Environment Food and Rural Affairs, 2007). The shadow price was effectively a 
predicted C 0 2 price which was designed to be built into UK government investment 
decisions, in order to help build the business case for lower C 0 2 investments. 
Although the screening values adopted by businesses were not the same, they were 
informed by similar analyses and they were broadly aligned with such values.
One final distinction worth acknowledging was the difference between the responses 
to Climate Change by energy intensive industries, such as manufacturing, versus the 
responses from less energy intensive businesses, such as banks and other service
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companies. The distinction was that companies which did no t use a lot o f energy 
were less constrained in their response to Climate Change. For example, HSBC 
Bank achieved ‘Carbon Neutral’ status in 2007 (HSBC Bank, 2007).
The overall trend was that companies were taking limited actions to recognise the 
price o f C 0 2, while publicly advocating for a scheme that would set a transparent 
long-term price for C 0 2.
5.3.4 Non-Governmental Organisations
There were a great many Non-Governmental Organisations campaigning on the 
issue o f Climate Change. To capture a representative point o f view, the Non- 
Governmental Organisation examined was a coalition o f around 50 individual 
organisations including ActionAid, Christian Aid, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, 
Oxfam, WWF-UK and a large number o f smaller and regional groups (Stop Climate 
Chaos, 2006). Stop Climate Chaos had pulled together the positions of their 50 or so 
members and come up with a manifesto which was summarised in the following 
statement (Stopclimatechaos.org, 2007). ‘I t is clear that there must be a global target for 
halting human-induced Climate Change, that the UK must gain proper control over its emissions 
and that the poorest countries of the world - who will be hit first and worst by Climate Change - 
must be fully supported. Consequently we call on the Government to do the following:
1. Negotiate internationally for global warming to peak at no more than 2 deg. C  -  there is an 
international consensus that this is the threshold for dangerous Climate Change. This will mean 
global greenhouse gas emissions must peak by 2015 and then decline irreversibly thereafter.
2. Institute a Carbon Budget to enable the UK to deliver an immediate and sustained decline in 
UK greenhouse gas emissions by an average of at least 3% p.a.
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3. Give all necessary support to developing countries to help them adapt to Climate Change and 
gain access to sufficient low/  zero carbon technology to grow sustainably; support programmes to 
help biodiversity adapt to Climate Change.
We will strive in the UK to generate public supportfor personal and political action pursuant to the 
above objectives. We will also help mobilise international civil society for concerted global action on 
Climate Change that is fa ir and equitable to all. ” This stance was common to most Non- 
Governmental Organisations, in that they advocated strong action on global 
regulation o f C 0 2. Stop Climate Chaos called for “global emissions [to]peak by 2015 and 
then irreversibly decline” (Stopclimatechaos.org, 2007). This was a strong call for action, 
especially when taking account that in 2008 there was currently only a semi global 
C 0 2 market, which would expire in 2012 and that reference to the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change estimates showed projected emissions in all scenarios rising 
sharply well past 2015 (IPCC, 2001). There was also a call for industrialised 
countries to support clean development in the developing countries. This was due to 
the industrialised countries’ responsibility for the majority of manmade C 0 2 
emissions to date and the lack of the necessary resources to develop a low-carbon 
economy in the developing world. Stop Climate Chaos called for adaptation 
strategies to be integrated within existing national and international development and 
poverty reduction activities and to be undertaken in such a way as to empower poor 
communities and strengthen disaster risk-reduction capabilities for the future.
5.4 Summary
This case examined efforts to extend the Kyoto Protocol beyond its expiration date 
o f the end o f 2012. The case first examined die processes whereby changes to the 
Kyoto Protocol were made through structured annual negotiations. These were held
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annually by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The 
case described the results of three of these ‘Conference o f the Parties’ (COP) 
negotiations from 2006, 2007 and 2008. The second half o f the case examined the 
stances o f International Governance Bodies, Governments, Businesses and Non- 
Governmental Organisations with regards to the extension of the Kyoto Protocol. 
This case drew upon the responses of international governance bodies such as the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the G8 group of 
countries and the European Union. The case also drew upon national policy 
responses from Brazil, China, India and the United States. Businesses’ interactions 
with the extension o f the Kyoto Protocol were examined through HSBC Bank, 
BASF and Tesco Pic. Finally, the case examined Non-Governmental Organisations’ 
stances through a Climate Change coalition called ‘Stop Climate Chaos’ and an 
organisation called the World Business Council for Sustainable Development.
This case was designed to give a macro-level illustration o f the responses o f key actor 
groups to the challenge of forming a C 0 2 market. It also gave a framework for the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme which was set up to deliver European 
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. The European Emissions Trading Scheme 
was examined in the second and third cases. Case two examines phase II of the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme. Case three then drew the discussion on to an 
examination o f the extension o f phase III o f the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme to cover the aviation industry.
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CHAPTER 6: 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS (CASE 2)
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6 CASE 2: A MANUFACTURER’S RESPONSE TO PHASE II 
OF THE C 02 MARKET OF THE EUROPEAN EMISSIONS 
TRADING SCHEME
6.1 Introduction
This second case examines phase II of the C 0 2 market of the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme. The previous case examined efforts to extend the global C 0 2 
market o f the Kyoto Protocol beyond its expiration date o f the end o f 2012. The 
link between cases one and two was that the European Emissions Trading Scheme 
could be viewed as a ‘child’ of the Kyoto Protocol. Phase II o f the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme was designed to deliver European obligations under the 
Kyoto Protocol’s commitment period of 2008-2012.
The case examines the interactions of Manufacturer Alpha during phase II of the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme. Data were collected between January and 
June 2009 through participant observation as a Carbon Consultant supporting 
Manufacturer Alpha. The case starts with an introduction to Manufacturer Alpha 
and their industrial network. Next, details are given o f an audit from the Carbon 
Trust that was designed to flag C 0 2 reduction opportunities at Manufacturer Alpha. 
The case then describes interactions with independent verifiers, the Department of 
Energy and Climate Change and the Environment Agency. These interactions 
concerned management o f Manufacturer Alpha’s participation in the United 
Kingdom’s Climate Change Agreements and the C 0 2 market of phase II of the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme. Finally, the case examines the influence of 
Manufacturer Alpha’s capital appraisal process and operational key performance
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indicators upon engagement with the European Emissions Trading Scheme. These 
discussions lead into case three which deals with how businesses responded to the 
announcement o f future developments within phase III o f the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme.
6.2 A business network in phase II o f the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme
This case examined a number of incentives and regulations which aimed to 
encourage energy efficiency improvements and C 0 2 emission reductions by 
Manufacturer Alpha. Manufacturer Alpha specialised in the production o f dairy 
nutrition goods. The case does not give further details o f Manufacturer Alpha’s 
product, since these details are not an important part o f the case and some o f the 
processes involved are subject to commercial confidentiality. Instead, it was the 
energy characteristics of the manufacturing process which made the case 
representative o f an energy intense manufacturer responding to C 0 2 markets. The 
manufacturing process relied heavily upon pumping to move the product around the 
site. To give an idea of the process, raw material entering at one end typically took 3 
to 4 days to emerge at the other end as a finished product. Pumps were required at 
all stages to keep the product moving. Heating and cooling requirements were also 
large draws on energy, as the product required pasteurisation (heating) and 
preservation (cooling) at a number of stages in the process. Finally, steam drove large 
evaporators which converted the treated liquid to a powder at the end of the process. 
Another reason that energy use was so intense was that the production process was 
continuous. All stages o f production fed into each other and hence all parts o f the 
site had to run simultaneously. . Extra storage could be introduced between
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productions stages, but as the product was perishable, this would require extra energy 
for refrigeration. These factors combined to mean that energy costs were estimated 
to represent -5 0 %  o f the overhead costs which could be controlled, or 20-25% of 
direct costs at Manufacturer Alpha’s production sites. Manufacturer Alpha’s network 
in phase II o f the European Emissions Trading Scheme is illustrated in Figure 15.
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The first interactions examined were with the United Kingdom’s government agency, 
the Carbon Trust. The Carbon Trust was tasked by government to facilitate the 
decarbonisation o f the United Kingdom’s industry. The Carbon Trust provided 
Manufacturer Alpha with funding to support the costs o f hiring the Technical 
Consultant to complete a review of efficiency investment opportunities at the site. 
Secondly, interactions between Manufacturer Alpha, Independent Verifier 1 and the 
Trade Association focussed upon maintenance of the site’s Climate Change 
Agreements with the Department of Energy and Climate Change. In a similar
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manner, interactions between Manufacturer Alpha, Independent Verifier 2 and 
Carbon Consultancy managed the site’s participation in the C 0 2 market of the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme, as administered by the Environment Agency. 
Figure 15 also illustrates that the Environment Agency interacted with the 
Departm ent o f Energy and Climate Change to manage data and compliance for 
pollution and prevention control in other environmental issues outside o f energy and 
C 0 2 emissions. These permits controlled other pollutants, such as hazardous 
chemicals and industrial wastes. Some data that related to other pollutants was 
linked to energy use and, as required, the Environment Agency shared this data with 
the Department o f Energy and Climate Change.
6.3 Interactions during phase II o f the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme
6.3.1 The Carbon Trusfs energy efficiency report
The Carbon Trust had a remit to decarbonise the United Kingdom’s Industry. One 
o f the major arms o f Carbon Trust’s program was to increase the energy efficiency of 
existing sites. This was an important consideration for C 0 2 markets, since any 
reductions in C 0 2 emissions resulting from efficiency efforts could potentially be 
monetised on the C 0 2 markets. The Carbon Trust managed an accreditation 
programme and kept a number of energy and carbon consultants on its books to 
perform energy efficiency audits at sites. In July 2008, one o f the accredited 
consultants, referred to as Technical Consultant in Figure 15, visited Manufacturer 
Alpha. The Technical Consultant agreed the scope o f the project to be to “identify 
between 7-10 opportunities, which typically have a payback of three years or less and would provide 
a noticeable reduction in both energy use and carbon emissions”. Prior to the visit, the Carbon
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Trust sent a checklist, asking the site to prepare the following material: the last 12-24 
months o f energy meter readings and invoices; copies o f any company energy 
policies; details o f any existing energy reduction work; site plans and a list of 
equipment on site.
During the visit, the Technical Consultant worked with the site engineer to 
understand the manufacturing processes. The Technical Consultant used his existing 
knowledge o f industry best practice to identify nine energy efficiency opportunities. 
These energy efficiency measures fitted into the categories summarised in Table 10.
Table 10: Energy efficiency measures recommended to Manufacturer Alpha
by the Carbon Trust
1. Improving the site energy management policy.
2. Improving site metering, so that energy data would be collected 
automatically to be used for energy management.
3. Fitting more efficient variable speed drives in some areas.
4. Using waste heat recovery to preheat other parts o f the process.
5. Improving insulation of hot processes
Collectively, these measures amounted to a potential saving o f 5% of energy use. 
The average payback o f the projects was around 0.5 years, with the maximum 
payback being 1.2 years. In the recommendations for Energy Management practices, 
the company was scored between 0 and 4 in the areas of Energy Policy, Organising, 
Training, Performance Measurement, Communication and Investment. 
Manufacturer Alpha’s average score was 2.4, with Training and Communication 
highlighted as areas to work on. The energy policy was subsumed within the site’s 
wider ISO 14001 procedures. These procedures managed environmental impacts
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which included, but were not limited to, energy use. It was recommended that a 
specific energy policy be drawn up and the appendix o f the Carbon Trust report gave 
an example energy policy to use as a starting point. With regards to the energy 
efficiency projects proposed, each was detailed in a standard table. The table gave: 
projected savings in terms o f cost, C 0 2 and energy, the project payback, project 
details, project rationale, a risk assessment, next steps and links to relevant Carbon 
Trust documents which could support the project going forwards. In all, the report 
consisted o f 34 pages and contained a significant amount of detail for the scoping 
stage o f each project.
6.3.2 Clima te Change Agreement interactions
The interactions of Manufacturer Alpha with the United Kingdom’s Climate Change 
Levy and Climate Change Agreements are now examined. These data are important 
because the Climate Change Agreements influenced Manufacturer Alpha’s 
interaction with the European Emissions Trading Scheme.
As an industrial user of electricity, Manufacturer Alpha was covered by the United 
Kingdom’s tax on industrial energy use, the Climate Change Levy. This tax applied 
to electricity, gas and coal, o f which Manufacturer Alpha only used electricity. For 
reasons o f confidentiality, average electricity prices for industry are used to illustrate 
the net cost o f the Climate Change Levy; these are illustrated in Figure 16. Issues of 
confidentiality relating to absolute levels of energy expenditure are managed by 
expressing costs in relative terms.
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Figure 16: Comparison of energy and C02 costs due to the Climate Change 
Levy and Climate Change Agreements
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An average rate for commercial electricity costs during the time o f the case was 7.5 
pence per kilowatt hour. The Climate Change Levy was added to this energy cost at 
a rate o f 0.45 pence per kilowatt hour, representing an increase in electricity costs by 
6%. However, Manufacturer Alpha was able to apply for a Climate Change 
Agreement through their Trade Association. The Trade Association managed 
Climate Change Agreements on behalf of their industry and communicated efforts 
back to the Department of Energy and Climate Change. In signing up for a Climate 
Change Agreement, Manufacturer Alpha had to adopt energy management policies 
and best practise. In return for this, they received an 80% discount on the Climate 
Change Levy, meaning that they paid the Climate Change Levy at a discounted rate 
o f 0.09 pence per kilowatt hour, instead of the original 0.45 pence per kilowatt hour.
A t this discounted rate, the net costs of the Climate Change Levy represented 1.2% 
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6.3.3 European Emissions Trading Scheme interactions
Moving on to examine Manufacturer Alpha’s engagement with the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme requires a switch in attention to their consumption o f oil. 
Manufacturer Alpha primarily used electricity and oil. This was because their rural 
location meant that they were not connected to a mains gas supply. Furthermore, 
electricity was not relevant to the European Emissions Trading Scheme, as it is a 
secondary form o f energy. The European Emissions Trading Scheme covered the 
large primary energy consumers, i.e. the power station, rather than dealing with all 
the dispersed electricity consumers. Since there was no gas, and electricity was not 
covered by the European Emissions Trading Scheme, the only items onsite which 
fell under the European Emissions Trading Scheme were Manufacturer Alpha’s large 
oil fired boilers. These were primarily used to produce steam to run the evaporators 
that converted the liquid product into a powder. There were two boilers, with one 
always running and the other kept up to temperature as a backup. These boilers are 
the subject o f an annual European Emissions Trading Scheme verification, where the 
verifier checked that the energy consumption figures and their conversion to C 0 2 
had been carried out in accordance with the Environment Agency guidelines. 
Manufacturer Alpha then had the option to engage the C 0 2 market in order to sell 
any surplus C 0 2 permits, or to purchase those required to cover any end of year 
shortfall. During the audit of the 2008 figures, the verifier praised the systems in 
place and only made small changes to the volume o f C 0 2 emissions reported. The 
changes took account o f a missed oil delivery and one mistake in data entry. These 
corrections resulted in less than a 0.5% change in the reported annual C 0 2 emissions 
for the site and the verification was passed with only minor comments. Firstly, it was 
requested that the temperature of an oil meter be recorded to ensure that
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consumption was adjusted to take account of differences in temperature. Secondly, 
the verifier recommended that some of the site practices should be recorded in the 
existing ISO 14001 documentation.
The annual European Emissions Trading Scheme verification did not involve any 
discussions o f the market based aspects of the European Emissions trading scheme. 
Instead it focussed solely upon ensuring that the correct volume o f C 0 2 was 
reported. Although Manufacturer Alpha had accumulated a significant surplus of 
European Emissions Trading Scheme credits for the past two years, they did not 
discuss or explore the option of trading these on the C 0 2 market. Instead they were 
withheld as a ‘float’ to ensure compliance was possible in coming years. In other 
words, despite significant C 0 2 credit surpluses affording a very large margin for 
expansion o f emissions in coming years, Manufacturer Alpha did not engage the CO, 
market and monetise their surplus credits. A second consideration was that these 
surplus credits came from a generous allocation to Manufacturer Alpha, rather than 
year on year reductions in emissions. Within the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme, the number of allowances each site received was based upon standard 
factors applied to an inventory of equipment onsite. In terms o f the impact of the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme, Manufacturer Alpha was in the position 
where they received more allowances than they needed to run their processes. In 
other words, they were and would be left with surplus C 0 2 allowances at the end of 
each year. The surplus amounted to around a 15% over allocation of C 0 2 permits. 
This over allocation would continue until phase II finished at the end o f 2012 and 
the allocations were reviewed. Figure 17 compares the value of this 15% surplus in 
C 0 2 permits to Manufacturer Alpha’s corresponding energy costs.
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Figure 17: Comparison of energy and C02 costs due to phase II of the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme
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At the time o f the case, oil prices were around $70 or €95 per barrel (EIA, 2010). 
One barrel o f oil represents 159 litres o f oil and at 11.84 kilowatt hours per litre this 
is equivalent to 1,883 kilowatt hours o f energy (Carbon Trust, 2008). Oil has a C 0 2 
content o f 0.247 kilograms of C 0 2 per kilowatt hour, meaning that one barrel of oil 
is roughly equivalent to 0.46 tonnes of CO, (Carbon Trust, 2008). A t the time of the 
case, the price o f C 0 2 credits in the European Emissions Trading Scheme had 
crashed to less than €2 per tonne (ECX, 2010). This was due to the over allocation 
o f credits during phase I o f the scheme, as discussed in chapter four. At €2 per 
tonne, the C 0 2 content of a barrel of oil represented a cost o f €0.93, or 
approximately 1% o f the cost o f the barrel o f oil. Given that Manufacturer Alpha 
received a surplus allocation o f C 0 2 credits o f around 15%, the total financial surplus 
recognised by Manufacturer Alpha due to the European Emissions Trading Scheme 
was around 0.15% of their energy expenditure. Even taking account for the timing 
of the case which corresponded with a temporary crash in the price of the C 0 2
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credits, this does not make a significant difference to the calculations. For example, 
taking a more representative cost of C 0 2 credits at €15 per tonne (ECX, 2010) still 
only gave a financial surplus that represented around 1.1% o f Manufacturer Alpha’s 
energy expenditure.
6.3.4 Manufacturer Alpha’s responses
The case was developed through separate interviews with the plant manager, 
engineer, accountant and compliance manager. It quickly became clear that they 
were very concerned about the cost of energy and the fact that it represented almost 
50% o f their controllable overhead costs. In discussions about C 0 2, they did not 
question the validity of concern over Climate Change. However, they did state that 
they found it a much less tangible issue to work with, when compared to energy 
costs. They also spoke about the Environment Agency’s C 0 2 regulation in terms of 
compliance and standards. This and C 0 2 as a whole was spoken of as an issue that 
had to be managed as a risk of potential non compliance, rather than a strategic, or 
business concern relating to participating in the C 0 2 markets. There were a number 
o f examples that illustrated that the cost of C 0 2 was yet to factor in the strategic 
decisions o f Manufacturer Alpha. Decision making processes at Manufacturer Alpha 
were examined though the project planning and appraisal processes and the Key 
Performance Indicators used to drive operational decision making.
Looking to the site’s CapEx plan, the projects were split into four levels o f priority, 
‘Strategic approved capital’, ‘Normal approved budget’, ‘CapEx to be considered’ and 
finally ‘CapEx on hold’. In die first category, one o f the two projects would have a 
significant impact upon C 0 2 emissions. The second category included sixteen
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projects, o f which seven would have a significant impact upon energy efficiency. 
Notably, about half o f the projects identified by the Carbon Trust were rolled into 
one o f the level two projects. Finally, one in four o f the projects in level three had a 
significant impact upon energy efficiency and none o f the three CapEx projects on 
hold impacted upon energy efficiency. When asked how a project came to be 
considered as Strategic Approved Capital, it was stated that this judgement was 
somewhat subjective, but would usually involve concerns o f increasing production, 
improving quality performance, or reducing cost. Efficiency and Climate Change 
were seen as a subset o f the third criteria of cost, but not as a strategic concern in 
their own right.
A further exploration o f the allocation of CapEx was made through an examination 
o f the project appraisal sheet that all CapEx proposals were submitted on. This was 
a five page document, Table 11 summarises the structure o f the document.
Table 11: Summary of Manufacturer Alpha’s standard CapEx appraisal sheet
Page 1: Project details, such as project name, manager, site contact details
etc. This included a tick box section where a project was to be 
classified as one of the following: Replacement’, ‘Extension’, 
‘Efficiency’, ‘New developments /  Markets’, ‘Quality’, 
‘Environment /  Safety’.
Page 2: Two free text boxes for completion, titled ‘Motivation for capital
project’ and ‘Description of project’.
Pages 3 + 4: Titled ‘Financial Information’. Requested details on expenditure 
level, project timing, specification and plan.
Page 5: Risk analysis with four questions: What happens if  we do not
invest? Influence on environment and safety? Influence on 
automation? Influence on factory throughput and storage capacity?
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The details above illustrate how Climate Change was incorporated into decisions 
affecting future investments. Attention is now turned to how C 0 2 markets 
influenced day to day management of the Manufacturer Alpha. Day to day decision 
making was examined through the site’s key performance indicators. A t the 
corporate level, the site reported performance against a number o f indicators under 
the headings given in Table 12.
Table 12: Manufacturer Alpha’s Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)
1. Deliver products at a competitive cost
2. Deliver and provide complete orders, on time and to specification
3. Adherence to plan
4. Optimise utilities efficiency
5. Materials recovery variance
6. Manufacture right-first-time
7. Customer complaints trends analysis
8. Factory expenses
The fourth KPI given in Table 12 was where energy efficiency was accounted for. 
‘Utilities’ refers to site energy supplies. In the case of Manufacturer Alpha, the two 
main concerns were that the boilers were run efficiently to produce steam and that 
the steam was used efficiently to produce product. The ultimate measure was tonne 
o f product produced /  litre of oil used. This high level target was then broken down 
to tonne o f steam produced /  litre of oil used and tonne o f product /  tonne of 
steam. The disaggregation was useful, since the first metric gave a performance 
measure for the team running the boilers and the second was a measure of the 
production team’s efficiency in using the steam. Supplementing these two measures,
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there were two further metrics which tracked compliance with the site’s Climate 
Change Agreements and the number of environmental complaints received.
6.4 Manufacturer Alpha’s final response
This case has outlined the three relationships held by Manufacturer Alpha in relation 
to C 0 2 markets. It has illustrated how the incentives and information introduced 
had not significantly influenced the medium-term decision making processes o f the 
company, or the day to day management of manufacturing sites. A t the time o f the 
case, seven months after the Carbon Trust survey was completed, there had only 
been one further interaction with the Carbon Trust. This was when the Carbon 
Trust’s account manager had enquired as to progress with the projects for his 
reporting purposes. The projects had not yet been started, but the site engineer had 
taken a few of them forwards. Around half of the projects identified by the Carbon 
Trust were rolled into a project assigned the second level o f priority. The 
relationships around the Climate Change Agreements and European Emissions 
Trading Scheme were both treated in much the same way as Manufacturer Alpha 
responded to previous environmental regulation. The C 0 2 reporting exercise was 
seen as a compliance requirement and the required support was hired to ensure that 
the correct reporting procedures were followed. However, the price of CO, which 
the Environment Agency had intended to change the decision making and 
management practices of C 0 2 market participants did not achieve this objective in 
Manufacturer Alpha’s case. Both schemes had negligible financial impacts of less 
than 1% of annual energy expenditure and as such did not significantiy impact upon 
the company’s overall operations. Furthermore as well as not representing a material
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cost, C 0 2 itself was not recognised as a variable to guide the decision making of 
Manufacturer Alpha.
6.5 Summary
This case examined phase II o f the C 0 2 market of the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme, which was designed to deliver European obligations under the Kyoto 
Protocol’s commitment period o f 2008-2012.
This case started with an introduction to Manufacturer Alpha and their industrial 
network. Next the case gave details of an audit from the Carbon Trust that was 
designed to flag C 0 2 reduction opportunities at Manufacturer Alpha. The case 
described interactions with independent verifiers, the Department o f Energy and 
Climate Change and the Environment Agency. These concerned management of 
Manufacturer Alpha’s participation in the United Kingdom’s Climate Change 
Agreements and the European Emissions Trading Scheme. Finally, the case 
examined the influence o f Manufacturer Alpha’s capital appraisal process and 
operational key performance indicators upon engagement with the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme.
The material presented in this case leads into case three, which examined the 
extension o f phase III o f the European Emissions Trading Scheme to cover the 
aviation industry.
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CHAPTER 7: 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS (CASE 3)
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7 CASE 3: AN ENERGY SUPPLIER’S RESPONSE TO 
AVIATION’S INCLUSION IN PHASE III OF THE C02 
MARKET OF THE EUROPEAN EMISSIONS TRADING 
SCHEME
7.1 Introduction
The third case examines the extension of phase III o f the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme to cover the aviation industry. This case details the response o f a 
large multinational energy company, NRG, to these changes. Data were collected 
through participant observation as an Energy Efficiency and Climate Change analyst 
at N RG  between April and December 2008.
The case starts with an introduction to NRG and their industrial network. Next the 
proposed updates to the European Emissions Trading Scheme, which would draw in 
the aviation industry, are summarised. The case then examines the interactions 
between different parts o f NRG  and a European Trade Association, EUTA, which 
was active in a niche o f the aviation industry. These interactions took place during 
the development o f an offering which bundled aviation fuel with C 0 2 permits 
equivalent to those which would be emitted during the burning o f the aviation fuel. 
The case also describes the influence of N RG ’s relationships with regulators of other 
anticipated C 0 2 markets. In addition, the case draws in consumers’ views of C 0 2 
offsetting, since they significantly influenced the response o f N RG  to phase III of 
the European Emissions Trading Scheme. The case closes with a description of how 
N RG ultimately responded to the proposed partnership with EUTA and how N RG ’s
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internal teams managed the new obligations faced by parts o f the company that were 
active in the aviation industry.
Phase II o f the C 0 2 market o f the European Emissions Trading Scheme was 
examined in the second case. Phase II was designed to deliver European obligations 
under the Kyoto Protocol’s commitment period of 2008-2012. The purpose o f the 
third case was to examine the extension of phase III o f the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme to cover the aviation industry.
7.2 A business network affected by aviationfs inclusion within phase III 
o f the European Emissions Trading Scheme
This case describes network interactions by an anonymised ‘N R G ’, a large 
multinational energy company, when faced with the opportunity to respond 
proactively to their future inclusion in the C 0 2 market of the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme. The business network which was affected by the proposed changes 
to the European Emissions Trading Scheme is illustrated in Figure 18. The core 
announcement triggering events described in the case was the inclusion of the 
aviation industry within the European Emissions Trading Scheme as of 2012, as 
detailed in the following section. As well as the deadline for inclusion o f the aviation 
industry, the European Union announced that early action in the years leading up to 
2012 would potentially be recognised by the final structure o f the extension of the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme.
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Figure 18: NRG’S network as a proposed participant within phase III of the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme
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The multinational energy company NRG was embedded in a network o f business 
relationships with other actors, with whom they interacted in response to the 
inclusion o f aviation in the European Emissions Trading Scheme. Figure 18 shows 
the industrial network and the interactions taking place. NRG  had a number of 
different parts o f its business which were affected by the changes, these are examined 
next through the customer and other actor relationships affected.
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7.3 Interactions to include aviation within phase III o f the C02 market o f 
the European Emissions Trading Scheme
7.3.1 Proposed changes to the market
From 2013 onwards, the European Emissions Trading Scheme will enter phase III 
and expand in scope to encompass additional sectors, including the aviation industry. 
Aviation was a fast growing sector and was politically charged with regards to 
Climate Change. European regulators were looking to include the aviation industry 
within the C 0 2 market o f the European Emissions Trading Scheme post 2012 and 
were also keen to incentivise early action before then. Figure 19 illustrates the 
timeline for inclusion o f aviation with the European Emissions Trading Scheme.
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Inclusion of internal EU flights 
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One o f the core debates surrounding phase III o f the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme was over how to allocate C 0 2 permits to market participants. Previously, 
permits were allocated for free, with their value arising from their scarcity and the 
fact that they could either be sold into the C 0 2 market, or surrendered to achieve
181
COa Market Design and Operation
compliance. There were proposals that instead, some or all permits should be 
auctioned, rather than allocated for free in phase III o f the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme. This development built upon experience gained during the first 
phase o f the European emissions trading scheme which ran from 2006 until 2008. 
During this practice phase, permits were allocated for free, based upon applications 
made by individual sites or companies. Since the permits were allocated for free, 
there was an incentive to apply for a ‘generous’ allocation. The aim o f auctioning 
permits was that sites would no longer have an incentive to apply for more permits 
than they required. The mechanism was also designed to encourage early reporting 
o f data. One o f the key incentives for early action was that companies in the aviation 
industry which collected and submitted their C 0 2 performance data early would be 
rewarded through being given the chance to apply for free C 0 2 emission permits.
Cooperation with this early data submission process could result in financial savings 
for the companies which adhered to the early implementation timeline illustrated in 
Figure 19. Financial projections were that aviation’s inclusion within the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme would increase the costs o f flights within Europe by €2- 
€9 and by around €40 for flights between the United States and Europe (Bebbington 
& Larrinaga-Gonzalez, 2008; Pais, 2008). Since almost all input costs for these 
calculations were variable, it was difficult to say what percentage o f airlines’ fuel costs 
would eventually be made up by the costs of C 0 2 emissions permits. However, 
some projections had been made regarding the anticipated overall impact upon flight 
fares. Anger and Kohler provide a review o f this work (2010), as summarised in 
Table 13.
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Table 13: Projected increases in aviation fares due to inclusion within the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme





>e in air fare 
Maximum
Short haul 0.2% 1.5% 2.5%
Medium haul 0.1% 1.4% 2.3%
Long haul 0.2% 0.6% 2.0%
The review by Anger and Kohler split cost projections between short, medium and 
long haul flights. In each case they gave minimum and maximum projected impacts 
o f the European Emissions Trading Scheme upon air fares. In short haul flights, 
estimated cost increases ranged between a minimum of 0.2% and a maximum of 
2.5%, the median being 1.5%. In medium haul flights, estimated cost increases 
ranged between a minimum of 0.1% and a maximum of 2.3%, the median being 
1.4%. Finally, for long haul flights, estimated cost increases ranged between a 
minimum of 0.2% and a maximum of 2.0%, the median being 0.6%. The absolute 
maximum projected increase in fares due to aviation’s inclusion in the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme was 2.5% and the median figure was between 0.6% and 
1.5%, depending upon the length of the flight.
7.3.2 NRG Fuel Supplier selling aviation fuel to Fuel Users
NRG had a business arm, NRG Fuel Supplier, which specialised in the supply of fuel 
to the aviation industry. NRG Fuel Supplier’s commercial relationships were 
affected by the inclusion o f Aviation within the European Emissions Trading
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Scheme. This was because Fuel Users still required the fuel they had always 
purchased, but would now also need support to trade C 0 2 within the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme. As such, this relationship was open to a new business 
opportunity and also new competitive pressures from alternative suppliers offering to 
provide emissions permits for the European Emissions Trading Scheme. There was 
also a shorter-term demand from customers for support as the regulation was 
finalised and implemented. This is where the link to EUTA, the trade association 
active in a niche o f the European Aviation Industry, became relevant. Firstly, the 
majority o f N RG  Fuel Supplier’s customers were members o f EUTA. Secondly, 
NRG had had strong links to EUTA, since its own aviation craft N RG  Fuel User 
were members. N RG ’s relationship with EUTA increased in importance, since they 
eventually developed a joint offering in response to aviation’s inclusion within the 
European Emissions Trading. More details on each o f these interactions are given 
below.
7.3.3 NRG Fuel User as a member o f EUTA
The second relationship affected by the inclusion of aviation within a C 0 2 market 
was between N R G ’s aircraft, NRG Fuel User and EUTA. EUTA was the trade 
association active in the European aviation industry. EUTA wanted to support their 
members in responding to and influencing the new regulations. As mentioned 
previously, a large number o f EUTA’s members already had an existing relationship 
with NRG Fuel Supplier and NRG Fuel User was already a member o f EUTA. 
EUTA approached NRG  Fuel User as members o f the trade association and 
proposed to set up a service where, through EUTA, members could buy fuel 
bundled with the required C 0 2 emission permits for compliance. The initial
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approach was for NRG  Fuel User to join this initiative as a member o f EUTA. 
Flowever, the discussions quickly moved from participation in the initiative, to the 
potential for N R G  Trading Arm and NRG Fuel Supplier to support the initiative as 
suppliers o f bundled C 0 2 emissions permits and aviation fuel respectively. This 
offer is explored further in the following section.
7.3.4 NRG Trading Arm and NRG Fuel Supplier as potential
new suppliers to EUTA. NRG Corporate as a mediator 
for the wider C02 market implications
After the approach from EUTA to NRG Fuel User outlined above, N RG Trading 
Arm and N RG  Fuel Supplier proposed to provide support to EUTA’s offering to 
their members. This support was proposed to be in the form o f N RG  Trading Arm 
and N RG  Fuel Supplier providing bundled emission permits and aviation fuel 
respectively. The offer would be made through EUTA, but contracts for fuel or 
emissions permits would be directly with NRG, many of them as extensions to 
existing commercial relationships. This offer changed the nature o f aviation fuel, 
which had been essentially a commodity, into a service that offered Fuel Users 
support with participation in the mandatory C 0 2 market. This was a potential point 
of differentiation for N RG Fuel Supplier and EUTA, as well as a potential new 
market for N RG  Trading Arm. NRG Corporate had a coordinating role and was 
responsible for managing potential impacts in other relationships. These related to 
the wider development o f the European Emissions Trading Scheme and other C 0 2 
markets. These considerations introduced potential conflicts of interest within 
NRG, the management and resolution of which was the responsibility of NRG 
Corporate. The new opportunities in aviation were part o f a much wider debate on
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energy and C 0 2 management for the whole of industry. Later, the case explored 
how C 0 2 markets were under discussion for all other sectors and how the issues of 
precedent setting and consistency were the concerns o f the central N RG  Corporate 
team.
7.3.5 Interactions between NRG Corporate and regulators o f
different regions and industries
The interactions between regulators o f different industries and regions were an 
important contributing factor in the guidance eventually given by N RG  Corporate. 
For example, the European Union was actively “examining whether it could he possible 
to..provide for the recognition of... [C O f allowances from] E T S [Emissions Trading Schemes] 
including the United States’ Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and the Californian E T S ” 
(Marr, 2007: 6). Similar discussions were also under way between the European 
regulators and Australian regulators attempting to develop C 0 2 markets (Marr, 2007). 
It was also the case that the scope of the European Emissions Trading scheme was 
much wider than that o f just the aviation industry. As discussed in the industry 
definition chapter in more detail, the European Emissions Trading Scheme also 
covered approximately 10,500 sites from the electricity generation, iron and steel 
production, manufacturing, mineral processing and pulp and paper processing 
industries (Europa, 2010). Interacting with European regulators on the treatment of 
aviation within the European Emissions Trading Scheme provided the possibility to 
intentionally or unintentionally influence the development o f C 0 2 markets for other 
industries or geographical regions. NRG Corporate was aware that the response to 
aviation would have to be placed in the wider context o f the developments o f C 0 2 
markets as a whole; they were active in a wide range of parallel negotiations. C 0 2
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markets were being discussed in Australia, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. Furthermore, aviation was only one o f a number o f industries covered by the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme.
7.3.6 Consumer scepticism with regards corporate COz 
responses
The role o f final consumers, such as aviation passengers and domestic transport fuel 
users, in shaping the response to aviation’s inclusion in the European Emissions 
Trading scheme could not be ignored. At the time o f the announcement in 2008, 
there were a number of consumer ‘scandals’ which received significant press 
coverage. These centred on widespread scepticism with regards the practice of 
offsetting, which is introduced in chapter four and explored in detail later in this case. 
Examples include headlines from the New York Times: “Carbon-Neutral is Hip, but is 
it Green?” (Revkin, 2007), the Guardian: “N ot carbon offsets, but carbon upsets” (Kysar, 
2010) and German consumers’ accusations that offsetting amounted to ‘selling 
pollution’ (Engels, 2001). These issues introduced significant reputational concerns 
which influenced the response o f all parties to the changes, but were o f particular 
concern to N RG  Corporate.
7.3.7 EUTA’s initialproposal to NRG
In response to their future inclusion in the European Emissions Trading Scheme, 
actors within the aviation industry saw the potential to proactively influence the C 0 2 
market. The formalised opportunities to gain recognition for early action were 
detailed in section 7.3. This section explores how actors sought to take further early
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action to demonstrate potential modes of compliance, with the hope of influencing 
the final regulatory design.
It is important to recognise that in this case, early action by the aviation industry 
would be offsetting, i.e. the purchase of C 0 2 permits outside o f a legally binding C 0 2 
market. This was unavoidable, since it was not possible to engage in emissions 
trading until the scheme became legally binding in 2012. The widespread scepticism 
and concerns with regards the practice of offsetting were introduced in chapter four. 
As the case will show, N R G ’s corporate policy team had to provide guidance to help 
avoid the potential technical and reputational pitfalls o f offsetting.
EUTA, a trade association active in a niche of the European Aviation Industry, 
approached N RG  Fuel User as a member and offered to supply a new fuel offering 
based upon bundling the aviation fuel and C 0 2 permit together. This would provide 
a potential compliance method for EUTA members covered by the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme, one built into the fuel purchase itself. The initial 
intention o f the approach was that NRG Fuel User would eventually purchase the 
offering, rather than be directly involved in its development and delivery.
The changes impacted on a number of areas of N RG ’s business. These areas 
overlapped and in some ways caused conflicts of interest within the company. NRG 
Fuel Supplier and NRG  Trading Arm saw the proposal as a potentially attractive 
business opportunity. They gave NRG Fuel User strong feedback to steer the 
proposal towards using NRG  Fuel Supplier and NRG Trading Arm as suppliers of 
the fuel and emission permits. NRG were to supply fuel and emission permits, while
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EUTA would bring economies o f scale by acting to aggregate the demand o f its 
members. EUTA members would benefit from a unified approach to compliance 
that would bring increased influence on the regulator to accept their ‘bundled fuel 
and offset’ method as a compliance option once the aviation was included in 2012. 
N RG Fuel User also saw the proposal as a response to external pressures from C 0 2 
interest groups. The proposal for a partnership between N RG  and EUTA was then 
put forward to NRG  Corporate. With the broad proposal outlined, NRG  Corporate 
had the responsibility to coordinate and oversee the actions taken by NRG Fuel 
User, NRG  Trading Arm and NRG  Fuel Supplier. Climate Change, offsetting and 
the emissions o f the aviation industry were all high profile issues. The main 
responsibilities o f N RG  Corporate were twofold: to manage the risk o f setting 
difficult precedents with other customers or regulators and to avoid damage to 
N RG ’s reputation, by ensuring the environmental validity o f the proposals. The key 
tensions experienced by N RG  Corporate and the resulting interactions are now 
examined.
7.3.8 The C02 conundrum: Make or buy?
‘Make’ or ‘buy’ is one o f the main discussion points within the wider C 0 2 
community. It is a result of the structure of C 0 2 markets, which is a cap and trade 
system, a detailed explanation o f such markets and their alternatives is given in 
chapter four. N RG  had to decide whether to ‘make’ or ‘buy’ when faced with the 
option to put forward a proactive response to the inclusion o f the aviation industry 
in the European Emissions Trading Scheme. They had to choose whether to ‘make’ 
the C 0 2 reductions required in-house, or ‘buy’ the emission permits from other 
parties via the C 0 2 market. This was the first point o f discussion within the different
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groups o f NRG. N RG  Trading Arm, NRG Fuel Supplier and NRG  Fuel User all 
felt that a ‘buy’ response through purchasing C 0 2 reductions, offsets if purchased 
before 2012, was the most appropriate response. This preference was in line with 
initiatives taken by competitors who had previously offered the chance for customers 
to supplement their flight ticket with an offsetting option. This offering had allowed 
passengers to offset the emissions generated during the flight by buying reduction 
certificates from the C 0 2 market. Along these lines, NRG Trading Arm saw the 
opportunity to extend its C 0 2 trading operations to a new area. NRG Fuel Supplier 
saw the partnership with EUTA as presenting an opportunity to achieve increased 
market share. NRG  Fuel User saw the offering as being the least cost and most 
convenient option to comply with the forthcoming C 0 2 market. N RG  Corporate 
however, saw the proposal as potentially damaging in a number o f other areas in 
N RG ’s wider network.
Aviation competitors had previously offered offsets as an optional product for 
purchase by consumers. However, if NRG bundled the offset and fuel together and 
used it to influence proposed regulation, they would set a precedent in the aviation 
industry. At the same time, it was noted that competitors would most likely be 
considering the same idea and so the fear of setting a precedent had to be weighed 
against the desire not to miss an opportunity. NRG Corporate developed a group 
policy on offsetting in order to deal with these concerns. There were two parts to 
the policy, the first dealt with who provided the offsets and the second with the type 
o f offset to be used. The first part of the policy stated that any offsets purchased by 
NRG must come from their trading arm, rather than a third party. It was felt that 
this would maximise the business opportunities for NRG, while at the same time
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avoiding the risk o f dealing with a third party in a potentially controversial market. 
The second part o f the policy gave guidance on what type o f offset to offer. It was 
quickly decided that although voluntary offsets "were the least-cost solution, they 
would not be used. This was due to their lack o f transparency and the low level o f 
consumer trust o f offsetting. The decision was taken that offsetting would be done 
using C 0 2 emission permits supplied by either the United Nations’ Kyoto Protocol, 
or by the European Emission Trading Scheme. The external verification o f 
compliance-based offsets by such authorities was seen as justifying their extra cost 
over voluntary offsets.
7.3.9 The issue of precedent setting
A wide range o f C 0 2 markets were being developed in parallel at the time o f the 
announcement o f aviation’s inclusion in the European Emissions Trading Scheme. 
As with many energy companies at the time, N RG publicly supported the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme and was calling for C 0 2 markets, in order to create a 
level playing field and to have the ability to assign a monetary value to C 0 2 
reductions. However, NRG Corporate was acutely aware that different regulators 
were interacting and that a precedent set in one region or industry could easily spread 
to others. For example Californian regulators were known to be working with 
Chinese and European regulators. Furthermore, the Stern team which published the 
influential Stem Review (Stern, 2006) were known to be working upon a similar 
report to support C 0 2 markets in developing countries. The existing relationships 
and interactions between regulators meant precedents set in one particular region or 
industry would quickly influence other pending C 0 2 markets. This made it essential 
that any proactive response to aviation’s inclusion in the European Emissions
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Trading Scheme was viewed within the wider context o f the development o f other 
C 0 2 markets. NRG  Corporate had a role of helping NRG Trading, NRG  Fuel 
Supplier and N RG  Fuel User in understanding the wider implications o f their 
proposals for a proactive response. NRG Corporate also played a part in explaining 
the environmental robustness and capital efficiency o f the different potential 
compliance options.
The interaction o f NRG  Corporate with other areas o f NRG and also in its 
engagement with EUTA performed two functions. Firstly, N RG  Corporate steered 
the proposal through careful treatment of C 0 2 offsetting. Secondly, they acted as 
advisors on the technical validity of proposals in terms o f environmental soundness 
and regulatory acceptability. While precedents had already been set externally on 
offsetting within the aviation industry and other sectors with equally public profiles, 
no one had yet offered the fuel and offset as a bundled product. NRG corporate 
was nervous that in setting the precedent it could have unintended circumstances in 
other future C 0 2 markets. NRG Corporate was also concerned that any actions 
taken should acknowledge consumer attitudes towards offsetting. Consumer interest 
in Climate Change was at an all time high and it was felt that consumers valued low 
C 0 2 offerings. However it was also recognised that consumers viewed offsetting 
with a scepticism that had been magnified by critical press articles and material 
released by C 0 2 interest groups.
7.4 NRGfs final response
N RG  assessed the reputational risks, observed the offsetting precedents in the 
aviation industry and weighed up the likelihood o f setting a precedent that would
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spread to other C 0 2 markets. NRG finally went ahead with the proposal, subject to 
two conditions. Firsdy, in order to maximise the business opportunity and minimise 
exposure to risk through third parties, NRG Trading Arm would be the sole supplier 
o f offsets and likewise NRG Fuel Supplier with regards aviation fuel. This would 
ensure the supply o f robust offsets and give full transparency as to their sourcing and 
treatment. Secondly, it was considered that it was acceptable to meet external 
demand for such offerings by using compliance based offsets. However, to mitigate 
reputational risks, NRG  would make further efficiency efforts in-house. Due to the 
external opinions o f offsetting, NRG Fuel User preferred to take a mix o f both 
‘make’ and ‘buy’ actions to manage C 0 2 emissions. N RG Fuel User would join the 
EUTA project and ‘buy’ offsets, while at the same time ‘making’ significant emissions 
reductions in-house through energy efficiency measures. This decision was partly 
due to external network pressures and partly to align with N RG ’s group-wide drive 
for efficiency improvements. In addition NRG Fuel User would supply emissions 
data in line with the timeframe illustrated in Figure 19. This would enable the 
application for free emissions permits when the scheme became legally binding.
7.5 Summary
This case examined the extension of phase III o f the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme to cover the aviation industry. The case detailed the response o f NRG, a 
large multinational energy company, to these changes.
The case began with an introduction to NRG and their industrial network. Next the 
case gave a summary o f the proposed updates to the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme in order to draw in the aviation industry. The case then examined the
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interactions between different parts of NRG and a European Trade Association, 
EUTA, which was active in a niche of the aviation industry. These interactions took 
place during the development o f an offering which bundled aviation fuel with C 0 2 
permits. The C 0 2 permits were equivalent to the C 0 2 emitted during the burning of 
the aviation fuel. The case also described the influence of N RG ’s relationships with 
regulators o f other anticipated C 0 2 markets. In addition, the case drew in 
consumers’ views o f C 0 2 offsetting, since they significantly influenced the response 
o f N RG  to their inclusion within phase III of the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme. Finally, the case closed with a description o f how NRG ultimately 
responded to the proposed partnership with EUTA and how N RG ’s internal teams 
which were active in the aviation industry managed the new obligations which they 
faced.
Case one provided an examination of efforts to extend the global C 0 2 market of the 
Kyoto Protocol beyond its end in 2012. The second case examined phase II o f the 
C 0 2 market o f the European Emissions Trading Scheme. Phase II was designed to 
deliver European obligations under the Kyoto Protocol’s commitment period of 
2008-2012. The purpose of the third case was to examine the extension o f phase III 
o f the European Emissions Trading Scheme to cover the aviation industry. The 
remaining cases examine a third C 0 2 market: the United Kingdom s Carbon 
Reduction Commitment. The Carbon Reduction Commitment targeted commercial 
companies which represented the next tier down o f energy users.
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CHAPTER 8: 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS (CASE 4)
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8 CASE 4: MANUFACTURER AND TRADE ASSOCIATION 
RESPONSES TO THE CONSULTATION ON THE 
UNITED KINGDOM’S C02 MARKET, THE CARBON 
REDUCTION COMMITMENT
8.1 Introduction
Case four examines a manufacturer’s and trade association’s responses to the 
consultation on the United Kingdom’s C 0 2 market, the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment. If  the European Emissions Trading Scheme was a ‘child’ o f the 
Kyoto Protocol, then the Carbon Reduction Commitment could be its ‘grandchild’. 
The Carbon Reduction Commitment targeted the next tier down o f energy users. 
These represented commercial companies which were not covered by the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme which focussed upon industrial scale operations.
Data were collected between January and October 2009 through participant 
observation as a Carbon Consultant supporting Manufacturer Beta. The case begins 
with an explanation o f the consultation format. Next Manufacturer Beta’s 
submission to the Environment Agency’s consultation process is examined. Then 
the public response o f the Confederation of British Industry to the consultation 
process is examined. The case closes by comparing the consultation responses with 
the outcome o f the consultation process and gives a description o f the final structure 
o f the Carbon Reduction Commitment.
As well as describing the development of the Carbon Reduction Commitment during 
its consultation phase, this case also gives important data on the structure o f the
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Carbon Reduction Commitment which is the starting point for cases five and six 
which examine the launch o f the Carbon Reduction Commitment.
8.2 A business network involved in the consultation phase o f the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment
This case details the response of Manufacturer Beta and the Confederation of British Industry 
to the consultation on the draft order of the Carbon Reduction Commitment. The draft order 
outlined the proposed structure of the Carbon Reduction Commitment ahead of its launch in
April 2010.
Figure 20 introduces Manufacturer Beta, The Confederation of British Industry and 
the network within which they responded to the Carbon Reduction Commitment.
Figure 20: Manufacturer Beta and the Confederation of British Industry as 
part of the Environment Agency’s network during consultation on the Carbon
Reduction Commitment
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Manufacturer Beta had their head office and over 100 sites within the United 
Kingdom. They also had multiple manufacturing bases and global export markets. 
Manufacturer Beta was a high-tech manufacturing company; however their specific 
industrial sector has been withheld for reasons of confidentiality. Manufacturer Beta 
was supported in their response to the Carbon Reduction Commitment and other 
C 0 2 markets by a Carbon Consultancy who specialised in sustainable energy and 
C 0 2 reporting. Data were collected through participant observation at Carbon 
Consultant at Carbon Consultancy.
The Confederation o f British Industry was a prominent industrial lobby group within 
the United Kingdom which was formed in 1965. They introduced themselves as 
“...the UK's top business lobbying organisation, [exerting] unmatched influence with government, 
politymakers and legislators meanpng] [they] can get the best deal for business -  at home and 
abroad”(CBI, 2009a) . The Confederation of British Industry was chosen for the case 
for several reasons. They represented 420,000 organisations within the United 
Kingdom, meaning that their reach across the estimated 5,000 Carbon Reduction 
Commitment participants was very broad. In addition, they had a specialist Climate 
Change Task Force that was well placed to comment on the draft order of the 
Carbon Reduction Commitment.
The case now outlines the format and process of the consultation, before giving 
details o f Manufacturer Beta’s and the Confederation o f British Industry’s response.
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8.3 Interactions during the consultation on the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment
8.3.1 Consultation format
The consultation for the development of the Carbon Reduction Commitment was 
carried out in three stages. The first stage questioned the form that the regulation 
should take. This is not examined here; the logic that regulators presented for the 
selection o f C 0 2 markets over other regulatory options was given in chapter four. 
The second consultation stage developed the design of the scheme’s draft order, as 
covered in section 4.7.6, where the draft order of the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment was introduced. Finally, the third stage o f the consultation asked for 
feedback on the Carbon Reduction Commitment’s draft order which detailed the 
proposed structure and timelines of the Carbon Reduction Commitment. 
Participating businesses were using the draft order to plan their response to the 
Carbon Reduction Commitment during 2009. The scheme was due to start in April 
2010 but the final consultation didn’t finish until 7 October 2009 (DECC, 2009d). 
The narrow timescales meant that companies started preparing for the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment on the basis of the draft order. By the time the final 
consultation was completed, there was little time left to prepare before the launch of 
the scheme. Table 14 gives a summary of the consultation format and content. The 
consultation was presented in the form o f 66 questions, to which respondents were 
asked to make a direct response by selecting one of a number o f multiple choices. In 
around half o f the questions, the respondents were given the chance to explain their 
response by typing a free text comment. These 66 questions were grouped according 
to a number o f concerns. Table 14 sorts them into eight categories which 
correspond with the main points raised during the consultation.
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Table 14: Categorisation of the 66 questions asked by the consultation on the
Carbon Reduction Commitment
Category 1: Treatment of groups- finding the highest parent company and its 
subsidiaries
Category 2: Landlord tenant issues- assigning responsibilities
Category 3: Qualification criteria and the registration process
Category 4: Managing exemptions and overlaps with other C 0 2 regulatory 
schemes
Category 5: Reporting requirements
Category 6: Administrative requirements
Category 7: League table publication and C 0 2 trading requirements
Category 8: Penalties and fines for non compliance
The first category dealt with the treatment of groups of companies which were 
owned by a parent organisation. The questions aimed to ensure that the final 
wording found the highest parent company and its subsidiaries. This was important, 
because rules which aggregated groups brought smaller businesses into the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment that would not have qualified on their own. The legal 
structure defined by the Carbon Reduction Commitment also specified which 
companies would ultimately be liable for the cost of C 0 2 permits and any penalties 
or fines for non compliance.
The second category o f questions examined landlord tenant issues, aiming to clarify 
how to assign responsibilities between landlords and tenants. This was important 
because any building usually had both a landlord and a tenant. It was necessary to 
define which o f these two parties would be required to participate in the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment. In the draft order, the default responsibility lay with the 
landlord. However it was argued that in many cases, tenants had more control over
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energy consumption and so should be liable for Carbon Reduction Commitment 
participation instead o f the landlord.
The third category o f questions dealt with the Carbon Reduction Commitment’s 
qualification criteria and registration processes. These processes were important 
since the ultimately determined which businesses had to participate in the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment.
The fourth category looked at how best to manage exemptions and overlaps with 
other C 0 2 markets. A t the time o f the launch of the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment, some businesses within the United Kingdom were already 
participating in the European Emissions Trading scheme and /o r  the United 
Kingdom’s Climate Change Agreements. The Environment Agency wanted to avoid 
double regulation o f any one C 0 2 emissions source due to the potential conflicts and 
administrative waste that this could cause.
The fifth category related to clarification of a number of reporting requirements. 
The original draft order had left some ambiguity in terms o f the reporting 
requirements o f the Carbon Reduction Commitment. It had also included some 
direct errors that required correction and clarification. For example, the definition of 
Voluntary automatic meter reading’ is dealt with later in this case. Two potential 
definitions gave rise to the potential to put certain participants at either the top or 
bottom  o f the scheme’s league table, depending upon which definition was chosen.
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The sixth category looked at the administrative requirements o f the scheme and 
clarified certain routine aspects such as how long records would have to be kept and 
exactly when and how participants would register for participation.
The seventh category dealt with the process of league table publication and 
participation in the Environment Agency’s annual auction of C 0 2 allowances.
Finally, the eighth category sought comment on the proposed penalties and fines for 
non compliance with the Carbon Reduction Commitment. These fines were 
potentially significant, because the Carbon Reduction Commitment was based upon 
self reporting. Penalties had to be significant enough to prevent businesses from 
simply ignoring the scheme and then paying a fine. Space was given in the 
consultation to comment upon each of the eleven different types of fine.
8.3.2 Manufacturer Beta’s consultation response
Manufacturer Beta’s response to the Carbon Reduction Commitment consultation is 
now described. All organisations had to respond to the same set o f questions, this 
amounted to responding to the 66 questions summarised by the eight categories in 
Table 14. The process of responding to the consultation represented about 8 hours 
of work and was informed by the 18 months of preparations for the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment undertaken by Manufacturer Beta and the Carbon 
Consultancy. The Carbon Consultancy performed an initial scan o f the document 
and proposed responses to the 66 questions. There was then a review meeting with 
Manufacturer Beta’s property lawyer to revise and agree responses. Although many 
o f the consultation questions were not relevant to a manufacturing company, such as
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those relating to the treatment of National Health Service organisations, Schools or 
Universities, Manufacturer Beta did identify a number o f concerns. The following 
section reviewed Manufacturer Beta s concerns within each of eight categories of 
consultation question as summarised in Table 14.
Firstly, the treatment o f groups did not cause any concerns for Manufacturer Beta. 
They had a United Kingdom parent company and a number o f subsidiaries which 
they had already identified. Therefore defining the legal structure o f the company 
was not a complicated issue for them and they did not provide any feedback on this 
issue.
However, the second category regarding the assignment of responsibilities between 
landlord /  tenants was o f particular relevance to Manufacturer Beta. Manufacturer 
Beta were landlords at some o f their sites and tenants at others. Question 10 asked 
“Do you agree with Government's proposal not to proceed with the option of allowing limited 
transfers o f emissions responsibility from the landlord to the tenant?” (DECC, 2009d). 
Manufacturer Beta stated that they did not agree with this proposal. They gave an 
example where they had responsibility for the purchasing of energy on behalf o f their 
tenants. Manufacturer Beta stressed that this meant they would have responsibility 
for Carbon Reduction Commitment reporting and compliance which related to end 
use by a third party tenant. Manufacturer Beta argued that they had little or no 
operational control over their tenants with which to encourage C 0 2 emission 
reductions and stressed that they felt that transferring Carbon Reduction 
Commitment responsibilities to their tenants would give the responsibility to those 
with operational control of the relevant C 0 2 emissions. Manufacturer Beta
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suggested that default responsibility for the Carbon Reduction Commitment should 
be with the landlord, but that a landlord should be able to take it upon themselves to 
prove responsibility o f  a tenant for emissions. When such proof was given, transfer 
o f responsibility was proposed to be on the basis of acceptance by the tenant. Once 
the transfer o f responsibility had been agreed, C 0 2 emissions for the site would be 
apportioned between the two parties, then reported and traded within each party’s 
Carbon Reduction Commitment account.
The third category regarding qualification criteria for the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment was not of particular relevance to Manufacturer Beta. They were large 
enough to qualify for the Carbon Reduction Commitment with certainty, meaning 
that there was no need to seek clarification or consideration of a borderline case of 
qualification for the scheme.
Similarly, the fourth category, which was concerned with managing exemptions and 
overlaps with other C 0 2 markets, did not cause any major concerns for 
Manufacturer Beta. The company was comfortable with the Environment Agency’s 
proposals for managing the overlaps between the Carbon Reduction Commitment, 
Climate Change Agreements and the European Emissions Trading Scheme. The 
management o f these exemptions and overlaps is dealt with later in this chapter 
when the final structure of the Carbon Reduction Commitment is given.
Xhe fifth category which dealt with reporting requirements o f the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment did flag a number of concerns for Manufacturer Beta. Question 18 
asked “Does the wording in the Draft Order around the calculation of a participant's footprint lead
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to any unforeseen consequences?” (DECC, 2009d). Here Manufacturer Beta highlighted a 
concern which was related to the process of converting energy use into the 
equivalent COz emissions. This process relies upon what are called ‘emissions 
factors’. These are multiplication factors for the C 0 2 content of each type o f fuel. 
The Environm ent Agency typically sets these and mandates the use o f these standard 
factors to ensure consistent reporting across scheme participants. Manufacturer Beta 
pointed out that reporting for the Carbon Reduction Commitment would cover sites 
which were also participants in the United Kingdom’s Climate Change Agreements 
and the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme. Reporting for a single site 
would thus require three sets of processes and records, one for each scheme. It was 
argued that the Environment Agency should look to address these requirements, 
since they represented a disproportionate burden upon C 0 2 market participants. In 
subsequent responses to questions 41, 43 and 44 Manufacturer Beta gave specific 
examples o f where such overlapping reporting requirements were out o f line due to 
inconsistencies in C 0 2 emissions factors between different C 0 2 markets. Another 
concern regarding reporting requirements related to the proposal of the 
Environment Agency to allow small emissions sources to be estimated. Question 47 
asked “Do you agree with the proposed approach to establishing when an energy bill counts as an 
estimate for the purposes of applying a 10% emissions uplift? (DECC, 2009d). This proposal 
was welcomed by Manufacturer Beta, who used the consultation response to show 
their support and request clarification on the details of the estimation process. The 
estimation techniques were viewed as being more efficient and appropriate for 
reporting small, locally procured, energy accounts. The 10% uplift applied to 
estimated C 0 2 emissions was seen as a price worth paying.
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The sixth category o f questions relating to administrative requirements o f the scheme 
did not raise specific concerns with Manufacturer Beta. They were familiar and 
comfortable with the proposals on record keeping, registry account management, 
audit processes and the level and types o f annual administrative fees due. These are 
summarised later in this chapter, when the final structure o f the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment is given.
The seventh category o f questions covered the publication of the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment league table and C 0 2 emissions trading requirements. Here, 
Manufacturer Beta flagged concern with regard to the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment’s Early Action.Metrics. The Early Action Metrics were proxy measures 
for good energy management that would be used in the first years of the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment, they are introduced in detail in section 4.7.6. In the first 
year o f the Carbon Reduction Commitment there would not be any previous C 0 2 
emissions data to make year on year comparisons of savings achieved by each 
participant. The emissions data would also still be of questionable quality while the 
scheme ‘found its feet’ in years two and three. Therefore, the Early Action Metrics 
were required to fill this gap in the data by giving proxy measures for good energy 
management. One of the Early Action Metrics proposed by the Environment 
Agency was the level o f installation of ‘Automatic Meter Reading’. The 
Environment Agency believed that companies going to the extra effort o f collecting 
energy data were likely to be managing energy well. Question 30 asked “Does the 
wording in the Draft Order around the calculation of the Early Action metric lead to any unforeseen 
consequences?” (DECC, 2009d). Manufacturer Beta pointed out that there was the 
potential for unforeseen circumstances and asked for clarification over what types of
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Automatic Meter Reading would qualify for the Early Action Metric. Their concern 
was that in sites with high electricity consumption, such meters were already 
mandated. The Environment Agency was proposing to only recognise voluntarily 
installed Automatic Meter Reading. Manufacturer Beta wanted to avoid being 
penalised at sites where the majority of their supply was already mandated to have 
Automatic Meter Reading, leaving them no opportunity to install it voluntarily.
The consultation questions ended with a number of questions which related to the 
level and types o f penalties and fines for non compliance. Manufacturer Beta agreed 
with the proposals o f the Environment Agency, subject to the request for the use of 
discretion in acknowledging the difficulties faced by participants due to delays caused 
by the Environment Agency missing deadlines. For example the Environment 
Agency had already missed a number of deadlines for providing information relating 
to the Carbon Reduction Commitment processes and requirements. These delays 
had left Manufacturer Beta little time to prepare for the launch o f the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment. The consultation process reported back in October 2009, 
only six months before the scheme was due to commence.
Finally, the consultation template left space at the bottom for additional comments 
to be given at the discretion of the respondent. Manufacturer Beta took the 
opportunity to present four concerns. Firstly, the Environment Agency was 
planning to send Carbon reduction Commitment qualification packs to each site that 
they knew of, instead o f to companies head offices. Manufacturer Beta argued that 
in a large multisite company this would cause confusion and start local work to 
respond to the Carbon Reduction Commitment. This risked duplicating what the
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corporate centre was already doing to respond to the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment. It was requested that the Environment Agency send each company’s 
qualification packs to a central focal point to aid the coordination process across 
large companies. Secondly, die Environment Agency had run a number of training 
events on die structure and timings of the Carbon Reduction Commitment. Further 
training dates were requested because there was still a low general understanding 
regarding the technicalities of the Carbon Reduction Commitment. Thirdly, it was 
known to Manufacturer Beta that a pilot of the Carbon Reduction Commitment 
registry account website was being tested with a number o f companies. It was 
requested that this pilot site be made public, in order to help with preparations for 
the Carbon Reduction Commitment. This would also remove the unfair advantage 
being given to the businesses in the pilot. Finally, one request based upon 
experiences from the European Emissions Trading Scheme was made. The 
European Emissions Trading Scheme was administered in the United Kingdom by 
an Environment Agency team which could only be contacted by email. This made 
processes o f querying and clarification o f technicalities of the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme complicated and drawn out. It was requested that the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment team be contactable by telephone once the scheme started 
in April 2010.
The consultation response was submitted in the excel template provided by the 
Environment Agency. Once submitted, there was no individual response from the 
Environment Agency. Instead the Environment Agency collated the returns and 
produced a document summarising the submissions and their response to this 
aggregated summary. The case now details how the Confederation o f British
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Industry responded to the consultation on the draft order of the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment. Following this discussion, the case closes by giving a summary of the 
response o f the Environment Agency to the consultation feedback and by describing 
the final structure o f the Carbon Reduction Commitment.
8.3.3 Confederation o f British Industryfs consultation response
The trade association examined here is The Confederation of British Industry, they 
made their consultation response publicly available from their website (CBI, 2009b). 
As representatives o f British industry, they prepared an eight page open letter which 
dealt with the keys topics summarised in Table 15.
The Confederation o f British Industry’s open letter started with an acknowledgement 
that mainstreaming energy efficiency would deliver environmental and cost benefits 
and that as such, the Confederation of British Industry supported the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment. The Confederation of British Industry had historically 
supported the European Emissions Trading Scheme and they placed their response 
to the Carbon Reduction Commitment within the stance that they supported 
economy-wide pricing o f C 0 2. The Carbon Reduction Commitment was 
acknowledged to be targeting the remainder of the business community, nominally 
the commercial sector. Their introduction closed with the request that, subject to 
achieving the objectives signed up to above, regulations should be as simple as 
possible and administrative costs as low as possible.
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Table 15. Summary headings of Confederation of British Industry’s response 
to Carbon Reduction Commitment Consultation
1. Assess impact on companies’ cash-flow in light of economic conditions ahead of 
first payment.
2. Allow businesses flexibility in determining Carbon Reduction Commitment 
administration most relevant to their operations and therefore allow large 
subsidiaries to operate in the Carbon Reduction Commitment in their own right.
3. Reward good carbon management, irrespective of business change, through 
exploring the use o f sector specific metrics and benchmarks in the capped phase.
4. Incentivise companies to invest in renewable energy generation within the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment.
5. Expand the Early Action Metric to include other accredited carbon management 
schemes and standards.
6. Recognise the burden that the Carbon Reduction Commitment will place on 
landlords, provide sufficient guidance and permit allowance transfers between 
landlords and tenants.
7. Ensure consistency between the Carbon Reduction Commitment and other carbon 
reporting requirements to make it easier for companies to administer.
8. Minimise the regulatory burden of multiple Climate Change policies by analysing 
interaction and overlap.
More detail is now given on each of the headings in Table 15. Firstly, the 
Confederation o f British Industry expressed concerns over the cash flow 
implications o f the Carbon Reduction Commitment. They did not quantify the 
anticipated the scale o f the impacts, but the calculations given in case five give an 
estimate o f  cash flow impacts of approximately 7.5% of annual electricity 
expenditure. In the Confederation of British Industry letter to the Environment 
Agency they stressed that scheme administration costs, the part o f the cost of C 0 2 
allowances which would be recycled and the potential civil penalties were ah costs
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over and above those borne to fund energy efficiency improvements. The point 
made by the Confederation of British Industry was that they wished to protect their 
members from administrative cash flow challenges since this reduced the money 
available for spending upon real energy efficiency projects and was, in their opinion, 
an unnecessary burden upon C 0 2 market participants.
The second request from the Confederation of British Industry was that participants 
in the Carbon Reduction Commitment be given some flexibility as to how to treat 
their subsidiary companies. The original draft order specified that all subsidiaries 
must report through their parent company, to give one aggregated Carbon Reduction 
Commitment participant. The Confederation of British Industry raised concerns 
over whether this would create additional administrative burdens. In a lot of 
companies, the legal structure did not match the operational structure. This could 
mean that CO , data would have to undergo complex apportionment exercises to 
allow reporting up to the highest parent company. The Confederation o f British 
Industry’s request was that certain large organisations could participate as a number 
o f subsidiaries in the Carbon Reduction Commitment instead. Furthermore, the 
Confederation o f British Industry argued that flexibility in defining the participant’s 
structure- would help to avoid a parent company reporting the perforniance and 
bearing the penalties /  rewards for performance of a subsidiary over which they had 
little or no operational influence. In such cases it was argued that the subsidiary 
would better recognise the incentives embedded within the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment if  allowed to participate directly.
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The third point raised by the Confederation of British Industry focused upon the fact 
that the Carbon Reduction Commitment targeted absolute C 0 2 emissions 
reductions. They pointed out that there were two mechanisms within the scheme to 
incentivise these reductions. These were the cap to the number o f C 0 2 allowances 
available in phase II o f the scheme, plus the fact that the league table would be 
dominated by measures o f absolute reductions in C 0 2 emissions. The Confederation 
of British Industry raised two concerns, one was that businesses may grow or shrink 
their emissions for reasons other than good or bad C 0 2 management. The first 
example they gave was that project based companies would fluctuate their position in 
the league table based upon the number of projects they were awarded over any one 
reporting period. The second example was that of a hypothetical company with 
excellent C 0 2 management performance that was growing in scale o f operations. 
Since this company’s absolute emissions would be growing, they would be penalised 
by the league table, despite their best practice in C 0 2 management. The growth 
metric measured the change in a business’s scale of operations through their financial 
turnover. The growth metric, as introduced fully in chapter four, could be applied 
for to bring up to a 25% uplift in the business’s targets due to an increased scale of 
business operations. The Confederation of British Industry also raised one lower 
level concern related to the growth metric. They were uncomfortable with the use of 
turnover as a measure o f business growth. The Confederation o f British Industry 
argued that a number o f other factors affected turnover and hence it could not be 
relied upon to have a stable relationship to the scale of business activity or thus to 
the level o f C 0 2 emissions. Instead of using turnover as a measure o f growth for 
normalising C 0 2 emissions in the league table, it was requested that sector specific
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benchmarks would be developed to give a more accurate indication o f business 
growth.
The issue o f onsite renewables generation was raised in the fourth section of the 
Confederation o f British Industry’s consultation response. Here it was 
acknowledged that the separate government scheme of ‘Renewables Obligations 
Certificates’ (ROCs) was already incentivising companies to invest in renewables 
technologies and that the Carbon Reduction Commitment had correctly avoided 
double counting o f C 0 2 through its proposed treatment of onsite renewables 
generation. The Confederation of British Industry acknowledged the need to 
continue to avoid double counting of emissions, but requested that the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment find another way to incentivise renewables through a 
parallel but non conflicting mechanism. It was pointed out that Renewables 
Obligation Certificates targeted large energy producers. The Confederation of 
British Industry requested that companies whose primary business was not energy 
generation could be awarded financial subsidy to help them invest in renewables, or 
extra league table points to recognise their investment in renewables.
The fifth concern o f die Confederation of British Industry related to the treatment of 
Early Action Metrics. Reference back to chapter four gives the full details of two 
proxy metrics for good C 0 2 management, these were named Early Action Metrics . 
The Environment Agency introduced the Early Action Metrics to deal with early 
stages o f the Carbon Reduction Commitment where there would be no or little C 0 2 
emissions reduction data on which to base the league table. It was argued that the 
level o f coverage o f the Carbon Trust’s standard and the coverage of voluntary
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Automatic Meter Reading would be good proxy measures of a company’s progress 
on energy and C 0 2 management. The Confederation of British Industry accepted 
the logic o f needing the Early Action Metrics, but proposed that their scope be 
widened to recognise a number of what they argued to be substitutes for the Carbon 
Trust Standard or Automatic Meter Reading. Namely, they asked that the Early 
Action Metrics be expanded in scope to recognise two alternative energy and C 0 2 
management standards. These were the international ISO 14064 and the upcoming 
European E N  16001 standard, established in summer 2009. A small change was also 
requested for treatment o f emissions which were covered by voluntary automatic 
meter reading. In the proposed structure of the scheme, any emissions covered by 
automatic meter reading would be subject to a higher level of scrutiny within the 
scheme rules. It was requested that where the installation o f the automatic meter 
reading was voluntary, this higher level of scrutiny be waived, in order to avoid a 
disincentive to invest in voluntary automatic meter reading.
Landlord-tenant issues were the focus of the sixth concern expressed in the 
consultation response. Although it may not sound relevant to a lot o f companies, 
the challenge o f dealing with landlord-tenant conflicts of interest was a significant 
issue for the Carbon Reduction Commitment. This was because many companies let 
or sublet parts of their properties, or even rent whole sites from a landlord who 
provided the energy utilities as part of the contract. This caused problems 
concerning ultimate responsibility for C 0 2 emissions and also for Carbon Reduction 
Commitment participation. The Confederation of British Industry raised a number 
o f issues relating to these concerns. Their requests amounted to asking for flexibility 
where there was agreement between the landlord and tenant over the preferred
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participant in the scheme. The Confederation of British Industry requested that 
landlords and tenants could joindy nominate which party should be the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment participant. Furthermore, it was requested that the landlord 
was given the right to reasonable support from its tenants in collecting the data 
required for Carbon Reduction Commitment submissions in instances where the 
landlord remained the participant on behalf of the tenant. This was in order to avoid 
the situation whereby the landlord was unable to comply with the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment due to the non cooperation of tenants who were not legally bound to 
provide data to their landlord.
The seventh point raised by the Confederation o f British Industry was that in 2012 
the United Kingdom government would be mandating that all United Kingdom 
companies provide a complete C 0 2 footprint. Their request was that the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment’s reporting requirements be aligned with this future 
requirement, primarily to avoid further reporting and administration burdens.
Related to this request, the eighth section of the response drew attention to the 
existing environmental (Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control regulations- 
IPPC) and C 0 2 (Climate Change Agreements and European Emissions Trading 
Scheme) related regimes. The Confederation of British Industry made a request for 
coherent targets and aligned reporting systems that would avoid unintended 
incentives and unnecessary duplicated administrative and reporting efforts. O f 
specific concern was how companies would carve out Climate Change Agreement 
and European Emissions Trading Scheme C 0 2 emissions from the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment. It was requested that Climate Change Agreement and
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European Emissions Trading Scheme emissions could be taken from the last audited 
number o f  each respective scheme, rather than recalculated to a slightly different 
timeframe for full alignment with the Carbon Reduction Commitment.
8.4 Consultation outcomes
The Environm ent Agency’s consultation on the draft order for the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment reported out in October 2009. The output was in the form 
of a 136 page document structured around the decision taken on each o f the 66 
questions asked in the original consultation. The consultation addressed a number of 
issues from the treatment of groups, to the penalties and fines for non compliance 
with the Carbon Reduction Commitment. Table 14 sorted these issues into eight 
categories which summarised the questions raised during the consultation. Using the 
same eight categories, Table 16 summarises the main decisions taken as a result of 
the consultation process.
The treatment o f  groups was important, since the Environment Agency aimed to 
have the Carbon Reduction Commitment administered at the level of each 
company’s highest United Kingdom parent company. This objective served two 
purposes. Firstly, it was meant to capture groups of companies that would not 
qualify on an individual basis. Secondly, it targeted the highest level decision makers 
in businesses, giving C 0 2 and energy management the highest possible level of 
exposure. During the consultation response a number o f companies raised concerns 
relating to the technicalities o f  this proposed approach.
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Table 16: Summary of Carbon Reduction Commitment consultation outcomes
(DECC, 2009c, 2009d; Environment Agency, 2009)
1. Treatment of groups- finding the highest parent company and its subsidiaries
a) Definition of a subsidiary widened: Principal subsidiary’ becomes Significant group 
undertaking’ (SGU)
b) Introduced option for voluntary disaggregation of Significant Group Undertakings
2. Landlord-tenant issues: assigning responsibilities
a) No possibility for transfer of Carbon Reduction Commitment liabilities given. 
However, obligations on tenants introduced, obliging them to comply with landlords 
on Carbon Reduction Commitment reporting requirements.
3. Qualification criteria and the registration process: (no significant changes)
4. Managing exemptions and overlaps with other CO2 regulatory schemes
a) Climate Change Agreement exemption process brought forwards; exemption now 
based on qualification year emissions (2008) and confirmed at registration. This 
avoided the need for exempt sites to participate for one year.
b) European Emissions Trading Scheme reporting simplified by allowing the use of the 
most recent verified European Emissions Trading Scheme year, rather than requiring 
apportionment to the Carbon Reduction Commitment year.
5. Reporting requirements
a) Double auction of CO2 allowances in 2011 becomes a single auction.
b) Transport exemption clarified, uses 1994 Vehicle Excise and Registration Act
6. Administrative requirements
a) Scheme name changed: ‘Carbon Reduction Commitment (CRC)’ becomes ‘CRC 
Energy Efficiency Scheme (CRC)’
b) Record keeping requirements clarified. All records must be kept for seven years and 
baseline data for the lifetime of the Carbon Reduction Commitment.
7. League table publication and CO2 trading requirements
a) Increased weighting and wider scope of Early Action Metrics: 100% in year one, 40% 
in year two, 20% in year three. It was also agreed to recognise substitutes to the 
Carbon Trust Standard, if an accreditation from an equivalent scheme was present.
b) Tick box criteria added to give visibility to energy management efforts:
— Setting long-term carbon emission reduction targets?
— Reporting performance against reduction targets?
— Naming a director to oversee CO2 emissions performance?
— Engagement with employees on CO2 management?
c) Percentage increase in companies’ renewables generation will be published in league 
table, but not be used in calculating the league table position. _________________
8. Penalties and fines for non compliance: (no significant changes)__________________|
Firstly, the Carbon Reduction Commitment targeted all United Kingdom 
organisations which broke its annual United Kingdom electricity consumption 
threshold. These included government agencies, hospitals, schools and so on. All o f 
these groups often had large subsidiaries that would qualify for the Carbon
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Reduction Commitment in their own tight, were they not part o f a larger parent 
organisation. The Environment Agency had decided to collect information on each 
of these, as a supplement to the parent company’s reporting requirements. This 
would give the large sub organisations visibility and facilitate the transfer o f 
responsibilities should they ever be sold or moved to a different parent organisation. 
Originally these organisations had been called ‘principal subsidiaries’, but the 
consultation process flagged that not all of these were commercial organisations. 
Accordingly, the definition was widened to ‘Significant Group Undertakings’. 
Furthermore, in a number of instances, these Significant Group Undertakings 
represented common brand names, or other organisations to which public 
perception o f their brand or company name was important. Some Significant Group 
Undertakings had flagged in the consultation process that they did not want to be 
reported in the league table as part of their parent company’s aggregated return. 
Instead they wanted to be able to participate individually and claim the good 
performance that they were aiming to achieve in their own name. There was one 
other type o f case where significant group undertakings had asked to be able to 
participate separately in the Carbon Reduction Commitment. This was where it was 
argued that the parent company did not have operational control over the significant 
group undertaking. In this case it was argued that Carbon Reduction Commitment 
participation best lay with the Significant Group Undertaking, since this gave them 
direct incentives and visibility in the scheme. For these reasons, the Environment 
Agency gave Carbon Reduction Commitment participants the chance to disaggregate 
Significant Group Undertakings from the central reporting process o f their parent 
company. This would be done on a voluntary basis during registration.
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The second issue that the consultation dealt with was the division o f responsibilities 
between landlords and tenants. The Carbon Reduction Cornrnitrnent assigned 
responsibility for emissions to whoever was named counterparty on the energy 
supply contract. However, it was acknowledged that in some cases this meant that 
Carbon Reduction Commitment responsibilities would fall on a landlord who sim ply  
charged their tenant a management fee which included utilities. Concerns were 
raised during the consultation that this situation placed responsibility for compliance 
with a party that had little actual control over energy use. In the most extreme case, 
it was argued that there was no obligation for tenants in this situation to help their 
landlords gather the data required to achieve Carbon Reduction Commitment 
compliance. The Environment Agency argued that contracts and rental agreements 
would evolve to avoid this problem and did not agree to change the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment to allow the transfer of responsibilities between landlords 
and tenants. However, they did agree to introduce obligations upon tenants to 
provide data to their landlords for Carbon Reduction Commitment participation.
The third category tackled during the consultation response examined qualification 
criteria for the Carbon Reduction Commitment and the registration process. The 
Environment Agency raised no particular concerns during the consultation process 
and neither did the consultation respondents. There were no changes to the 
qualification criteria or the registration process.
Managing overlaps with other C 0 2 markets was the fourth category covered by the 
consultation process. The United Kingdom’s Climate Change Agreements and the 
process whereby they led to an exemption for the Carbon Reduction Commitment
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was introduced in chapter four. In summary, if a whole company, or a significant 
group undertaking o f a company had 25% or more of their emissions covered by a 
Climate Change Agreement, then they were exempt from participation in the Carbon 
Reduction Com m itm ent The original proposal was that this exemption would be 
proven during the first annual reporting cycle of the scheme. However, it was 
that this would require companies that were most likely exempt to undergo a 
full year’s compliance with the scheme before being able to prove their exemption. 
O f particular concern was the case where a parent company had a Significant Group 
Undertaking which they expected to be exempted. In this scenario the parent 
company would have to participate in the first Environment Agency auction before 
having their exemption for the Significant Group Undertaking approved. If  the 
anticipated exemption turned out to be incorrect, this would leave the parent 
company with a large shortfall of C 0 2 allowances, since they would not have 
purchased C 0 2 allowances for the part o f the company they expected to be exempt. 
In light o f these concerns, the Environment Agency brought forwards the Climate 
Change Agreement exemption point to that of registration. This was for companies 
that were able to provide the data at that point in time. For those lacking the 
required data, they would still have to participate as originally planned and exempt 
themselves during the first annual cycle of the scheme on the basis of the data 
collected. The second C 0 2 market which had overlaps with the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment was the European Emission Trading Scheme, as introduced in section 
chapter four. Any emissions covered by the European Emission Trading Scheme 
were not counted again for the Carbon Reduction Commitment. This principle 
avoided double regulation o f the same C 0 2 emissions and was supported in the 
consultation responses. However, the consultation process also flagged a concern
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that the annual cycles o f the two schemes started at different points in the year. The 
Carbon Reduction Commitment would run to a United Kingdom tax year from April 
until March, while the European Emission Trading Scheme ran to a calendar year 
from January until December. Carbon Reduction Commitment participants were 
given the freedom to use the latest set o f verified European Emission Trading 
Scheme accounts as an annual C 0 2 emissions figure, instead of reapportioning a 
calendar year’s emissions to a United Kingdom tax year. This was in order to 
minimise the burden o f compliance with the Carbon Reduction Commitment. It was 
argued that there would be no impact on the overall performance o f companies, 
since any anomalies arising in one year would be balanced out in the next year.
The reporting requirements of die Carbon Reduction Commitment were also 
changed slighdy. The first auction had been scheduled to be a double auction to 
cover the first year o f the scheme retrospectively and the second year based upon 
forecasts. Significant pressure was exerted on the Environment Agency to avoid the 
cash flow implications o f the double auction. The Environment Agency conceded in 
this case and agreed to make the first year of the scheme reporting only, avoiding the 
need for a double auction in April 2011. The other reporting requirement which was 
clarified was the basis for the exemption of transport vehicles. These were exempted 
on the basis o f their treatment under the Vehicle Excise and Registration Act. Any 
vehicle which required a road license would be excluded, while site vehicles which 
did not use public roads would be included in the Carbon Reduction Commitment.
Administrative requirements o f the Carbon Reduction Commitment are dealt with by 
the sixth category of the consultation themes. Firstly, the ‘Carbon Reduction
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Commitment' was renamed as the ‘CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme’. This seemingly simple 
renaming was in response to a broad set of lobby interests which had tried to change 
the focus o f the Carbon Reduction Commitment in a number of ways during the 
consultation process. The two main lobbies were the renewables industry and those 
who prioritised behaviour change, rather than capital investment, in efforts to 
manage C 0 2 emissions. These lobbies were resisted by the Environment Agency, 
which maintained that the primary objective of the Carbon Reduction Commitment 
was to incentivise the implementation of energy efficiency projects as the best 
starting point for C 0 2 management. It was argued by the Environment Agency that 
renewables generation was already incentivised for utility companies through another 
mechanism, the ‘Renewables Obligation Certificates’. It was argued that companies 
would make better use of their funds by first investing in reducing energy use, rather 
than swapping to expensive forms of low C 0 2 energy generation. The interests of 
the group advocating staff engagement were not out of line with the original or final 
name o f the Carbon Reduction Commitment, but they did achieve raised visibility 
for target setting and staff engagement. The concessions granted to the behaviour 
change lobbyists are covered in the next paragraph. The second administrative 
announcement was an important clarification for participants, but not one that 
materially changed the scheme. It was clarified that Carbon Reduction Commitment 
records would have to routinely be kept for 7 years and any relating to the baseline 
year would need to be kept indefinitely.
The previous section explored how the ‘renewables’ and ‘staff engagement’ lobbyists 
had tried to pull the Carbon Reduction Commitment in the directions of 
‘incentivising renewables generation’ or ‘engaging staff on energy use’ respectively.
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The seventh category o f the consultation response deals with changes to the league 
table publication and trading requirements of the scheme which, these were used in 
response to the requests from the lobbyists. The first two changes were concessions 
to the parties who wanted to see more emphasis upon staff engagement in energy 
management. The first change saw an increased weighting of the Early Action 
Metrics, which represented proxy measures for good energy management, ahead of 
the actual performance data being made available. The second change saw the 
introduction o f four tick box criteria which would be reported as an appendix to the 
league table. These indicated whether a company had long-term targets for C 0 2 
emission reductions, whether they reported performance against these targets, 
whether a director was named with overall responsibility for C 0 2 performance and 
whether staff engagement on energy management was taking place. The staff 
engagement was recognised if it was in the form of either: widespread energy 
management training, the formation staff action groups, or an energy management 
campaign in conjunction with the relevant union. The third change was a concession 
to the renewables industry and companies which had prioritised renewables 
generation as their response to Climate Change. The overall structure of the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment was not changed to emphasise renewables, in fact the 
opposite was the case. As explained in the previous paragraph, the ‘Carbon Reduction 
Commitment’ was renamed as the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme. The Environment 
Agency argued that companies would make better use of their funds by first 
investing in reducing energy use, rather than swapping to mote expensive forms of 
low carbon energy generation. The concession given was that companies would have 
to report their annual increase in the percentage of renewables generation achieved.
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This would at least give some visibility to renewables, but while leaving the 
fundamental structure o f the Carbon Reduction Commitment unchanged.
Finally, the questions regarding the penalties and fines for non-compliance, the 
eighth category o f the consultation process, did not give rise to any particular 
concerns or changes to the scheme. Companies requested that the Environment 
Agency exercise discretion as the scheme started, a call that the Environment Agency 
acknowledged. There were some changes to the potential fines, but none which 
changed their nature or order o f magnitude.
8.5 Summary
This case examined a manufacturer’s and trade association’s responses to the launch 
of the United Kingdom’s C 0 2 market, the Carbon Reduction Commitment. The 
case started with an explanation of the consultation format. Secondly, Manufacturer 
Beta’s submission to the Environment Agency’s consultation process was examined. 
Next, the public response of the Confederation of British Industry was also 
examined. Finally, the responses were then compared with the outcome of the 
consultation process and the ultimate structure o f the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment was given.
This case also gave important data on the design of the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment, which was the starting point for cases five and six which examined the 
launch o f the Carbon Reduction Commitment. The next case examines the new 
accounting and reporting obligations placed upon Carbon Reduction Commitment
participants.
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9 CASE 5: ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING
OBLIGATIONS WITHIN PHASE I OF THE UNITED 
KINGDOM’S C 02 MARKET, THE CARBON REDUCTION 
COMMITMENT
9.1 Introduction
Case five examines the new accounting and reporting obligations introduced by the 
Carbon Reduction Commitment. If the European Emissions Trading Scheme was a 
‘child’ o f the Kyoto Protocol, then the Carbon Reduction Commitment could be its 
‘grandchild’. The Carbon Reduction Commitment targets the next tier down of 
energy users. These represented commercial companies which were not covered by 
the European Emissions Trading Scheme which focussed upon industrial scale 
operations.
Data were collected between January 2009 and June 2010 through participant 
observation as a Carbon Consultancy hired by Retailer Gamma. The case starts with 
an introduction to Retailer Gamma and their industrial network. Interactions 
involved Retailer Gamma and the Environment Agency, as well as Retailer Gamma s 
Energy Suppliers and their Bureau Provider who checked the accuracy of their 
energy bills. Firsdy, the process of registration with the Environment Agency for 
participation in the Carbon Reduction Commitment is examined. Next the 
implications o f participation in the Environment Agency’s annual C 0 2 auction are 
discussed. Then the process of preparing and submitting the Footprint and Annual 
Reports is outlined. Finally, the processes driving league table publication and the
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allocation o f recycling payments generated by the Carbon Reduction Commitment 
are examined.
Case four examined the consultation process and outcomes during the development 
o f the Carbon Reduction Commitment. Case five focuses upon the accounting and 
reporting obligations introduced by the Carbon Reduction Commitment. Finally, 
case six examines the implications of the Carbon Reduction Commitment for 
participants and their energy supply and reporting networks.
9.2 A business network affected by phase I  o f the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment
Case five examined the issues faced by Retailer Gamma in responding to the 
accounting and reporting requirements introduced by the United Kingdom’s Carbon 
Reduction Commitment. Retailer Gamma was significantly larger than the minimum 
size required for qualification for the Carbon Reduction Commitment. They were 
therefore representative o f the scale of business targeted by the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment. Furthermore, Retailer Gamma was a major consumer retailer within 
the United Kingdom; they were a FTSE 100 company. Being commercial, rather 
than industrial in nature, they were also representative of the type of business 
targeted by the Carbon Reduction Commitment. Retailer Gamma had over 200 
retail and associated support sites within the United Kingdom. Retailer Gamma s 
relationships with the Environment Agency, as the regulator for the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment, and a number of third party suppliers are introduced in
Figure 21.
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Figure 21: Retailer Gamma as a COz market participant within the United 
Kingdom’s Carbon Reduction Commitment
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The first relationship was primarily between Retailer Gamma, as a participant in the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment and the Environment Agency which administrated the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment on behalf of the United Kingdom’s government. This relationship 
gave Retailer Gamma accounting and reporting obligations which are summarised in
Figure 22. The Carbon Reduction Commitment also gave Energy Suppliers 
obligations to provide annual statements of consumption to Retailer Gamma in 
order to support their C 0 2 reporting and trading. The second relationship involved 
the bulk supply o f energy by Energy Suppliers to Retailer Gamma. The supporting 
invoicing for these energy contracts formed the basis of C 0 2 emissions reporting, 
since conversion factors were applied to energy consumption totals in order to 
calculate C 0 2 emissions. The relationship between Retailer Gamma and their 
Energy Suppliers was moderated by a Bureau Provider who checked the energy 
invoices ahead o f payment by Retailer Gamma. This type of service was often used
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by large businesses, since the specialist support of Bureau Providers was needed to 
cope with the large volume of billing data that was required to manage multiple large 
sites. Finally, Bureau Provider and Carbon Consultancy aggregated energy 
consumption data and converted it into the C 0 2 reports required by the 
Environment Agency for participation in the Carbon Reduction Commitment. 
Retailer Gamma relied upon their Energy Suppliers and Bureau Provider for the 
energy consumption data and then called upon the support of Carbon Consultancy 
to prepare the required reports and support trading in the C 0 2 market.
Figure 22 gives the accounting and reporting requirements of the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment during its launch and first years of operation. The temporal scope of 
this case is from the Carbon Reduction Commitment’s start date of April 2010, until 
O ctober 2011, when all required activities will have been completed at least once.
Figure 22: Carbon Reduction Commitment accounting and reporting
obligations
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Next each o f the accounting and reporting requirements illustrated above are briefly 
introduced, these form the structure of the remainder of the case. The first 
obligation upon Retailer Gamma was to register for the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment between the start of the Scheme in April 2010 and the last working day 
in September 2010. The second obligation on Retailer Gamma was to participate in 
the Environment Agency’s first annual C 0 2 Auction in April 2011. Next, Retailer 
Gamma will have to submit a phase I Footprint report and the first Annual report by 
the last working day of July 2011. Finally, once the Environment Agency has 
collated the submitted reports, it will publish the Carbon Reduction Commitment 
league table and make the corresponding recycling payments in October 2011.
9.3 Accounting and reporting obligations within phase I  o f the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment
9.3.1 Registration
Registration for the Carbon Reduction Commitment served three major purposes. 
Firstly, Retailer Gamma was required to prove that they exceed the electricity 
consumption threshold for qualification for the scheme. Secondly, in order to 
submit the data, Retailer Gamma needed to setup a Carbon Reduction Commitment 
online registry account. This account would be used for all future interactions with 
the Environment Agency. Finally, it was during registration that the focal points for 
managing the Carbon Reduction Commitment within Retailer Gamma needed to be 
nominated. Each o f these issues and the difficulties Retailer Gamma faced in 
responding to them are now dealt with in turn.
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Qualification for the Carbon Reduction Commitment was based upon annual 
electricity consumption through an industrial class of electricity meter called a ‘half 
hourly m e te r. Retailer Gamma had to participate in the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment since they exceeded an annual consumption o f 6,000MWh, which was 
roughly equivalent to an annual expenditure of £0.5M on electricity. The 
qualification year for the first phase of the Carbon Reduction Commitment was 
2008, with consumption totals being made for all half hourly meters held by 
subsidiaries or joint ventures where Retailer Gamma had a shareholding o f greater 
than 50%. The snapshot of the legal structure of the company had to be taken as per 
31 December 2008. The requirement to prepare data against the qualification year of 
2008 was the first challenge faced by Retailer Gamma. Large organisations typically 
have hundreds o f legal entities and frequently buy or sell different parts o f their 
company on an ongoing basis. The Carbon Reduction Commitment started in April 
2010, meaning that preparing a detailed map of the whole company’s United 
Kingdom energy supply infrastructure as of 2008 was a complicated and uncertain 
task. W ithin  Retailer Gamma this required die collation of data from legal, property, 
energy management and strategy teams. The exercise amounted to identifying the 
legal entities which had to be reported under the Carbon Reduction Commitment, 
building a full list o f the real estate for which these legal entities were responsible and 
finally determining their 2008 half hourly electricity consumption. This data 
gathering exercise for Retailer Gamma represented around 3 months worth o f effort. 
Furthermore, since this was the first time such an exercise had been mandated, once 
it was completed there was still no way to verify whether any extra sites had been
missed.
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The process broke new ground at all three stages. Two examples of legal entities that 
were identified for die first time by the Corporate Reporting Team were a majority 
owned research association and American operations with autonomous facilities in 
the United Kingdom. Both of these organisations were required to report under the 
highest United Kingdom parent company. At the next level, the corporate centre 
expanded their United Kingdom property list by more than 40% in terms o f number 
o f properties identified. The generation of a full United Kingdom property list 
unearthed whole office blocks, bus depots, accommodation complexes and many 
other facilities that had been managed by subsidiary companies without previous 
oversight from the centre. Finally, even once a complete site list had been populated, 
it was difficult to then determine the energy supplies which went to each site. 
Typically around 60-70% of energy was procured centrally, but the remaining 30- 
40% was managed locally at the site level. For Carbon Reduction Commitment 
registration it was a relatively straight forward exercise to identify the large half 
hourly meters, but it was still difficult to gather 2008 consumption data for local 
energy supplies. It was not possible to make a standard mail shot requesting energy 
consumption details from focal points. Local energy procurement was dealt with on 
an ad hoc basis, usually as a portion of an employee’s job, rather than as their sole 
responsibility. The task was complicated further by the fact that at some sites the 
accounts team looked after local energy procurement, at others it was a local energy 
manager and at others again it was the production /  operations manager. This aspect 
of the data collection task was challenging for another reason. Local focal points did 
not have expert knowledge on energy procurement. As an example, identifying half 
hourly electricity meters that were relevant to registration for the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment involved a number of technical checks which are now discussed.
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onIt was first necessary to locate the Meter Point Administration Number (MPAN) 
the 31 December 2008 invoice, l o  do so required some prior knowledge o f the 
energy supply terms and notations. The Meter Point Administration Number was a 
standard format within the energy supply industry for referencing supply meters 
within the United Kingdom. Figure 23 shows the Meter Point Administration 
N umber in the format in which it is printed on energy invoices.




















Meter point unique reference
If  the profile type, as per Figure 23, read ‘00’, then the meter was a half hourly meter 
and therefore potentially relevant to the Carbon Reduction Commitment.
Secondly, the supply counterparty, the company named on the energy bill, defined 
legal responsibility for the meter under the Carbon Reduction Commitment. It was 
necessary to ascertain whether this counterparty was part o f the business s legal 
structure as per 31 December 2008.
Asking non experts across hundreds of sites to perform these checks was the only 
primary source o f data for locally procured energy and was perceived as a significant 
risk regarding successful Carbon Reduction Commitment registration by Retailer
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Gamma. Furthermore, since tliese reporting requirements were new, there was no 
team within the company with obvious responsibility for managing the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment. This lead to a lack of accountability and in some cases 
infighting to either avoid or claim the role. Typically, these conflicts were between 
the legal, energy management and corporate reporting teams, each o f which had a 
case to make for coordinating the efforts. These dynamics caused particular 
problems in the final hurdle faced at registration. The Environment Agency had set 
significant potential fines for non compliance with the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment and coupled this with a requirement that a company director, or 
member o f  staff with equivalent management control, had to sign off the final 
submission on behalf o f the liighest United Kingdom parent company. In extreme 
cases o f fraud /  negligence, there was the potential for the director who signed off 
the submission to face a two year custodial sentence. These potential sanctions, plus 
the novelty o f the reporting requirements of the Carbon Reduction Commitment, 
meant that it was difficult to identify a member of the company who could sign with 
authority for the highest United Kingdom parent company. Their willingness to sign 
off the submission, based upon evidence collected from a dispersed and diverse set 
of sources was not very high. At the time of writing, the task of assigning this role 
was still ongoing. The United Kingdom Finance Director had been nominated to 
oversee the submission, but had refused to do so until the data collection practices 
were checked by the corporate governance team.
Setup o f  the Carbon Reduction Commitment online registry account did not cause 
any major stumbling blocks. The process was similar to setting up internet banking 
and was not technically challenging. Instead, registration was stalled due to the
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significant amount o f effort going into due diligence and reassurance o f the director 
signing off the submission before registration could be completed. These checking 
efforts involved requests to the Environment Agency’s helpdesk to confirm the 
status o f newly identified subsidiaries or supplies. Cross-checking was also 
undertaken with Energy Suppliers and Bureau Providers. However, this again was 
not simple, for the reason that these companies faced a conflict in interest They 
wished to support existing energy supply and bill checking contracts, respectively. 
However, they also saw opportunities and risks in supporting data collection for the 
Carbon Reduction Commitment. Firstly, they were very cautious about p ro v id in g  
data which they may later be required to substantiate in the event o f an Environment 
Agency audit. Secondly, they saw the opportunity to sell Carbon Reduction 
Commitment services to Retailer Gamma and so didn’t wish to let the scope o f their 
existing contracts creep to include supporting the Carbon Reduction Commitment. 
These commercial developments are dealt with in more detail in the next case. This 
case continues with an examination of the accounting and reporting requirements 
introduced by the Carbon Reduction Commitment, the next being annual 
participation in the Environment Agency’s auction o f C 0 2 permits.
9.3.2 Participation in the Environment Agency’s C02 auction
Following registration, which was due by the last working day in September 2010, the 
next deadline for interaction with the Environment Agency falls in April 2011. At 
this point, the Environment Agency will hold an Auction of CO, permits lasting for 
one month. The sale is to cover the coming year’s C 0 2 emissions, so the first sale 
wdl cover April 2011 through to March 2012. Retailer Gamma needed to forecast 
their coming year’s CO, emissions and decide upon a trading strategy. O f these two
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tasks, the first was the most technically challenging. Retailer Gamma had to use 
historic records to estimate their C 0 2 emissions and then try to adjust them for 
anticipated changes in their operations, such as increased operations or expected 
mergers /  divestments. Retailer Gamma also had to carve out exemptions such as 
C 0 2 emissions already covered by the European Emissions Trading Scheme. A t the 
time o f writing, this activity had not yet taken place, but a number o f concerns had 
been raised and efforts were underway to resolve them. These are now examined in 
turn.
Firsdy, Retailer Gamma acknowledged the need to hold a central budget for 
payments made during the C 0 2 auction. The Carbon Reduction Commitment was 
administered through a single account at the level o f the highest parent company, 
meaning that the highest parent company had to hold a budget that could cover all 
costs relating to the Carbon Reduction Commitment. There was no debate around 
this, but there was significant debate over whether the costs which were administered 
at the centre should be recharged to the different parts o f the business. One 
argument presented by energy management specialists was that they wanted to have 
access to potential savings generated through the Carbon Reduction Commitment. 
This led them to want all costs to be redistributed within the company, so that they 
could claim their share o f future anticipated successes. This discussion was also 
interwoven with the discussion on target setting. At the same time as the launch of 
the Carbon Reduction Commitment, it was under review whether C 0 2 reduction 
targets set should be centrally defined, or instead set by each business. By 
volunteering to take on the costs of the Carbon Reduction Commitment, businesses 
hoped to reinforce their arguments that target setting was best done locally by those 
with detailed knowledge o f that part o f the company. However, the accounting
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function within Retailer Gamma took a different view of the issue of whether to 
recharge the centrally administered costs of Carbon Reduction Commitment 
participation. As will be seen in the next case, the net anticipated costs of the 
Carbon Reduction Commitment were less than 1% of annual energy expenditure. 
Central accounting teams within the company proposed not to reallocate the costs 
for two reasons. Firsdy, they were not large enough to influence business decisions 
and secondly, the costs of administering the reapportionment would not be justified 
relative to the sums of money involved. Eventually these discussions led to a 
compromise which was that costs would not be reallocated during the early phases of 
the Carbon Reduction Commitment. Later, if the costs of the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment rose significantly, this decision would be reviewed.
The second consideration that affected the C 0 2 trading strategy o f Retailer Gamma 
was internal rules preventing speculative activities. Similar to many large companies, 
there were policies in place that prohibited speculative activity outside o f Retailer 
Gamma’s core business. The rules were designed to avoid problems such as the 
mark to market practices that eventually led to the demise o f Enron (Thomas, 2002). 
These rules were maintained by trading specialists who enforced them within the 
company. The purpose of a C 0 2 market, such as Carbon Reduction Commitment, 
was to provide flexibility through market mechanisms which allowed C 0 2 savings to 
be made at the cheapest reduction options available. These C 0 2 savings were then 
traded to allow all parties to achieve compliance. This C 0 2 market did not fit with 
Retailer Gamma’s policy that speculation was not possible in any non core business 
activities. As such, this effectively reduced the C 0 2 market to a compliance exerase. 
Retailer Gamma was keen to overtly and demonstrably avoid speculation. This led
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to a trading strategy which amounted to buying C 0 2 permits equivalent to the 
forecast C 0 2 emissions, plus a small buffer of permits to ensure compliance in the 
case that C 0 2 emissions were slighdy higher than anticipated. None o f the flexibility 
o f the C 0 2 market was utilised. Retailer Gamma’s trading strategy did not attempt to 
take account o f their anticipated internal costs of reducing CO? emissions relative to 
those o f the other players in the CO? market. The trading strategy also did not take 
into account the anticipated development of a secondary market for C 0 2 permits.
9.3.3 Footprint and annual reports
The Carbon Reduction Commitment ultimately required businesses to report their 
C 0 2 emissions and reduce them on a year on year basis. Two reports were designed 
to track this process.
Firstly, the Footprint report was due at the start of each phase o f the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment. The Footprint report built a map of the energy supply 
infrastructure o f the whole company, its purpose being to identify 100% of the 
company’s C 0 2 emissions. Once the full energy supply infrastructure o f the 
company was known and the corresponding total annual C 0 2 emissions calculated, 
this was used to provide a template against which the Annual report tracked year on 
year CO? emission reduction performance. The Footprint report served one further 
purpose, which was to identify and support applications for exemptions on the basis 
o f Climate Change Agreements, transport use and so on. Once 100% of emissions 
were known, these were used to check whether exemption thresholds, such as 25% 
coverage o f Climate Change Agreements, were met.
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The next section examines the generation of the Annual report, which presented the 
annual C 0 2 emissions o f the energy supply infrastructure identified in the Footprint 
report. The annual report formed the basis of the calculations which determined 
performance in the Carbon Reduction Commitment league table.
The task o f producing a Footprint report built upon the work required for 
registration for the Carbon Reduction Commitment. This case has already described 
how the central corporate team responsible for managing Carbon Reduction 
Commitment compliance had struggled to gain oversight of their full estate portfolio 
within the United Kingdom. This task continued into the generation o f the 
Footprint report and expanded in scope. For the purposes o f registration, the main 
reporting requirement was to identify all half hourly electricity meters within the 
company. For the Footprint report, a full map of the energy supply infrastructure 
required the tracking of supplies of all types of electricity meter and supplies o f any 
other fuel such as gas, coal, oil, renewables and so on. The Environment Agency 
provided a list o f 29 fuels which had to be tracked if they were used. This created 
further work to check again that all sites had been identified and that a reporting 
route existed for the central collection of energy data for all supplies.
The Annual report drew upon the map of the energy supply infrastructure developed 
by the Footprint report. To be able to generate the Annual report, processes had to 
be put in place to collect the relevant consumption data and convert it to equivalent 
C 0 2 emissions presented in the format required by the Environment Agency. The 
next case deals witii an example of how such sources of data were used and the 
commercial opportunities arising from these new requirements. This case focuses
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upon the technical requirements for manipulation o f the data from raw energy 
consumption data through to C 0 2 emissions figures required for the Annual report 
and trading during the auction of C 0 2 permits. An example o f such calculations is 
given in Figure 24, which uses dummy consumption data, but follows the data 
processing steps required to calculate the annual Carbon Reduction Commitment 
emissions and the cost of the corresponding C 0 2 permits.
Figure 24 illustrates the five main steps involved in Carbon Reduction Commitment 
accounting and reporting activities. Firstly, all energy consumption must be 
identified and measured, from both local and central procurement contracts. Figure 
24 shows that different fuels are measured in their corresponding units o f 
consumption, for example electricity and gas in Megawatt hours, coal consumption 
in tonnes and diesel consumption in litres. These measures were set by the 
Environment Agency and each was given a corresponding C 0 2 content. The second 
step is to convert energy consumption into equivalent C 0 2 emissions. This means 
that energy consumption cannot be aggregated across different fuels, for example 
electricity has a carbon content of 0.541 tC 0 2/M W h while gas’s corresponding 
conversion factor is 0.1836 tC 0 2/MWh. This helps to explain why the Environment 
Agency uses the Carbon Reduction Commitment to target reductions in C 0 2 
emissions rather than energy use. Saving the same number of MWh o f gas or 
electricity would not reduce C 0 2 emissions by the same amount; electricity has 
almost three times the C 0 2 content of gas.
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Once the total C 0 2 emissions for the company have been calculated, the third step is 
to remove any exempted activities, such as those already covered by the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme. Finally, the total C 0 2 emissions covered by the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment, 144,808 tC 0 2in Figure 24, must be multiplied by the price 
o f C 0 2 permits to form a basic forecast of C 0 2 permit costs. The final conversion 
which may be necessary is to take account of the trading strategy for the auction. 
For example a 5% surplus could be purchased to give a margin for error that reduces 
the risk o f actual emissions exceeding those purchased in the Environment Agency’s 
auction.
9.3.4 League table publication and recycling payments
Through the Carbon Reduction Commitment, the Environment Agency aimed to 
make the C 0 2 performance o f companies public and easily comparable, thus creating 
reputational incentives to reduce C 0 2 emissions. These reputational incentives were 
designed to reinforce the financial incentives introduced by the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment’s C 0 2 market. This was a new development which had not been 
included in previous C 0 2 markets. Between July and October the Environment 
Agency will collate all participants’ Annual reports and generate the public league 
table to be published on the last working day in October. On the same day of 
publication o f the Carbon Reduction Commitment league table, participants will 
receive their recycling payment. The recycling payment returns the money spent 
during the Environment Agency’s auction of C 0 2 permits with a financial bonus /  
penalty, depending upon league table position. In early years, participants will receive 
their repayments with an adjustment of up to ±10%, based upon their league table 
position. By 2015, this will have risen to ±50% of their original ouday. Through this
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mechanism, the Environment Agency hopes to reward leaders and punish laggards, 
providing a further incentive to improve C 0 2 emissions on a year on year basis. The 
first instance of the publication of the league table and release o f the recycling 
payments will be in October 2011. At the time of writing this was yet to occur, 
however two related issues had been raised and explored by Retailer Gamma. The 
first was concerning management of the reputational implications o f the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment league table. The second concerned financial implications 
o f the Carbon Reduction Commitment. Each of these is now dealt with in turn.
The first concern o f Retailer Gamma was the reputational implications o f the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment league table. Their approach was risk averse and was 
primarily concerned with managing the risk of appearing in the lower half o f the 
league table. The risk of slipping down the league table was also perceived as being 
important, especially in managing the transition from what were called the Early 
Action Metrics. The dynamics of the league table ranking during the early years of 
the Carbon Reduction Commitment are now examined, as summarised in Table 17.
Table 17: Weighting for Carbon Reduction Commitment league table scores
2010
P h a se  I
2011 2012
F utu re  p h a s e s
2013  onw ard s
1) EARLY ACTION METRICS: 100% 40% 20% N/A
C arbon  Trust S ta n d a rd  (or equ ivalen t) (50%) (20%) (10%) N/A
Level o f vo lun tary  A utom atic M eter R ead ing (50%) (20%) (10%) N/A
2) ABSOLUTE METRIC:
B a se d  on C 0 2 reduction
0% 45% 60% 75%
3) GROWTH METRIC:
In c re a se d  tu rn o v e r u s e d  to ad ju s t b a se lin e
0% 15% 20% 25%
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Initially the Carbon Reduction Commitment’s league table will suffer from the 
challenge that there will not be any previous data to allow year on year comparisons. 
For example, when the first annual report is submitted in April 2011 to cover 
2010/2011 data, there will not be any data available for comparisons to 2009/2010. 
To overcome this challenge, the Environment Agency has introduced two Early 
Action Metrics which are proxy measures of C 0 2 emission reductions. These are, 
firstly, the level o f coverage of Automatic Meter Reading and, secondly, the level of 
coverage o f the government’s Carbon Trust Standard. Presence o f Automatic Meter 
Reading represents collection of energy data, which is the first step in identifying and 
appraising C 0 2 emission reductions. The Carbon Trust Standard, a voluntary 
accreditation framework for companies wishing to manage their emissions, would 
signify meaningful action to reduce emissions through adherence to an accredited 
C 0 2 emission management process.
In later years, once there is annual C 0 2 emissions data for year on year comparisons, 
the Early Action Metrics will be phased out. At this point, the scheme will be 
dominated by a measure o f absolute C 0 2 emission reductions. The absolute metric 
will be supplemented by an optional growth metric available to companies if they 
want to take account of a growth in their operations. However, the growth metric 
will only ever constitute up to 25% of a company s league table score and will be 
based upon growth in turnover. The main determining factor contributing to league 
table performance will remain as year on year reductions in absolute emissions.
Retailer Gamma recognised the need to attempt to avoid negative press as part o f the 
Carbon Reduction Commitment, however as has been examined, they faced
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significant challenges in simply preparing the systems required for scheme 
compliance. These observations were in line with an industry survey which found 
that one third (33.2%) o f Carbon Reduction Commitment participants rated their 
state o f readiness for the scheme as being less than moderate and half o f them (49%) 
stated that their existing energy management programmes were not aligned with the 
Carbon Reduction Commitment (CAMCO, 2009). As such, management of 
reputational impacts was limited to three defensive activities.
Firstly, the corporate affairs team was briefed on the nature, content and timelines of 
the Carbon Reduction Commitment. They did not produce any press releases, but 
developed their understanding o f the scheme so that they were ready to respond 
should they be questioned on it. Secondly, the Corporate Reporting team focussed 
upon developing the systems required for compliance with the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment. They did not have the time or foundations on which to build a 
communications strategy for the scheme. Finally, there was a perceived risk that 
Retailer Gamma could enter the league table favourably, based upon Early Action 
Metric performance and then drop down the league table as it transitioned towards 
being dominated by absolute reductions in C 0 2 emissions. Retailer Gamma had 
already met some of the Early Action Metrics, through a middling level of voluntary 
Automatic Meter Reading and a small number of pilot sites within the Carbon Trust 
Standard accreditation scheme. It was decided that no extra action would be taken to 
improve the scoring against Early Action Metrics, since this would reduce the risk of 
slipping down the league table when it would later be dominated by performance on 
absolute C 0 2 emission reductions.
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The final concern of Retailer Gamma was related to the costs o f the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment. Upon learning of the C 0 2 market, most managers 
immediately started to think about ways to use it in their favour. The most common 
suggestion was that if year on year emissions reductions would eventually dominate 
the league table, then perhaps planning efficiency projects should be delayed until 
2012 or 2013 when these measures would replace the Early Action Metrics as 
dominant drivers o f league table performance. However, these suggestions did not 
survive more detailed scrutiny. Typically, efficiency savings of at least 15% of energy 
use and expenditure were available for immediate implementation. In the following 
case it is demonstrated that the net financial implications of the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment for the early years of the scheme would be less than 1% of energy 
expenditure. Once this was realised, it was no longer seen as attractive to delay 
potential 15% reductions in energy costs in order to attempt to influence a cost that 
amounted to less than 1% of energy costs. This illustrates that although concerns 
relating to Carbon Reduction Commitment costs and reputational impacts were 
acknowledged, they were overridden by other larger financial concerns.
9.4 Summary
This case examined the new accounting and reporting obligations introduced by the 
Carbon Reduction Commitment. The case started with an introduction to Retailer 
Gamma and its industrial network. Interactions involved Retailer Gamma and the 
Environment Agency, as well as Retailer Gamma’s Energy Suppliers and their 
Bureau Provider who checked the accuracy of their energy bills. Firstly, the process 
of registration with the Environment Agency for participation in the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment was examined. Next, the implications of participation in the
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Environment Agency’s annual C 0 2 auction were examined. Subsequently, an 
examination o f the process of preparing and submitting the Footprint and Annual 
Reports was made. Finally, the processes of Carbon Reduction Commitment league 
table publication and recycling payment generation were discussed.
Case four examined the consultation process and outcomes during the development 
of the Carbon Reduction Commitment. Case five focussed upon the accounting and 
reporting obligations introduced by the Carbon Reduction Commitment. Case six, 
which follows, examines the implications of the Carbon Reduction Commitment for 
scheme participants and their energy supply and reporting networks.
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CHAPTER 10: 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS (CASE 6)
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10 CASE 6: A MANUFACTURER’S RESPONSE TO THE 
LAUNCH OF PHASE I OF THE UNITED KINGDOM’S 
C02 MARKET, THE CARBON REDUCTION 
COMMITMENT
10.1 Introduction
Case sis details the response of Manufacturer Beta and its energy supply and 
reporting network to the launch of the Carbon Reduction Commitment. If the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme was a ‘child’ of the Kyoto Protocol, then the 
Carbon Reduction Commitment could be its ‘grandchild’. The Carbon Reduction 
Commitment targeted the next tier down of energy users. These represented 
commercial companies which were not covered by the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme which was more focussed upon industrial scale operations.
Data were collected through participant observation between January 2009 and June 
2010. The participant observation role involved the researcher acting as a Carbon 
Consultant advising Manufacturer Beta. The case starts with a description of 
Manufacturer Beta and their industrial network. Next the financial implications of 
the Carbon Reduction Commitment for Manufacturer Beta are examined. The 
influence of the Carbon Reduction Commitment upon Manufacturer Beta’s 
relationships with their Energy Suppliers, bill checking service provider and their 
Carbon Consultancy were then examined. The case ends with a description of 
Manufacturer Beta’s final selection between multiple Carbon Reduction 
Commitment service offerings put to them by their service providers.
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Case four examined the consultation process and outcomes during the development 
of the Carbon Reduction Commitment. Case five focussed upon the accounting and 
reporting obligations introduced by the Carbon Reduction Commitment. Finally, 
this case completed the examination of the Carbon Reduction Commitment by 
describing the changes which the scheme brought about in participants, their energy 
supply and reporting networks.
10.2 A business network affected by phase I  o f the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment
Manufacturer Beta had their head office and over 100 sites within the United 
Kingdom. They also had multiple manufacturing bases and global export markets. 
Manufacturer Beta was a high-tech manufacturing company. However their specific 
industrial sector has been withheld for reasons of confidentiality. Manufacturer Beta 
was supported in their response to the Carbon Reduction Commitment and other 
C 0 2 markets by their Carbon Consultancy who specialised in sustainable energy and 
C 0 2 reporting. It was through employment at this Carbon Consultancy that data 
were collected through participant observation. Figure 25 details the relationships 
affected by the launch of this C 0 2 market, the case starts by introducing each in turn.
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Figure 25: Manufacturer Beta’s network as a C 02 market participant within 
phase I of the United Kingdom’s Carbon Reduction Commitment
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The first relationship was between the Environment Agency as the regulator, and 
Manufacturer Beta as a Carbon Reduction Commitment participant. The second 
relationship affected by the Carbon Reduction Commitment was between 
Manufacturer Beta and their Energy Suppliers. This relationship was primarily over 
the provision of bulk supplies of gas and electricity as inputs to Manufacturer Beta’s 
operations. However it also encapsulated a lot o f Manufacturer Beta’s energy 
consumption data, which was the basis of their C 0 2 emissions reporting and 
forecasting. This data was essential for participation in the C 0 2 market. The third 
relationship involved the Bureau Provider checking the hundreds of invoices
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generated by Energy Suppliers, verifying energy costs ahead o f payment of the 
invoices by Manufacturer Beta. Finally, this bill checking exercise also overlapped 
with C 0 2 emissions reporting, since it was a source of data that was more reliable 
than the unchecked invoices. This data fed into the Carbon Consultancy who 
provided compliance support to Manufacturer Beta. Manufacturer Beta was 
involved in the two C 0 2 markets of the European Emissions Trading Scheme and 
the Carbon Reduction Commitment, as well as the C 0 2 tax o f the Climate Change 
Levy. Carbon Consultancy had been hired to lead compilation and verification of 
the various reports required for each scheme and had had a longstanding business 
relationship with Manufacturer Beta since 2001. The manufacturing processes 
employed by Manufacturer Beta were energy intensive. Around ten o f their largest 
sites were covered by the European Emissions trading Scheme and the United 
Kingdom’s Climate Change Agreements. Manufacturer Beta had dealt with these 
two historical schemes at the level of the business unit, through a team of energy 
managers who met on a quarterly basis and employed the Carbon Consultancy to 
complete their annual returns for each scheme. As a result of the launch of the 
Carbon Reduction Commitment, all of Manufacturer Beta’s sites in the United 
Kingdom would now be required to participate in a C 0 2 market.
10.3 Interactions during the launch o f the Carbon Reduction Commitment
10.3.1 Financial implications o f the Carbon Reduction
Commitment
Manufacturer Beta exceeded the electricity consumption threshold for inclusion 
within the Carbon Reduction Commitment. For reasons of confidentiality, their 
annual electricity expenditure will not be disclosed. However, this does not prevent
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an examination o f the financial implications of the Carbon Reduction Commitment 
for them. This is because what mattered in terms of impact of the scheme were the 
ratios between energy costs, energy consumption, carbon content and carbon costs. 
Since these were effectively fixed for all participants, there is no requirement to deal 
with absolute figures for the purpose of the following discussion. Instead Figure 26 
gives the costs of the Carbon Reduction Commitment expressed as a percentage of a 
nominal annual energy expenditure.
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Due to confidentiality restrictions the figures are based upon a nominal annual 
electricity expenditure of £5m, instead of quoting Manufacturer Beta’s actual energy 
expenditure. This would be equivalent to around 60,000MWh of electricity, or ten 
times the threshold for inclusion in the Carbon Reduction Commitment. Using the 
Environment Agency’s conversion factor for the C 0 2 content of grid electricity of 
0.537tonnes/MWh, this amounts to approximately 32,000tonnes of C 0 2 per annum
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(Carbon Trust, 2008: 3). In phase I of the Carbon Reduction Commitment, this 
would cost £12/tonne, meaning that the purchase of C 0 2 permits during the annual 
auction would cost approximately -£380,000 per year. This would be equivalent to 
about 7.5% of annual electricity expenditure. At the end of the year, following 
publication of the league table, the money spent during the auction would be 
recycled with a bonus or penalty of ±10% in the first year, rising to ±50% by 2015. 
Therefore the maximum potential net cost or benefit due to the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment would be approximately ±£38,000 in 2011. This represents less than 
1% of the annual electricity expenditure of £5M. By 2015 this has the potential to 
approach a net cost of 5-10% of electricity expenditure, taking account of the likely 
rise in cost of C 0 2 permits and the heavier weighting of the league table performance 
bonus /  penalty. As explained earlier, these conversions are linear. The conversion 
from electricity consumption in MWh to rough energy cost was a multiplication of 
the price of electricity per unit. Converting from electricity consumption to tonnes 
C 0 2 was also fixed by the electricity generation mix in the national grid, i.e. a 
weighted average of the carbon content of nuclear, coal, gas and renewables 
generation. Finally, the price of carbon credits in phase I was fixed at £12/tonne. 
As such, any other company which performed such a calculation would forecast 
similar financial implications relative to annual energy expenditure. Thus the costs of 
the Carbon Reduction Commitment represented cash flow implications of around 
7.5% of annual electricity expenditure and a net cost or benefit of less than 1% of 
annual electricity expenditure. These costs were set to rise in coming years, but not 
to a level whereby they were considered significant in terms of financial implications 
for Manufacturer Beta.
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10.3.2 Interactions between the regulator and manufacturer
Dealing first with the compliance based implications of the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment for Manufacturer Beta; case four explored the process whereby the 
Environment Agency engaged with industry on the proposed draft order during the 
consultation process. Case four ended with a summary of the outcomes of the 
consultation process, the final structure of the Carbon Reduction Commitment is 
given in Table 18.
Table 18: Key elements of the Carbon Reduction Commitment
(DECC, 2009c, 2009d; Environment Agency, 2009)
KEY ELEMENT STRUCTURE
1. Market price for COz 
emissions developed 
through an annual 
auction of C 0 2 permits.
• No auction in first year of the scheme, reporting 
only.
• ^12/tonne C 0 2 for remainder of phase I.
• Price set by Environment Agency auction after 
2013.
2. Public league table on 
C 0 2 emission 
reduction performance.
• Published annually for all 5,000 participants.
• First three dominated by ‘Early Action Metrics’- 
proxy measures for carbon management best 
practise
• Eventually dominated by absolute C 0 2 emissions 
reduction performance.
3. Recycling payments 
(rebates) given on C 02 
costs. Bonus /  penalty 
set by league table 
performance.
• Starts at ± 10% of the money spent in the 
Environment Agency auction
• Rises to ± 50% by 2015.
4. Text supplements to the 
league table, published 
without influencing 
weighting of league 
table scoring.
1) Tick box criteria added to give visibility to:
• Setting long-term C 0 2 emission reduction targets?
• Reporting performance against reduction targets?
• Named a director managing C 0 2 emissions 
performance?
• Employee engagement s on C 0 2 management?
2) Percentage increase in companies’ renewables 
generation will be published in league table.
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This case examined Manufacturer Beta’s interactions resulting from the new 
obligations introduced by the Carbon Reduction Commitment. The case shows how 
the C 0 2 market led to opportunities for the Bureau Provider and Carbon 
Consultancy to offer what were loosely termed as Carbon Reduction Commitment 
compliance services. The case also describes how Manufacturer Beta responded to 
the structures of the Carbon Reduction Commitment as an issue of compliance, 
rather than as an opportunity.
The Carbon Reduction Commitment greatly increased the scope of Manufacturer 
Beta’s exposure to C 0 2 markets. Prior to the development of the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment, less than 10 of Manufacturer Beta’s sites were part of a C 0 2 market. 
These were the larger sites covered by the European Emissions Trading Scheme, or 
the United Kingdom’s Climate Change Agreements. The Carbon Reduction 
Commitment brought all of Manufacturer Beta’s sites in the United Kingdom into a 
C 0 2 market. To be able to cope with the tenfold increase in data flow, Manufacturer 
Beta had to develop C 0 2 reporting and compliance processes. These were seen as 
essential, in order to mitigate the risk of potential fines and negative press for non 
compliance with the Carbon Reduction Commitment. This need for support in 
forecasting, tracking and trading C 0 2 was further emphasised by the fact that the 
C 0 2 reporting requirements of the Carbon Reduction Commitment were not 
targeted at individual sites within a company, as had been the case in previous 
schemes. Instead, the highest United Kingdom parent company had to aggregate 
emissions data through all sites, business units and subsidiaries to one single number 
for the whole o f Manufacturer Beta. The annual report had to be signed off by a 
director, or another member of staff with equivalent management control. In
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extreme cases o f non compliance there was the potential for this individual to face a 
2 year custodial sentence. These penalties for individuals were backed up with 
potentially significant fines to the company. With these risks in mind, staff in the 
Corporate Reporting department of Manufacturer Beta sought external support with 
the preparation and verification of these reports. This led to new business 
opportunities for Bureau Provider and Carbon Consultancy to offer new services in 
carbon reporting, forecasting and trading support. These carbon management 
offerings are dealt with later on in the case.
The wider considerations o f the Carbon Reduction Commitment concerned how to 
deal with the league table, the C 0 2 permit costs and the recycling payments received 
following the publication of the league table. Staff in the Corporate Reporting 
department at Manufacturer Beta saw the annual publication of a Carbon Reduction 
Commitment league table as a significant reputational issue. They were worried 
about being positioned in the lower half of the league table and how they would be 
placed compared to their peers. This issue was not viewed as being financially 
problematic. In fact, in light of the relatively low costs involved, it was planned to 
manage the budget for participation in the C 0 2 auction from a central corporate 
account. The costs of the Carbon Reduction Commitment would not be reallocated 
to the businesses, since their scale did not justify the administrative effort of 
reallocation. Although the reputational concerns linked to the league table were 
given significant attention, Manufacturer Beta perceived that they were unlikely to 
drive business decisions. Instead, the focus was upon minimising exposure to 
negative press. It was perceived by the Corporate Reporting Department that there
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was a significant gap to bridge even in achieving compliance and accordingly most 
management effort was applied to developing the required C 0 2 reporting systems.
Finally, the questions included in the annual report caused a great deal o f concern to 
the Corporate Reporting department at Manufacturer Beta. Manufacturer Beta 
would only be able to satisfy one of the four optional requirements at the start of the 
Carbon Reduction Commitment. The company did not have a corporate target for 
C 0 2 emission reductions and thus neither had a director named as responsible for 
the target, nor reported progress against the target. The only question to which they 
would give a positive response was whether they had staff engagement on energy and 
Climate Change. The team managing compliance with the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme had piloted this engagement approach and it was decided to roll this 
out across the company. The worries of Manufacturer Beta were softened slighdy 
by the fact that less than half of their peer companies had set targets on energy and 
COz performance and so they did not see that this would present them as being any 
worse than average within their sector. These new public reporting obligations did 
however give a new level of visibility to energy and C 0 2 management within 
Manufacturer Beta. What had previously been an issue for local or regional energy 
managers became an issue that directors, investor relations and legal teams took a 
keen interest in. Again, this gave rise to new business opportunities for Energy 
Suppliers, Bureau Provider and Carbon Consultancy to support a rapid development 
o f capability and objectives in C 0 2 management and target setting.
Having examined the primary aspects of the compliance relationship between the 
regulator of the Environment Agency and Manufacturer Beta as a scheme
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participant, the affects of these developments upon other companies with which 
Manufacturer Beta had business relationships are now explored. The affected 
relationships were with their Energy Suppliers, their Bureau Provider and their 
Carbon Consultancy.
10.3.3 Interactions between the manufacturer and energy
suppliers
Manufacturer Beta had a number of long-term contracts for the bulk supply of gas 
and electricity for use in their manufacturing operations. The Energy Suppliers held 
multimillion pound supply contracts and provided a number of supporting services 
to develop and protect their relationships with Manufacturer Beta. These extra 
services were not of significant financial value to the Energy Suppliers and were 
viewed more as being account management type activities. However, these services 
are still important for this case, since they were in competition with the core 
offerings of the Bureau Provider and the Carbon Consultancy.
The major overlap between Energy Suppliers and carbon reporting was that energy 
consumption data formed the basis for calculating C 0 2 emissions. Once energy 
consumption had been measured, it was converted to C 0 2 emissions by multiplying 
by the C 0 2 content factor for the fuel in question. The fact that the Energy 
Suppliers held fuel consumption data for their billing processes made them owners 
of the data for the first step in calculating C 0 2 emissions. This consumption data 
was then checked by the Bureau Provider and compiled by the Carbon Consultancy 
before being converted into the relevant reports for submission to the Environment 
Agency. The energy consumption data was used primarily for billing purposes, but
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was also made available real-time online. The web portal for viewing this data 
allowed site energy managers to track energy performance and support decision 
making at sites. There was a separate contract to provide extended automatic meter 
reading to a wider range of sites and supplies at Manufacturer Beta, since energy 
management was becoming a core issue. Once installed, the automatic meters 
simplified billing and improved accuracy. They also gave more live data for real-time 
energy management. The Energy Suppliers were starting to see a much higher level 
of concern regarding energy and C 0 2 performance. Accordingly they had developed 
small teams o f in-house consultants to provide support in energy and C 0 2 
management, including guidance on the Carbon Reduction Commitment.
Another aspect which emphasised the importance of the Energy Suppliers in 
responding to the Carbon Reduction Commitment was a new obligation placed upon 
them by the Environment Agency. Energy Suppliers were legally obliged to provide 
customers with annual statements for their Carbon Reduction Commitment related 
energy consumption. Importandy, the liability for errors in this report lay with the 
Energy Supplier, rather than scheme participants. This altered the market dynamics 
for carbon compliance support, since it made reliance upon Energy Suppliers’ 
statements attractive, due to the transfer of risk. Such considerations emphasised the 
importance of the Energy Suppliers’ data and somewhat undermined the value of the 
checked data held by the Bureau Provider.
Later the case explores how Energy Suppliers attempted to provide Carbon 
Reduction Commitment support sendees as an extension to their energy 
management support offered to customers. This move was viewed by Energy
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Suppliers as an account management type activity, protecting their energy supply 
contracts which they still viewed as their core business.
10.3.4 Interactions between the manufacturer and bureau
provider
The Carbon Reduction Commitment also had implications for the bill checking 
services provided by Bureau Provider to Manufacturer Beta. A bureau company 
typically checks the hundreds of invoices generated by their client’s Energy Suppliers, 
ahead of payment by the client. This overlaps with C 0 2 emissions reporting, since 
the checked invoice data has an extra level of verification and reliability over that 
received direct from the Energy Suppliers. Although this was a useful by product of 
the bill checking service, it was not paid for explicitly and was a secondary concern 
relative to the original purpose of detecting multi million pound errors in energy 
invoices. In other words, carbon compliance services were not a core business 
offering for Bureau Provider. However, supporting Manufacturer Beta in their 
response to the Carbon Reduction Commitment was of interest to Bureau Provider. 
This was because the original value of their bill checking service was being eroded. 
Bureau services were a historic element of the energy supply industry which had 
emerged during an era when invoicing was a manual process which was prone to 
errors. Automatic meter reading had since cut out a large number of billing errors. 
In addition, increased competition in the energy supply market, plus the vigilance of 
the Bureau Providers themselves had further improved the accuracy of energy 
invoicing. This erosion of their original bill checking business model meant that the 
Bureau Provider was aggressively attempting to move into the provision of services 
in Carbon Reduction Commitment compliance support.
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10.3.5 Interactions between the manufacturer and carbon
consultancy
The Carbon Reduction Commitment also brought changes in the relationship 
between Carbon Consultancy and Manufacturer Beta. Carbon Consultancy was a 
small specialist consultancy that had previously dealt with Manufacturer Beta’s sites 
that were part of the European Emissions Trading Scheme and the United 
Kingdom’s Climate Change Agreements. This support involved calculating 
Manufacturer Beta’s C 0 2 emissions and preparing the reports for Manufacturer 
Beta’s submissions to the Environment Agency. These previous interactions with 
the Environment Agency meant that Carbon Consultancy had a good working 
knowledge o f the Environment Agency’s processes. Carbon Consultancy attended 
free Environment Agency training on the structure and timelines of the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment and also made use of an Environment Agency email address 
for enquiries and clarification regarding the scheme. These communications gave the 
Environment Agency a quick and informal means to fix problems with the structure 
of the Carbon Reduction Commitment as they arose. Carbon Consultancy also 
benefited from the process, since they could answer questions on the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment faster and in more detail than other relative newcomers to 
the space. Although all communication channels used were free and available to any 
company, this informal route to gathering data gave some advantages to specialist 
firms such as Carbon Consultancy, who were active in the right forums to be able to 
hear about and capitalise upon such opportunities.
Carbon Consultancy spent the 18 months prior to the launch o f the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment supporting Manufacturer Beta in the definition of
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administrative and reporting responsibilities introduced by the scheme. This work 
involved developing an energy supply inventory for all sites in the United Kingdom, 
determining the most reliable source of consumption data for each o f these supplies 
and helping to specify a reporting system to be used once the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment went live in April 2010. Previously, C 0 2 reporting had been carried 
out manually using spreadsheets, but the Carbon Reduction Commitment brought a 
scale of reporting that was not possible on this manual basis.
The Carbon Reduction Commitment represented a maturing o f C 0 2 reporting 
requirements. Following the introduction of the scheme, the majority of industrial 
and commercial emissions in the United Kingdom were covered by a C 0 2 market. 
This increased market size justified the development of new database services which 
supported Carbon Reduction Commitment reporting. This meant that Carbon 
Consultancy saw a large part of their core business eroded by these new competitors 
who made it hard for niche players to compete using manual processes. Carbon 
Consultancy saw these changes and started to seek out the next innovative niche in 
energy and C 0 2 management, anticipating that compliance support would be 
commoditised by database providers in less than 5 years. Carbon Consultancy 
developed a new focus upon supporting staff engagement campaigns for energy 
awareness. This was seen as the next step once C 0 2 reporting and compliance was in 
place at a company. With a view to moving on to tackle staff engagement, Carbon 
Consultancy started introducing its customers to database solutions for compliance 
management The logic behind these introductions was that these databases were a 
better long-term solution to energy and C 0 2 reporting. Further emphasising the 
need for scalability, Manufacturer Beta chose to use the Carbon Reduction
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Commitment reporting requirements to develop a database reporting system that 
would later be able to deal with anticipated C 0 2 markets in other regions and 
markets. Carbon Consultancy supported the selection of the database provider and 
provided training for a new Carbon Compliance Manager who was recruited within 
the Corporate Reporting Department at Manufacturer Beta. The following section 
examines how the COz compliance database provider was selected.
10.4 Manufacturer Beta’s final selection between multiple compliance 
service offerings
Eventually, all three suppliers to Manufacturer Beta proposed a service to support 
compliance with the Carbon Reduction Commitment. In this section the offerings 
are described and the final selection made by Alanufacturer Beta is explained. This 
discussion is supported by Figure 27, which illustrates the stages that raw data passed 
through before finally being submitted to the Environment Agency in the form of an 
annual report for the Carbon Reduction Commitment. Figure 27 also illustrates that 
different data are required for energy management, as opposed to C 0 2 compliance 
reporting. Energy management data must be fresh enough to inform timely decision 
making and this comes at the expense of accuracy. C 0 2 compliance data are only 
required at annual intervals, but must undergo a number of checks, presentation in 
the correct format, and preferably independent verification, before it is ready to 
submit to the regulator. These ideas are illustrated in the first three rows of the table. 
The last two rows show how Manufacturer Beta collected and reported C 0 2 
emissions data before and after the Carbon Reduction Commitment came into being. 
The first o f these shows Alanufacturer Beta’s original C 0 2 data chain for the small 
number of sites originally affected by the European Emissions Trading Scheme and
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the United Kingdom’s Climate Change Agreements. The second shows 
Manufacturer Beta s final C 0 2 data chain for the large number o f sites eventually 
affected by the Carbon Reduction Commitment.
Figure 27: Chain for conversion of raw energy data to C 02 compliance reports
1) Data \ 2) Data \ 3) R eport \ 4) Third party  \ 5) R egistry  \ 6 )C 0 2
co llec tion  / check ing  / p repara tion  / verification / a c c o u n t m gt / trad ing
Data frequency Live, hours, Days, weeks Months Yearly Yearly Yearly
Suitability for energy 
management High Medium Low - - -
Suitability for C 02 
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The first Carbon Reduction Commitment service was proposed by the primary 
electricity supplier to Manufacturer Beta. Figure 27, shows that Energy Suppliers 
held live energy data that was well suited to energy management purposes. This live 
data was the basis of their online energy monitoring package that managers at 
Manufacturer Beta used to monitor energy performance on site. It was proposed to 
Manufacturer Beta to extend this system into Carbon Reduction Commitment 
compliance services. However, in the first proposal meeting it became clear that the 
database was not capable of holding, checking and providing a verifiable trail of data 
for the purpose o f compliance reporting. Manufacturer Beta continued to view the 
package as being useful for supplying timely data for energy management, but they
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did not see a feasible route towards it supporting Carbon Reduction Commitment 
compliance reporting. For this reason, the discussions with the energy supplier were 
not taken any further.
The second proposal for a Carbon Reduction Commitment compliance service came 
from the Bureau Provider. They held their own database and proposed to complete 
all stages of compliance reporting using their internal systems. In the original 
compliance reporting system they had provided checked data to Carbon Consultancy 
for compilation into the required Environment Agency reports. The proposal from 
Bureau Provider was the lowest cost option for compliance with the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment. However, the corporate team in Manufacturer Beta viewed 
the development of C 0 2 reporting capabilities in-house as being of key importance 
and as being much wider than simply responding to the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment. Manufacturer Beta were concerned that outsourcing the task to 
Bureau Provider would not build any internal capabilities and would not start to 
build a system that could be used in the future to respond to upcoming C 0 2 markets 
in other regions. These doubts were reinforced by the weakening of the original 
business model of Bureau Provider. The need to check bills was being eroded by 
automatic meter reading and by better billing accuracy. Combined, these 
considerations meant that Manufacturer Beta did not wish to outsource what was 
seen as a critical activity to a partner whose long-term business relationship was 
already under question.
Finally, Carbon Consultancy had a good oversight of the compliance market and had 
recognised the development of a number of database products that would replace the
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first three steps of the compliance reporting process shown in Figure 27. This would 
give a standard system for collecting, checking and preparing emissions data. Carbon 
Consultancy supported Manufacturer Beta in selecting the most appropriate database 
and committed to shadow the reporting process for the first 3 years of the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment. This was on the agreement that, once the system was 
robust enough, reporting and compliance activities would be centralised and all run 
through the same database. Carbon Consultancy presented this as a 3 year transition 
during which systems would be developed and embedded within Manufacturer Beta. 
In addition to purchasing access to the database service, Manufacturer Beta also 
recruited a new member of staff with the job title of Carbon Compliance Manager. 
This new staff member was responsible for developing and maintaining the database 
and project managing the Carbon Reduction Commitment data collection processes. 
At the end of the 3 year transition, the new staff member would take over the 
activities performed by Carbon Consultancy.
10.5 Summary
This case detailed the response of Manufacturer Beta and its energy supply and 
reporting network to the launch of the Carbon Reduction Commitment. The case 
started with a description of Manufacturer Beta and their industrial network. Next 
the financial implications of the Carbon Reduction Commitment for Manufacturer 
Beta were examined. The case then examined the influence of the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment upon Manufacturer Beta’s relationships with their Energy Suppliers, 
bill checking service provider and the Carbon Consultancy who prepared their 
accounts for the different C 0 2 markets in which Manufacturer Beta participated. 
The case ended with a description of Manufacturer Beta’s final selection between
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multiple Carbon Reduction Commitment service offerings proposed to them by their 
service providers.
Case four examined the consultation process and outcomes during the development 
of the Carbon Reduction Commitment. Case five focussed upon the accounting and 
reporting obligations introduced by the Carbon Reduction Commitment. Finally, 
this case completed the examination of the Carbon Reduction Commitment, by 
describing the changes it brought about in scheme participants and their energy 
supply and reporting networks.
Case six was the final case presented by this research. The following chapter moves 
on to analyse the cases by confronting them with the conceptual framework which 
was developed in the literature review.
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11 ANALYSIS OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
11.1 Introduction
This chapter confronts the six case studies with the conceptual framework for the 
study o f market design and operation which was proposed at the end o f the literature 
review. The conceptual framework is presented in Figure 4 on page 73. The first 
section of this chapter reviews the research questions. The second section presents 
the actors involved during C 0 2 market design and operation. The third and fourth 
sections analyse the network-level and macro-level aspects o f C 0 2 market design and 
operation. The chapter closes with a brief conclusion, leading into chapter twelve 
which discusses the conclusions and implications of the research.
11.2 Review o f research questions
This section reviews the research questions which informed the application of the 
conceptual framework during the analysis of the six empirical cases. The remainder 
o f the analysis in this chapter is then presented in the order of the research questions. 
The research questions were introduced in section 1.2 and discussed in more detail in 
sections 2.4.4 and 2.5.4, which dealt with network-level and macro-level aspects of 
C 0 2 market design and operation respectively. For convenience, the research 
questions are reviewed below.
Firsdv, section 11.3 answers the research question ‘Who are the actors involved in C 02 
market design and operation.V\ It was important to identify these actors, because the 
remaining sections refer to them during the discussion of each case study. The next 
two sections of the chapter then discuss C 0 2 market design and operation. Section
11.4 examines the network-level aspects of C 0 2 market design and operation,
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answering research questions 2, 3 and 4. Research question 2 asked ‘How do exchange 
practices affect C 02 market design and operation and what is their influence upon representational 
and normalising practices?”. Research question 3 asked “How do representational practices 
affect CO2 market design and operation and what is their influence upon exchange and normalising 
practices?”. Research question 4 asked “How do normalising practices affect C 02 market 
design and operation and what is their influence upon exchange and representational practices?”. 
Section 11.5 examines the macro-level considerations for C 0 2 market design and 
operation, answering research questions 5, 6 and 7. Research question 5 asked “How 
are technical considerations affecting C 02 market design and operation?”. Research question 6 
asked ‘How are temporal considerations affecting CO2 market design and operation?”. Research 
question 7 asked ‘How are uncertainty-based considerations affecting C 02 market design and 
operation?”. The structure of sections 11.4 and 11.5 follow that of the conceptual 
framework presented in Figure 4 on page 73.
The following section answers research question 1, by introducing the actors 
involved during C 0 2 market design and operation.
11.3 Actors involved in C02 markets
This section identifies the actors involved in C 0 2 market design and operation. The 
discussion was prompted by the first research question which asked ‘Who are the 
actors involved in C 02 market design and operation?”. Research question one acknowledges 
that the network perspective of C 0 2 market design and operation which was adopted 
emphasises the interdependence between C 0 2 regulators and C 0 2 market 
participants. The literature review showed that current theories of COz market
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design place a disproportionate emphasis upon the desires and objectives o f COa 
market regulators. This first research question aimed to redress the balance, by 
identifying the other network actors who are involved during C 0 2 market design and 
operation. These findings contributed to a more detailed empirical understanding of 
the networks which operate C 0 2 markets.
The answer to research question 1 is given initially in a general sense in Table 19. 
Table 19 identifies the thresholds that regulators have set in order to identify the 
actors who must participate in the C 0 2 markets. A second answer is given in Table 
20, which identifies the specific actors involved in each of the six cases and the 
generic types o f C 0 2 market actor which they represent. The actors identified in 
Table 20 include the C 0 2 market participants, regulators, providers of products or 
services relating to energy and CO,, final customers, business associations, research 
and academic institutions and Non-Governmental Organisations that are involved 
during C 0 2 market design and operation.
The process whereby C 0 2 market participants are identified is now discussed. This 
discussion is summarised in Table 19. Efforts to extend the C 0 2 market of the 
Kyoto Protocol were discussed in the first case study. The Kyoto Protocol is 
administered by the United Nations and governments can sign up to the protocol on 
a voluntary basis. Phase I of the Kyoto Protocol runs from 2008-2012 and has 37 
member state signatories, as well as the European Union which has signed up as a 
region. The second C 0 2 market, as discussed in cases two and three, was the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme. The European Emissions Trading Scheme 
was different from the Kyoto Protocol, in that it mandated the participation of sites
272
CO, Market Design and Operadon
from specific industries. The participation of individual sites from within these 
industries was determined by reference to thresholds for participation based upon 
annual energy usage. Phase I and phase II o f the European Emissions trading 
scheme targeted the electricity generation, iron and steel, manufacturing, mineral 
processing and pulp and paper processing industries. All sites from these industries 
with total site combustion facilities of greater than 20MW were mandated to 
participate in the European Emissions Trading Scheme. This threshold resulted in 
approximately 10,500 sites across the European Union being included in phases I 
and II o f the European Emissions Trading Scheme. Phase III o f the European 
Emissions Trading scheme will raise the qualification threshold to 35MW of 
combustion facilities, to allow some smaller facilities to exit the scheme. The scope 
o f the European Emissions Trading Scheme has also been extended in phase III to 
include aviation and carbon capture and storage, as well as producers o f aluminium, 
ammonia and petrochemicals. These changes will bring an estimated further 1,500 to 
4,500 sites within the C 0 2 market of the European Emissions Trading Scheme. 
Finally, the third C 0 2 market, as examined by cases four, five and six was the United 
Kingdom’s Carbon Reduction Commitment. Like the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme, the Carbon Reduction Commitment mandates its participants through 
setting a threshold based upon energy consumption. However, the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment does not discriminate in its choice o f participating 
industries. The Carbon Reduction Commitment also avoids targeting single sites and 
instead targets whole organisations. The Carbon Reduction Commitment’s 
participation threshold is annual electricity consumption through an industrial class 
of electricity meter of greater than 6,000MWh. This threshold represents annual 
energy expenditure o f approximately -£500,000 across the whole organisation. C 0 2
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market participants in the Carbon Reduction Commitment include government 
authorities, landlords, office based organisations, retailers, smaller manufacturers and 
universities. The number of C 0 2 market participants in the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment is typically defined at the level of individual organisations. There are 
an estimated 5,000 organisations participating in the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment. These 5,000 organisations are estimated to represent between 25,000 
to 150,000 sites, as compared to the 10,500 sites in phases I and II o f the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme.
Table 19: C 02 market entry criteria and results
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The previous discussion identified the generic types of C 0 2 market participant and 
the means by which their participation in each C 0 2 market is decided. The 
discussion now moves to specific examples of C 0 2 market participants and the 
actors who influenced or were influenced by their participation in some way. Table 
20 introduces the regulators, market participants, providers o f products or services 
relating to energy and C 0 2, final customers, business associations, research and 
academic institutions and Non-Governmental Organisations that were identified in 
each o f the six case studies. Each type of actor is discussed below.




1 2 3 4 5 6
1) REGULATORS / - United Nations
✓ ✓ - European Union
✓ - Department of Energy & Climate Change
✓ V / ✓ - Environment Agency
2) C 0 2 MARKET 
PARTICIPANTS
/ - Governments
✓ - Manufacturer Alpha
- NRG
s - Fuel Users
V ✓ - Manufacturer Beta
V - Retailer Gamma
3) ENERG Y & CO2 
PRODUCT /  SERVICE  
PROVIDERS
- Technical consultant
✓ - Independent verifier 1
✓ - Independent verifier 2
V v' ✓ - Carbon Consultant
- Bureau Provider
✓ - Energy Suppliers
4) FINAL CUSTOMERS s - Consumers
5) BUSINESS  
ASSOCIATIONS
S - Trade Association
- EUTA
✓ - Confederation of British Industry
6) RESEARCH & ACADEMIC  
IN STITU TIO N S
S - Stem Review team
V - Carbon Tmst
7) N O N - G O VERNM ENTAL  
ORGANISATIONS
- Stop Climate Chaos
- World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development
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The first type o f actor involved during C 0 2 market design and operation is the 
regulator. In case one this was the United Nations which administers the Kyoto 
Protocol. In cases two and three the European Union administered the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme. Finally, in cases four, five and six the Department of 
Energy and Climate Change set the structure of the Carbon Reduction Commitment 
and the Environment Agency administered its operation on a day to day basis. Both 
o f these entities were part of the United Kingdom’s government. Inclusion of the 
regulator within discussions of C 0 2 markets was essential, since the regulator 
provides the legal basis for each C 0 2 market’s design and also for mandating 
organisations’ participation within the C 0 2 market. One exception to the regulators’ 
typical role o f mandating participation is the governance of the Kyoto Protocol. The 
United Nations still provides a framework for the operation of the Kyoto Protocol, 
but they are unable to mandate participation of governments within the scheme.
The second type of actor involved during C 0 2 market design and operation is C 0 2 
market participants. C 0 2 market participants are those actors which are required to 
purchase C 0 2 credits as direct market participants. In case one, the participants 
within the Kyoto Protocol were governments. In cases two and three, the C 0 2 
market participants examined were Manufacturer Alpha in phases I and II of the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme and the multinational energy Company £NRG’ 
and aviation ‘Fuel Users’ in phase III. Finally, Manufacturer Beta and Retailer 
Gamma were examined in cases four, five and six which dealt with the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment. Inclusion of C 0 2 market participants was essential to the 
examination of C 0 2 markets. The remaining C 0 2 market actors are those who 
influenced or were influenced by the C 0 2 market, but who do not purchase C 0 2.
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The next types o f C 0 2 market actor are energy and C 0 2 product and service 
providers. These actors are consultants, independent verifiers, bureau providers and 
energy suppliers. The role of each of these actors is now discussed. Consultants are 
often hired to support C 0 2 market participants in calculating and reporting their C 0 2 
emissions. Independent verifiers are hired by the C 0 2 market participants to check 
their annual C 0 2 reports. This verification process is mandatory in the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme and voluntary in the Carbon Reduction Commitment. 
Bureau providers are important C 0 2 market actors that predate the launch of C 0 2 
markets. Bureau providers use complex databases to check and challenge their 
customers’ energy bills. Bureau providers therefore held the most accurate set of 
energy data for most CO, market participants. During the launch of C 0 2 markets, 
these bureau providers have been attempting to provide new services to convert this 
energy data into the C 0 2 reports required by CO, market regulators. Finally, energy 
suppliers are an important C 0 2 market participant, as their energy supplies are the 
source of most of the C 0 2 emissions of market participants. Energy suppliers have 
seen CO, markets as an opportunity to support their customers and provide added 
benefits to their core offering of energy services. Furthermore, the latest C 0 2 
market, the Carbon Reduction Commitment has mandated that energy suppliers 
must provide accurate amiual energy use statements for use by the market participant 
during COz reporting and trading. All of diese energy and C 0 2 product and service 
providers are important actors in CO, markets, as they influence the C 0 2 reporting 
and reduction activities undertaken by C 0 2 market participants.
The next set of C 0 2 market actors, ‘final customers’ are not prominent in the case 
studies presented. One exception is that case three gives an example of how
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consumers concerns regarding C 0 2 markets and offsetting were managed. 
However, the majority of cases did not deal direcdy with end customers. Instead of 
being consumer-led, C 0 2 markets were found to be primarily regulator-led.
The anonymised ‘Trade Association’, ‘EUTA’, as well as the Confederation of British 
Industry are examined in cases two, three and four. Business associations are 
important actors in C 0 2 Markets, since they represent their members’ interests and 
attempt to influence the development of C 0 2 markets.
Research and academic institutions are also important actors during C 0 2 market 
design and operation, since they provide technical data upon the likely impact of 
Climate Change and on the possible actions that business could take to reduce their 
C 0 2 emissions. These actors tended to be more important at the macro-level, rather 
than the operational level of C 0 2 markets. The Stern Review team and Carbon Trust 
were included in case one which examined the extension of the Kyoto Protocol. The 
remaining case studies examined operational aspects of C 0 2 markets, where research 
and academic institutions had stepped back from the day to day market operation.
Finally, Non-Governmental Organisations were important C 0 2 market actors, as 
they attempted to mobilise action on Climate Change. Again, like research and 
academic institutions, the Non-Governmental Organisations tended to focus upon 
high level negotiations, rather than operational aspects of C 0 2 markets. Hence the 
inclusion of Stop Climate Chaos and the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development in case one which dealt with the extension of the Kyoto Protocol.
This section has answered research question 1, by identifying the actors involved 
during COz market design and operation. Sections 11.4 and 11.5 now examine
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network-level and macro-level aspects of C 0 2 market design and operation. The 
analysis is undertaken by confronting the conceptual framework for the study of 
market design and operation developed in the literature review with the contextual 
data on C 0 2 markets from chapter four, plus the empirical data from the six case 
studies presented in chapters five to ten.
11.4 Network-level aspects o f C02 markets
This section analyses the network-level aspects of C 0 2 market design and operation 
which were identified by confronting the cases with the conceptual framework 
developed in the literature review. The conceptual framework for the analysis of 
market design and operation is discussed in section 2.6 and summarised in Figure 4 
on page 73. Figure 4 is repeated below for convenience.
Figure 4: Conceptual framework for the study of C 02 market design and 
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This analysis deals with research questions 2, 3 and 4. Research question 2 asked 
“How do exchange practices affect C 02 market design and operation and what is their influence 
upon representational and normalising practices?”. Exchange practices relate to the
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economic exchanges taking place within the market and the supporting activities 
which surround them, these are analysed in section 11.4.1. Research question 3 
asked How do representationalpractices affect C 02 market design and operation and what is their 
influence upon exchange and normalising practices?”. Representational practices are those 
which aim to depict markets and how they work, these are analysed in section 11.4.2. 
Finally, research question 4 asked “How do normalising practices affect C 02 market design 
and operation and what is their influence upon exchange and representational practices?”. 
Normalising practices are those which aim to introduce normative guidelines for how 
a market should work, these are analysed in section 11.4.3.
11.4.1 Exchange in C02 markets
Aspects of COz market design and operation relating to exchange practices are now 
analysed. This section answers research question 2 which asked “How do exchange 
practices affect C 02 market design and operation and what is their influence upon representational 
and normalising practices?”. Exchange practices relate to the economic exchanges taking 
place within the market and the supporting activities which surround them. The first 
half o f research question 2 seeks to understand how exchange practices affected C 0 2 
market design and operation. The second half of research question 2 looks at how 
exchange practices influenced representational and normalising practices. This part 
o f die question focused attention upon the two translations of: ‘interests’, which link 
exchange practices to normalising practices and ‘measurements’, which link exchange 
practices to representational practices (Kjellberg & Helgesson, 2006, 2007b, 2007a). 
Interests are stakes or involvement in an undertaking which drive exchange practices 
and inform efforts to influence a market’s representational and normalising practices. 
Measurements are descriptions of exchange which influence how actors represent the
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market and respond to it. Interests and measurements during C 0 2 market design 
and operation are now discussed.
The following discussion o f interests during CO. market design and operation is 
summarised in Table 21. The interests o f the market regulators and business 
participants are presented by C 0 2 market and also by case study.










- Reduction of greenhouse- 
gasses by >5% between 
2008 and 2012.
- CO2 emission reductions 
at least cost to society.
- Profit maximisation
- Need for level playing 
field’
~ Need for CCE market to 
monetise CCh ahead of 
business action.






- Reduction of CO2 
emissions by 8% between 
2008 and 2012.
- CO2 emission reductions 
at least cost to society.
- Profit maximisation,







- Support EU ambition to 
cut CO2 emissions by 20- 
30%, by 2020.
- CO2 emission reductions 
at least cost to society.
- Manage reputational 
impact.




R E D U C T IO N
COM M ITM ENT
✓ ✓ ✓
- Reduction of CO2 
emissions by 4.4 million 
tonnes by 2020, ~3% of 
the projected total 2020 
UK CO2 emissions.
- CO2 emission reductions 
at least cost to society.
- Cost management
- Build COa reporting 
capabilities.
- Regulatory compliance.
In each study, the C 0 2 market regulator’s primary interests were to achieve CQ2 
reductions at the least cost to society. Although all regulators agreed on the need for
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capital efficiency, each regulator expressed their interest in reducing C 0 2 emissions in 
different ways. In case one the United Nations’ set a target for the Kyoto Protocol 
to achieve a reduction of greenhouse-gasses by >5% between 2008 and 2012 
(UNFCCC, 2005). The European Union set a C 0 2 reduction target for phase I and 
II o f the European Emissions Trading Scheme to achieve an 8% reduction in C 0 2 
emissions between 2008 and 2012 (Braun, 2009; Delay & Grubb, 2008; Sandoff & 
Schaad, 2009). In phase III of the European Emissions Trading Scheme, the 
European Union has not yet set a binding reduction target. Instead, the target will be 
aligned with the wider European ambition to reduce C 0 2 emissions by 20% by 2020 
if no global replacement for Kyoto Protocol is agreed (Europa, 2008). This target 
will be ratcheted to 30% by 2020, if other countries ratify and strengthen the Kyoto 
Protocol’s second phase in 2013. Finally, the United Kingdom’s government has set 
a target of annual savings of 4.4 million tonnes of C 0 2 through the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment by 2020 (DECC, 2009d). This is equivalent to 
approximately a 3% saving of the projected total United Kingdom C 0 2 emissions in 
2020 (DEFRA, 2006). Although these interests differ in their detail, it can be seen 
that the regulators consistently expressed their interests as being to achieve absolute 
reductions in C 0 2 emissions through a method that will do so at the least cost to 
society. This interest was aligned with the theoretical principles underpinning the 
design of C 0 2 markets to achieve capital efficiency (Aldy et al., 2003; DEFRA, 2007; 
Haug et al., In press; Kolk & Pinkse, 2004; Levin & Espeland, 2002; MacKenzie, 
2009; McKibbin & Wilcoxen, 2002; Sanden & Azar, 2005; Wittneben, 2009).
Moving on to analyse the interests of the C 0 2 market participants in each case, it can 
be seen that their interests are quite different to those of the C 0 2 market regulators.
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In case one, during negotiations to extend the Kyoto Protocol, businesses expressed 
interests o f profit maximisation, the need for a level playing field and the need for 
0 O 2 markets to lead business action on Climate Change. The calls for a level 
playing field mosdy reflected the concerns of businesses based in the Western world. 
These businesses wished to avoid competitive distortions that could arise if they were 
subject to a market for C 0 2 that did not include, for example, Chinese or Indian 
manufacturers. Furthermore, businesses stressed that they could not justify a 
proactive response to Climate Change to their shareholders without a price for C 0 2 
that would allow them to build the cost of C 0 2 into their business decisions. Within 
phases I and II o f the European Emissions Trading Scheme, Manufacturer Alpha’s 
interests were profit maximisation through increased production throughput and 
quality, as well as cost minimisation. Manufacturer Alpha also expressed an interest 
that they wished to comply with C 0 2 markets. Discussions within NRG about phase 
III of the European Emissions Trading Scheme primarily centred upon interests in 
managing the reputational impact of aviation’s inclusion within the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme. NRG also expressed an interest in avoiding setting 
difficult precedents in other C 0 2 markets. NRG also expressed an interest in 
ensuring regulatory compliance with phase III of the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme. Finally, in their responses to the United Kingdom’s Carbon Reduction 
Commitment, Manufacturer Beta and Retailer Gamma expressed interests of cost 
management and regulatory compliance. However, they also expressed an interest 
that was not seen in the first three cases, they saw that the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment represented a maturing of C 0 2 markets which required the 
development of COz reporting capabilities in-house.
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Business interests were essentially aligned across all case studies. Business 
participants in C 0 2 markets saw their primary interests in maximising profit, 
managing the reputational impact of C 0 2 markets and achieving compliance with the 
C 0 2 markets. These interests were strikingly different to those of the regulators. 
The observations were however aligned with a small body of research which 
challenges the traditional view of C 0 2 markets through empirical observations of 
business responses to C 0 2 markets (Engels, 2009; Reid & Toffel, 2009; Spash, 2010). 
Below, the analysis of the case studies continues with a discussion of measurements 
during C 0 2 market design and operation.
The following discussion of measurements during C 0 2 market design and operation 
is summarised in Table 22. The measurements of the market regulators and business 
participants are presented by C 0 2 market and also by case study.
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measurements1 2 3 4 5 6
KYOTO
PROTOCOL
- Absolute cost of CO2 in 
$ / tonne
- n/a (Kyoto Protocol is 
between governments, no 
direct business 
participation)




phase I V - Absolute cost of CO2 in 
€ / tonne
- Relative cost as % of 
energy expenditure
phase II - Absolute cost of CO2 in 
€ / tonne
phase III . Absolute cost of CO2 in 
€ / tonne




R E D U C T IO N
COM M ITM ENT
✓ ✓
- Absolute cost of CO2 in 
£ /  tonne
- Relative cost as % of 
energy expenditure
- Reputational impacts
Subject to differences in local currency, the regulators’ measurements of all three 
C 0 2 markets covered by the cases were undertaken in terms of the absolute cost of 
C 0 2 in either $ / tonne C 0 2 for the global Kyoto Protocol, € /tonne C 0 2 for the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme, or £ / tonne C 0 2 for the United Kingdom’s 
Carbon Reduction Commitment. These measurements, in terms o f the absolute cost 
o f C 0 2, were aligned with the regulators’ interests in achieving C 0 2 reductions at the 
least cost across society.
The measurements employed by the business participants in the C 0 2 markets were 
not aligned with those of the regulators. Instead of measuring the absolute costs of 
C 0 2, business participants measured the relative costs of C 0 2 as a percentage of their 
annual energy expenditure. One exception to this was in case three, where NRG did
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not directly discuss the cost of C 0 2 and instead measured the market in terms of 
reputational impacts. This attempt to measure reputational impacts was also 
undertaken by Manufacturer Beta and Retailer Gamma in cases four, five and six. 
These measurements by the business participants in the C 0 2 markets were 
significant. Later the analysis of the results of the measurements will show that C 0 2 
markets have a negligible financial impact when compared to energy expenditure. 
This provides a fundamental challenge to literature, for example (Barrett, 2007; 
Bebbington & Larrinaga-Gonzalez, 2008; Braun, 2009; Coase, 1960, 1988; Dales, 
1968; Demsetz, 1966; Kolk et al., 2008; Lohmann, 2005, 2009; MacKenzie, 2009; 
Okereke, 2007; Stern, 2006), which presents C 0 2 markets as fostering Climate 
Change mitigation through the monetisation of C 0 2 emissions.
The analysis now discusses representations during C 0 2 market design and operation, 
starting with a discussion of the results of the measurements introduced above.
11.4.2 Representations o f C02 markets
This section analyses representational aspects of C 0 2 market design and operation. 
The discussion answers research question 3, which asked ‘How do representational 
practices affect C 02 market design and operation and what is their influence upon exchange and 
normalising p r a c t i c e s Representational practices are those which aim to depict 
markets and how they work. The first half of research question 3 seeks to 
understand how representational practices affected C 0 2 market design and 
operation. The second half of research question 3 looks at how representational 
practices influenced exchange and normalising practices. This part of the question 
focused attention upon the two translations of: ‘results’, which link representational
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practices to exchange practices and ‘descriptions’, which link representational 
practices to normalising practices (Kjellberg & Helgesson, 2006, 2007b, 2007a). 
Results o f measurements drive exchange practices by influencing how market 
participants view the outcome of their exchanges. Descriptions of markets drive 
normalising practices by informing participants’ representations of the markets which 
they are seeking to regulate in some way. Results and descriptions are now discussed.
The following discussion of results during C 0 2 market design and operation is 
summarised in Table 23. The results of measurements made by the market 
regulators and business participants are presented by C 0 2 market and also by case 
study.






1 2 3 4 5 6
KYOTO
PROTOCOL
- —$20/tonne CO2 - n/a (Kyoto Protocol is 
between governments, no 
direct business 
participation)




phase I - —€2 /  tonne CO2 - -0.15% of energy 
expenditure
phase II ✓ - —€15 /  tonne CO2




- €?? /  tonne CO2 (future 
price in 2013 unknown)
- 0.6 - 1.5% increase in air 
fares (Median estimated 
increase in air fares due to 
aviation’s inclusion in 
phase III)
CARBON
R ED U C TIO N
COM M ITM ENT
V
- £12/tonne CO2 (price 
fixed in 2012 and 2013)
- -0.77% of energy 
expenditure
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The regulator’s results of their measurements of each C 0 2 market were expressed as 
measurements of the absolute costs of C 0 2, as discussed above. The history of these 
costs is given in detail in Figure 12, with the costs quoted in Table 23 relating to 
those at the time of each case study. The most commonly traded CO, credit within 
the Kyoto Protocol was the ‘Certified Emission Reduction’ Unit (CER), this was 
typically traded at around $20/tonne C 0 2 (trade association data provided on 
anonymous basis). Within the European Emissions Trading Scheme, CO, permits 
averaged around €2/tonne C 0 2 during phase I and around €15/tonne C 0 2 in phase 
II (ECX, 2010). At the time of writing, the future price of C 0 2 within phase III of 
the European Emissions Trading Scheme was unknown. The lack of ability to 
predict future prices in C 0 2 markets is discussed later as a macro-level consideration 
due to the uncertainty during C 0 2 market design and operation. Finally, within the 
Carbon Reduction Commitment, the United Kingdom’s Government had set a fixed 
price of C 0 2 at £12/tonne during the early years of the C 0 2 market (DECC, 2009c).
The discussion now switches to analyse the results of measurements of the C 0 2 
market made by businesses. As can be seen in Table 23, all market participants 
converted the absolute costs of C 0 2 into a percentage of energy expenditure. These 
measurements gave results which were CO, costs of 0.15 /o  of energy expenditure 
in phase I of the European Emissions Trading Scheme, — 1.1 /o  during phase II of 
the European Emissions Trading Scheme and -0.77%  of energy expenditure during 
phase I of the Carbon Reduction Commitment. The estimated increases in air fares 
given following aviation’s inclusion in phase III of the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme were not undertaken by NRG. Instead, these come from academic research 
discussed in the literature review. NRG had focussed upon managing reputational
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impacts due to aviation’s inclusion in phase III of the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme. The research on possible increases in air fares due to aviation’s inclusion in 
phase III o f the European Emissions Trading Scheme estimated increases of 0.6-
1.5% on the median air fare. Finally, the C 0 2 costs introduced by the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment represented around 0.77% of energy expenditure. This 
analysis shows that although the absolute costs of C 0 2 were real, they were not 
significant in terms of their cost relative to the energy expenditure of C 0 2 market 
participants. While literature, for example (Barrett, 2007; Bebbington & Larrinaga- 
Gonzalez, 2008; Braun, 2009; Coase, 1960, 1988; Dales, 1968; Demsetz, 1966; Kolk 
et al., 2008; Lohmann, 2005, 2009; MacKenzie, 2009; Okereke, 2007), emphasises the 
financial incentives introduced by C 0 2 markets, there is a lack of discussion of the 
scale of these costs, or their comparison to other costs faced by businesses. The 
insights developed from the case studies as to the relatively low costs of C 0 2 markets 
starts to help to explain why these markets have not significantly influenced 
businesses’ behaviour.
The analysis now deals with descriptions during C 0 2 market design and operation. 
Table 24 summarises the following discussion. The descriptions of the markets by 
the regulators and business participants are presented by C 0 2 market and also by 
case study.
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Table 24: Descriptions in C02 markets
Case studies 
covered Regulator’s Businesses’




- Kyoto Protocol aiming to 
realise the foil potential of 
market-based 
opportunities to respond 
to Climate Change.
- CO2 market as an issue of 
regulatory compliance.
- Local CO2 markets as 
potential threats to global 
competitiveness.
- CO2 markets required to 






- Market mechanism 
delivering CO2 reductions 
at the least cost across 
industry.
- Two key design criteria of: 
avoiding unnecessary 
regulatory burdens and 
achieving flexibility in 
modes of compliance 
available to businesses.
- CO2 as a strategic concern 
for businesses
- CO2 market as a 
compliance scheme.








- Risk management exercise 
to avoid setting adverse 
precedents for other CO2 






- Market based mechanism 
designed to introduce a 
price for CO2 emissions.
- Supplementary public 
CO2 performance league 
table designed to 
introduce reputational 
incentives to reduce CO2 
emissions.
- Complex and extensive 
reporting scheme 
requiring development of 
new CO2 reporting 
infrastructures to ensure 
compliance.
- CO2 costs as <1% of 
energy costs.
- Reputational driver 
managed defensively.
The descriptions of C 0 2 markets by regulators are now analysed. The United 
Nations described the Kyoto Protocol in terms of a mechanism which was designed 
to realise the full potential of market-based opportunities to respond to Climate 
Change. Descriptions by the European Union of the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme were similar. Again, the market based elements were discussed and the 
ambition to achieve CO, reductions at least cost was reiterated. The market based
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mechanism was described as relying upon flexibility in compliance modes and the 
avoidance o f unnecessary regulatory burden in order to achieve this capital efficiency. 
The European Union described C 0 2 as a strategic concern for businesses. Finally, 
the Carbon Reduction Commitment was described as a market mechanism which 
would introduce a price for C 0 2 emissions. The regulator’s description of the 
Carbon Reduction Commitment also made reference to the performance league 
table, which was designed to introduce reputational incentives to reduce C 0 2 
emissions.
The descriptions of each C 0 2 market by their business participants are now analysed. 
Businesses’ descriptions of the Kyoto Protocol during negotiations over its extension 
focussed primarily upon C 0 2 markets as a compliance issue for business. They also 
described the potential for local C 0 2 markets to cause threats to global 
competiveness, while still acknowledging the need for C 0 2 markets to provide 
businesses with a means of monetising and therefore reducing their C 0 2 emissions. 
Manufacturer Alpha described phases I and II of the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme as a compliance scheme similar to other environmental regulation 
administered by the United Kingdom’s Environment Agency. Manufacturer Alpha 
also described the C 0 2 costs as being less than 1% of energy expenditure and 
therefore not significant enough to influence investment or operational decisions. 
During the inclusion of aviation in phase III of the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme, NRG described the C 0 2 market as an opportunity to differentiate the 
commodity of aviation fuel. However, the opportunity was not described in terms of 
a reduced C 0 2 offering, but instead as a means of offering a bundled aviation fuel 
and compliance package. The descriptions focussed upon the need to manage the
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risk of reputational damage and to avoid setting difficult precedents in other COz 
markets by region or industry. Finally, the Carbon Reduction Commitment was 
described by Manufacturer Beta and Retailer Gamma as a complex and extensive 
scheme which required the development of new C 0 2 reporting infrastructures in 
order to ensure compliance. The costs of the Carbon Reduction Commitment were 
presented as not being material enough to drive business decisions, as they 
represented less than 1% of energy expenditure. Furthermore, the reputational 
driver introduced by the Carbon Reduction Commitment’s public league table was 
managed defensively as a risk, rather than as an opportunity. The ambition was to 
avoid being in the bottom half of the league table, but also not to risk the exposure 
o f aiming for the top of the league table either. These descriptions of C 0 2 markets, 
as compliance based mechanisms triggering risk management type responses, 
certainly affected the exchange and normalising efforts within the C 0 2 markets. 
These observations of descriptions as affecting, as well as resulting from, market 
practices are aligned with literature which emphasises the normative power of 
representations (Hardie & MacKenzie, 2007; Kjellberg & Helgesson, 2006, 2007b, 
2007a). The stark differences between the descriptions of C 0 2 markets by 
regulators, versus the descriptions of businesses demonstrate the multiplicity of 
perceptions within a single market (Ford et al., 2003; Geiger & Finch, 2010; 
Henneberg et al., 2006; Henneberg et al., 2010; Leek & Mason, 2010; Ramos & Ford, 
in press). Acknowledging these differences in perceptions is an important step in 
explaining the exchange and normative practices which were observed in the
network.
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11.4.3 Constitutions of C02 markets
Aspects of C 0 2 market design and operation relating to normalising practices are 
now analysed. This section answers research question 4 which asked “How do 
normalising practices affect C 02 market design and operation and what is their influence upon 
exchange and representational practices?”. Normalising practices are those which aim to 
introduce normative guidelines for how a market should work. The first half of 
research question 4 seeks to understand how normalising practices affected C 0 2 
market design and operation. The second half of research question 4 looks at how 
normalising practices influenced exchange and representational practices. This part 
of the question focused attention upon the two translations of: ‘rules and tools’, 
which link normalising practices to exchange practices and ‘measures and methods of 
measurement’, which link normalising practices to representational practices 
(Kjellberg & Helgesson, 2006, 2007b, 2007a). Rules and tools are used to perform 
and influence exchange practices. Measures and methods of measurement influence 
representational practices by setting what aspects of markets are measured and how 
they are measured. Rules and tools and measures and methods of measurement are 
now discussed.
The following discussion analyses rules and tools during C 0 2 market design and 
operation, as summarised in Table 25. The rules and tools recognised by the 
regulators and business participants are presented by C 0 2 market and also by case
study.
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Table 25: Rules and tools in C02 markets
Case studies 
covered Regulator’s Businesses’ 





- Target setting and 
scheme administration 
discussed at annual 
Conference of Parties.
- Obligations to maximise 
shareholder value.






phase I - Participation mandatory 
for sites with > 20MW of 
combustion plant.
- CO2 permits allocated for 
free.
- Annual CO2 reporting 
and audits.
- Penalties for non- 
compliance.
- Management of 
throughput, quality and 
costs drives investment 
and operational decisions.
- Compliance with CO2 
market obligatory.
phase II
phase III - Participation mandatory 
for sites with > 35MW of 
combustion plant.
- CO2 permits auctioned, 
but participants providing 
data early will receive free 
permits in early years.
- Annual CO2 reporting 
and audits.
- Penalties for non- 
compliance.
- Decisions driven by 
efforts to manage 
reputational concerns and 
precedents set in other 
CO2 markets.





- Participation mandatory 
for companies using 
>6,000MWh of electricity 
per year.
- CO2 permits auctioned.
- League table ranks 
participants’ CO2 
reduction performance.
- Rebates on CO2 auction 
expenditure; league table 
sets bonus /  penalty.
- Random audits to verify 
accuracy of CO2 reports.
- Penalties for non- 
compliance.
- CRC compliance costs to 
be minimised
- Policy prohibiting 
speculation in non core 
business activities.
- Compliance with CO2 
market mandatory.
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The main rules and tools of the C 0 2 market which were set by regulators related to: 
determining which organisations should participate in the market, the mechanism by 
which C 0 2 permits were allocated, guidance on how to report C 0 2 emissions and the 
methods of verifying and enforcing participants’ compliance with the C 0 2 market. 
These are now discussed in turn.
The only C 0 2 market whose members were selected on a voluntary basis was the 
Kyoto Protocol. This market was administered by the United Nations which had a 
role to encourage and coordinate the global C 0 2 market. However, the United 
Nations did not have any authority to force nations to join the Kyoto Protocol. 
Participation in all other C 0 2 markets was determined by thresholds of energy 
consumption, whereby any organisation breaking the threshold would have to join 
the C 0 2 market by law. For phases I and II of the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme, the threshold for participation was measured at the site level and 
encompassed all sites with combined combustion facilities of greater than 20MW 
capacity (DTI, 2004). This threshold was raised to 35MW for phase III of the 
European Emissions Trading scheme, in order to allow some of the smaller sites to 
avoid what.was deemed to be a disproportionate burden of compliance (Europa, 
2008). The United Kingdom’s Carbon Reduction Commitment measured the 
threshold for participation at the level of a legal entity /  business rather than by site. 
A. business was required to join the scheme if their total electricity consumption 
through all commercial scale electricity meters exceeded 6,000MWh per year (DECC, 
2009c).
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Having determined the participants for each C 0 2 market, the next step was to 
examine how their C 0 2 reporting and trading was undertaken. The Kyoto Protocol 
involved trading between governments, however their targets have not been 
enforced, due to the voluntary nature of the scheme. This lack of enforcement 
meant that trading has not taken place to ensure compliance with the Kyoto 
Protocol s reduction targets. Instead an annual Conference of the Parties continues 
to review progress and to negotiate the terms of longer-term cooperation after phase 
I o f the Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012. Within phases I and II of the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme, C 0 2 permits were allocated to market participants for 
free. At the end of each compliance year the true C 0 2 emissions of each 
organisation were reported and then equivalent C 0 2 permits surrendered. In order 
to comply, each participant could either sell excess C 0 2 permits, or purchase any 
shortfall on the C 0 2 market. The European Union provided strict guidelines on how 
to calculate and report C 0 2 emissions. The European Emissions Trading Scheme 
mandated that participants must have these calculations checked by a third party 
independent verifier ahead of their submission each year. Phase III of the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme will work in the same way as described above, except that 
C 0 2 permits will be auctioned, rather than allocated for free. The auctioning will be 
phased in, representing a shift so that C 0 2 will be paid for in full, rather than the 
initial allowance being free and any shortfall being purchased upon the C 0 2 market. 
This change was necessary, since in a free allocation it is in every participant s interest 
to apply for as many C 0 2 permits as possible. Auctioning encourages participants to 
buy only what they believe they need, as each tonne of C 0 2 requested must be paid 
for. These steps are aligned with literature that advocates the design of markets to 
avoid adverse economic incentives (Barnett, 1986, 2003; HurwicZ, 1973; McMillan,
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2003; Roth, 2002, 2007a, 2008). However, the alignment of these incentives does 
not mean that they are at a scale that will be significant enough to change businesses’ 
behaviour. It is this second consideration, of the scale of incentives, that is flagged 
by the case studies, but which is not explicit in the literature. Finally, the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment starts die annual cycle in the same way as described above 
for phase III o f the European Emissions Trading Scheme. Firstly, market 
participants forecast their requirements and purchase C 0 2 permits in an annual 
auction. Next they report their C 0 2 emissions and surrender the required number of 
permits. At this point the Carbon Reduction Commitment differs from the other 
C 0 2 markets in three ways. Firsdy, a reputational incentive is introduced as the CO, 
reduction performance of each participant will be published in a public league table. 
Secondly, a further financial incentive is introduced as the majority of the 
expenditure during the C 0 2 auction will be repaid to participants with a bonus or 
penalty that is based upon performance in the league table. Thirdly, the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment will not force participants to have their C 0 2 emissions 
reports verified before submission. Instead, die Environment Agency will audit 
participants on a random basis approximately once every 5 years. The final aspect of 
the European Emissions Trading Scheme and the Carbon Reduction Commitment is 
that they are both backed up by significant fines which encourage businesses to 
participate in the scheme and to report their C 0 2 emissions accurately. These fines 
are considerably higher than the costs of participation in the scheme, making it 
cheaper to comply with, rather than to ignore the C 0 2 markets.
The rules and tools employed by the business participants in C 0 2 markets are now 
discussed. Although each participant did acknowledge and comply with the
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regulator’s rules which were just discussed, it will be seen that the rules set out by the 
regulators did not drive businesses’ decisions. Business responses to the negotiations 
to extend the Kyoto Protocol focussed upon rules and tools which emphasised that 
the primary obligation for businesses was to maximise shareholder value. CO, 
markets were not ignored, but were seen as a compliance issue, rather than as a 
driver of decision making. Again, within phases I and II of the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme, profit maximisation through the management of throughput, 
quality and cost were seen as the rules which drove manufacturer Alpha’s operational 
and investment decisions. Compliance with the C 0 2 market was seen as mandatory, 
but not as a strategic concern. During the future extension of phase III of the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme, NRG planned to comply with the CO, 
market, but spent the majority of its preparatory effort on managing reputational 
concerns and attempting to avoid setting difficult precedents within other regions or 
industries covered by C 0 2 markets. Finally, Manufacturer Beta and Retailer Gamma 
responded to the Carbon Reduction Commitment in ways designed to minimise 
compliance costs. They also followed company policies that prohibited speculation 
outside of their core business activities. To a certain extent, this internal rule short 
circuited the make or buy decision at the heart of the capital efficiency of C 0 2 
markets. Internal trading specialists were very wary of trading in C 0 2 markets for 
purposes other than to obtain C 0 2 permits required for market compliance, since 
any further trading could be seen as speculative activity.
The differences between the constitutions of the rules and tools employed by the 
regulators versus the businesses are important aspects which have significandy 
influenced the operation of C 0 2 markets. Such observations are aligned with the
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work o f Mouzas and Ford (Mouzas, 2006a; Mouzas & Ford, 2009). While the rules 
and tools introduced by the regulator were followed, they did not deliver the desired 
reductions in business C 0 2 emissions. This failure to influence business behaviour 
was pardy because other business rules and tools overrode those introduced by C 0 2 
markets. The discussion now moves to examine the measures and methods of 
measurement employed by regulators and businesses during C 0 2 market design and 
operation.
Table 26: Measures and Methods of Measurement in C02 markets
Case studies 
covered Regulator’s measures and methods of 
measurement
Businesses’ measures 
and methods of 
measurement1 2 3 4 5 6
KYOTO
PROTOCOL ✓
- CO2 price: $ or € per 
tonne CO2, set by 
market.
- CO2 volume: Standard 
conversion factors to 
define CO2 content of 
fuels.
- n/a (Kyoto Protocol is 







phase I ✓ - Relative cost as % of




- Impacts upon CO2 




COMMITMENT ✓ ✓ ✓
- CO2 price: Fixed during 
early years.
- CO2 volume: Standard 
conversion factors to 
define CO2 content of 
fuels.
- Relative cost as % of 
energy expenditure.
- Reputational impacts.
Regulator’s measures and methods of measurement related to the determination of 
the C 0 2 prices and volumes for which C 0 2 market participants had to account. This
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challenge o f making different activities commensurable within markets has already 
received a significant level of attention in the literature (Azimont & Araujo, 2007; 
Gallon & Muniesa, 2005; Christiansen & Wettestad, 2003; Cochoy, 2008; Finch, 
2007; MacKenzie, 2004, 2007, 2009; Tenbrunsel et al., 2000). In all C 0 2 markets, 
except for the early phases of the Carbon Reduction Commitment, the C 0 2 price 
was set by the market. In early years of the Carbon Reduction Commitment, the 
C 0 2 price was fixed in order to allow participants to focus upon collecting and 
reporting their C 0 2 volumes. In all C 0 2 markets the C 0 2 volume to be accounted 
for was calculated using the participant’s energy consumption plus standard 
conversion factors which defined the C 0 2 content of each fuel. Although the 
processes of calculating C 0 2 emissions involved the same steps, one source of 
complaints from market participants was that the C 0 2 conversion factors were not 
consistent across the different C 0 2 markets. In other words the same fuels could 
result in different amounts of C 0 2 emissions, depending upon which C 0 2 market 
covered them. This lack of consistency was a frustration for market participants, 
but it was not their primary concern with regards to C 0 2 markets.
Businesses acknowledged the measures and methods of measurement imposed by 
the regulator in order to calculate the relevant C 0 2 prices and volumes. However, 
these calculations were undertaken as reporting and compliance exercises. The 
measures and methods of measurement which actually drove business decisions are 
now discussed. In phases I and II of the European Emissions Trading Scheme, 
Manufacturer Alpha measured the European Emissions Trading Scheme in terms of 
its financial impact as a percentage of their energy expenditure. During discussion of 
aviation’s inclusion in phase III of the European Emissions Trading scheme, NRG
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paid primary attention to concerns relating to reputational impacts and impacts of 
precedents set upon C 0 2 markets in other regions or industries. The lack of a 
measure of the cost of C 0 2 markets by NRG could arguably be explained by their 
previous engagement in other C 0 2 markets which had proven that C 0 2 costs were 
not material. The lack of cost calculations could also have been due to the problems 
of predicting the future price of C 0 2 in a market. Finally, the measures and methods 
o f measurement employed by Manufacturer Beta and Retailer Gamma during the 
launch o f the Carbon Reduction Commitment were C 0 2 costs as a percentage of 
energy expenditure and the reputational impact of the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment’s league table. The main point raised by this analysis is that the focus 
of the attention of previous literature upon the intricate details of the regulator’s 
measures and methods of measurement has overlooked a much more significant 
challenge faced by C 0 2 markets. This challenge is that the costs introduced by C 0 2 
markets have so far proven to be too little to significantly influence businesses’ 
behaviour. The regulator’s measures and methods of measures of measurement were 
technically robust and logically sound; however they neglected to take account of the 
measures employed by businesses. This problem has been overcome by taking a 
network perspective of markets and studying the practices within the network, actor 
by actor (Araujo, 2007; Araujo et al., 2008; Kjellberg & Helgesson, 2006, 2007b, 
2007a; Mouzas & Ford, 2009; Reverdy, 2010). Such an approach has highlighted 
empirical inconsistencies between regulators and businesses measures and methods 
of which have been largely undetected in the literature to date.
This section has discussed exchange, representational and normalising practices as 
network-level aspects of CO, market design and operation. In the following section
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the discussion moves on to examine macro-level aspects of C 0 2 market design and 
operation.
11.5 Macro-level aspects o f C02 markets
This section analyses the macro-level aspects of C 0 2 market design and operation 
which were identified by confronting the cases with the conceptual framework 
developed in the literature review. The conceptual framework for the analysis of 
market design and operation is discussed in sections 2.5.4 and 2.6 and summarised in 
Figure 4 on page 73. Figure 4 is repeated below for convenience.
Figure 4: Conceptual framework for the study of C 02 market design and 
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During the literature review, three macro-level aspects of C 0 2 market design and 
operation were identified, these were technical, temporal and uncertainty based 
considerations, as examined in research questions 5, 6 and 7. Technical aspects relate 
to physical and scientific aspects of market design and operation, these are analysed 
in section 11.5.1. This section answers research question 5 which asked How are
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technical considerations affecting C 02 market design and o p e ra tio n ,Temporal aspects of 
market design and operation are analysed in section 11.5.2. This section answers 
research question 6 which asked ‘flow are temporal considerations affecting C 02 market 
design and operationV\ Uncertainty based aspects of C 0 2 market design and operation 
are analysed in section 11.5.3. This section answered research question 7 which 
asked ‘flow  are uncertainty-based considerations affecting C02 market design and operation 
The analyses given in these sections are simpler in structure than the network-level 
analyses which were performed individually for each case study in section 11.4. The 
analysis is not split between each case, since macro-level aspects encompass all C 0 2 
markets. Following this discussion of the macro-level aspects of C 0 2 market design 
and operation, the chapter closes with a summary which leads into the final chapter 
o f the dissertation.
11.5.1 Technical aspects of C02 markets
Technical aspects of C 0 2 market design and operation are now analysed. This 
section answers research question 5, which asked “How are technical considerations 
affecting C 02 market design and opera tionThe conceptual framework proposed in the 
literature review identified technical considerations within technological aspects of 
market design and operation and considerations due to ‘public goods and resource 
limits’. Technological aspects are immutable physical laws, or limits of today’s 
technological knowledge and capabilities. For example, the laws of thermodynamics 
impose efficiency limits upon certain technologies, limiting their potential to adapt to 
C 0 2 markets (Okereke, 2007; Shi et al., 2008; Teppo, 2006; Tsoutsos & Stamboulis, 
2005; Walawalkar et al., 2007). The second technical aspect of market design and 
operation relates to environmental constraints upon markets. Public goods are
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particularly hard to regulate, given that they are non-excludable and non-rival in their 
consumption (Cornes & Sandler, 1986; Groves & Ledyard, 1977; Hardin, 1968; 
Olson, 1965; Peattie & Ratnayaka, 1992). In other words, public goods are available 
for everyone and their consumption by one actor does not prevent others from 
consuming them as well. Technical aspects of C 0 2 market design and operation are 
summarised in Table 27 and then discussed in turn.
Table 27: Technical aspects of C02 markets
Technical aspects
Technological
-  C 0 2 emissions are widely dispersed across many parts of the 
economy and society.
- Heavy manufacturing processes are inherently energy and C 0 2 
intensive.
- Technical expertise regarding C 0 2 reduction opportunities is 
often weak in-house.
- Market based regulatory approach required to retain control 
over C 0 2 reduction target and push reductions to least cost 
opportunities within industry.
- Energy consumption data cannot be used direcdy for C 0 2 
market compliance reporting. Further checks and conversions 
are required before annual C 0 2 accounts can be presented.
-  Expertise for conversion of raw energy data into equivalent 
C 0 2 emissions is not available in-house.
-  Many businesses lack a central record of all real estate and 
energy supplies where they have an interest.
- Database systems are required to process the large volumes of 




- C 0 2 is free to move within the atmosphere, meaning that C 0 2 
emissions can only be managed globally.
- Local efforts to reduce C 0 2 emissions are potentially subject to 
‘free riding’.
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Technological aspects of C 0 2 market design and operation include the nature of C 0 2 
as a pollutant, the means of production of goods and finally the challenges in 
reporting and trading C 0 2 emissions. Firstly, as discussed in section 4.5, C 0 2 is a 
widely dispersed pollutant, having sources across many parts of industry and society. 
This can explain the empirically observed reach of C 0 2 markets across sectors as 
diverse as electricity generation, iron and steel production, manufacturing, mineral 
processing, pulp and paper processing, aviation, carbon capture and storage, 
aluminium, ammonia and petrochemical production, government authorities, 
landlords, office based organisations, retailers, smaller manufacturers and universities. 
The dispersed nature of sources of C 0 2 emissions means that there is no simple 
target for C 0 2 reductions. Furthermore, there are not many easy substitutes for the 
processes which emit C 0 2. In contrast, the global response to the problem of ozone 
depletion faced fewer challenges, since there were readily available substitutes and 
their use was restricted to a relatively small number of industrial applications 
(Harrison, 1998; Harrison & Easton, 2002). In the case of C 0 2, heavy 
manufacturing processes are often inherently energy and C 0 2 intensive, as was 
observed in case two. Furthermore, technical expertise regarding C 0 2 reduction 
opportunities is often weak inside organisations, as was observed in all cases. The 
lack o f options within existing technology and the lack of expertise regarding 
potential C 0 2 reductions severely hampered businesses’ ability to respond to C 0 2 
markets, as had also been observed by previous research (Okereke, 2007; Shi et al., 
2008; Teppo, 2006; Tsoutsos & Stamboulis, 2005; Walawalkar et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, the discussion of the relatively insignificant costs imposed by COa 
markets given in section 11.4.2 explains why businesses were not making significant
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efforts to overcome these technological barriers. The costs introduced by C 0 2 
markets did not justify the investments required to develop lower C 0 2 technologies.
The remaining technological aspects of C 0 2 market design and operation relate to a 
number of technological details of the function of C 0 2 markets. Firstly, as 
discussed in section 4.6, technological considerations originally led to the selection of 
a market based method of regulating C 0 2 emissions (Kolk & Pinkse, 2004; 
MacKenzie, 2009; McKibbin & Wilcoxen, 2002). This market based approach was 
required in order to retain control over the C 0 2 reduction target and to push 
reductions to least cost opportunities within industry. A C 0 2 tax did not achieve 
capital efficiency or set a reduction target at the outset and a mandated C 0 2 
reduction allowed a reduction target to be set, but did not achieve capital efficiency. 
The selection of a market based approach to C 0 2 regulation is the technological 
reason for much of the uncertainty which is discussed in section 11.5.3. A C 0 2 tax 
or mandate could have avoided much of the uncertainty which is inherent in C 0 2 
markets (Wittneben, 2009). Technological challenges with respect to C 0 2 reporting 
requirements were also observed in cases two, five and six. For example, energy 
consumption data cannot be used directly for C 0 2 market compliance reporting. 
Further checks and conversions were required before annual C 0 2 accounts could be 
presented. The expertise for conversion of raw energy data into equivalent C 0 2 
emissions was often not available in-house and furthermore, many businesses lacked 
a central record of all real estate and energy supplies where they had an interest. 
These technological aspects necessitated the development of database systems to 
process the large volumes of data which were generated as part of C 0 2 market 
compliance. These systems were comparable in levels of complexity to the financial
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accounting systems that have been in place inside companies for decades. As 
discussed in the fifth and sixth cases, building such C 0 2 reporting systems 
represented a significant challenge during the design and operation of C 0 2 markets. 
These challenges were acknowledged by the Carbon Reduction Commitment which 
set a 3 year practice phase at the start of its C 0 2 market. During the first 3 years of 
the Carbon Reduction Commitment the price was fixed at £12 /  tonne C 0 2 with no 
cap on the C 0 2 volume available (DECC, 2009c). This fixed price phase was to 
allow participants to focus upon setting up systems to gather and report their C 0 2 
data.
The nature of COz as a public good and die limited resource of air quality were also 
important aspects of C 0 2 market design and operation. Access to release gases into 
the atmosphere is a public good, in that any party can do so and doing so does not 
stop any other from doing the same (Comes & Sandler, 1986; Groves & Ledyard, 
1977; Hardin, 1968; Olson, 1965; Peattie & Ratnayaka, 1992). Furthermore, C 0 2 is 
free to move within the atmosphere. If the atmosphere was a locally bounded 
resource, it would not be a public good (Kjellberg, 2008; Lohmann, 2005). For 
example, China would not be able to pollute the USA’s air, or vice versa. In such a 
scenario, the management of Climate Change would become a local concern, with 
much simpler incentives and potential regulatory structures. The public good aspects 
of Climate Change mean that C 0 2 emissions can only be managed globally. 
Therefore C 0 2 markets will only be successful if between them they cover the 
majority of global emitters, or if one single global market is developed. These types 
o f concern were not prominent in cases two to six which dealt with day to day 
aspects o f C 0 2 markets. However, they were raised dunng the discussion of the
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extension of the Kyoto Protocol in case one. These concerns were important to 
regulators, but sat outside the profit seeking objectives of businesses. As such, these 
environmental considerations do not form part of the mainstream business literature. 
There is a wider literature on sustainability which promotes business accountability to 
people, planet and profit (Brundtland, 1983; BSI, 2006; Elkington, 1994; Elkington, 
1997, GRI, 2010a). However, this view of business is not widely recognised by 
practitioners who recognise the dominant form of enterprise as being the public 
limited company, which is primarily obligated to maximise profit for shareholders.
The discussion now moves to examine temporal aspects of C 0 2 market design and 
operation.
11.5.2 Temporal aspects of C02 markets
Temporal aspects of C 0 2 market design and operation are now analysed. This 
section answers research question 6, which asked “How are temporal considerations 
affecting C 02 market design and o p era tio n Temporal aspects of C 0 2 market design are 
proposed as ‘windows of opportunity’ and ‘lock ins’. Windows of opportunity are 
important during market design and operation, as many markets will be subject to a 
window of opportunity, after which there is little possibility to solve the problem or 
meet the needs which the market has been designed to tackle. The second temporal 
aspect relates to decisions which have long-term impacts due to the lock ins winch 
they create and decisions which are subject to delayed rewards. Delays in reward 
cause time delays, as even once a decision is taken, the anticipated benefits may not 
be received for a certain period of time. Temporal aspects of market design and
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operation due to windows of opportunity and lock ins are summarised in Table 28 
and are now analysed in turn.
Table 28: Temporal aspects of C 02 markets
Temporal aspects
Windows of 
opportunity - The opportunity for mitigation of Climate Change is subject to 
a 20-30 year window of opportunity.
- Projections of business as usual C 0 2 emissions growth leads to 
dangerous atmospheric levels of C 0 2 in the next 20-30 years.
Lock ins
- C 0 2 has an atmospheric lifespan of around 50 years. In short 
to medium-term timeframes, atmospheric concentrations of 
C 0 2 are cumulative and irreversible.
- Investments by businesses typically take a 10-20 year 
timeframe.
Windows of opportunity are significant aspects of C 0 2 market design and operation. 
C 0 2 levels in the atmosphere are effectively cumulative, due to their long 
atmospheric lifetime. As discussed in section 2.5.2, projections of business as usual 
growth in C 0 2 emissions lead to dangerous atmospheric levels of C 0 2 within the 
next 20-30 years (Vaughan et al., 2009). C 0 2 markets are ultimately designed to 
provide a means to incentivise businesses to reduce their C 0 2 emissions in order to 
mitigate Climate Change. Therefore it follows that C 0 2 market design and operation 
is subject to a 20-30 year window of opportunity. This aspect of C 0 2 market design 
and operation is discussed in the literature, but is not apparent in the current 
operation of existing C 0 2 markets.
Temporal aspects of C 0 2 market design and operation are also lock ins. Lock ins are 
decisions which have an extended and irreversible impact. One lock in for C 0 2 
markets is due to the long atmospheric lifespan of C 0 2 of around 50 years (Moser,
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2010). This atmospheric lifespan makes COa emissions effectively cumulative and 
irreversible when viewed within the 20-30 year timeframe for the mitigation of 
Climate Change. The lock in due to the atmospheric lifespan of C 0 2 removes the 
opportunity for C 0 2 markets to reverse Climate Change. C 0 2 markets can o nly 
attempt to prevent Climate Change and each emission of C 0 2 ratchets up 
atmospheric C 0 2 concentrations to a new level that cannot be reversed. The second 
lock in is that investments by businesses typically take a 10-20 year timeframe. Once 
these long-term investment decisions are taken, businesses are extremely keen to 
avoid prematurely writing off their assets. For example, convincing a utilities 
company to shut down a 5 year old coal fired power station would be extremely 
difficult and expensive, as the typical operating life of a coal fired power station is 
around 40 years (Meinshausen & Hare, 2008). Acknowledging these lock ins is key 
to the development of C 0 2 markets as an effort to mitigate Climate Change. The 
timeframes of the lock ins often extend beyond the window of opportunity for 
mitigation of Climate Change and will therefore lock in an outcome that will be 
extremely difficult to influence.
These temporal aspects of C 0 2 market design and operation receive significant 
interest in the literature (Meinshausen & Hare, 2008; Moser, 2010, Teppo, 2006, 
Tsoutsos & Stamboulis, 2005; Vaughan et al., 2009), but were not prominent in the 
six cases. It would appear that the current modes of operation of C 0 2 markets will 
struggle to acknowledge the windows of opportunity and lock ins that will play a 
significant role in C 0 2 markets’ success or failure in mitigating Climate Change.
310
C 0 2 Market Design and Operation
Finally, the discussion now moves on to the role of uncertainty during the design and 
operation o f C 0 2 markets.
11.5.3 Uncertainty in C02 markets
Uncertainty-based aspects of C 0 2 market design and operation are now analysed. 
This section answers research question 7, which asked “How are uncertainty-based, 
considerations affecting C 02 market design and operation?”. Uncertainty-based aspects of 
C 0 2 market design and operation are now analysed as ‘problem uncertainty’ and 
‘cognitive biases’. Problem uncertainty is due to uncertainty regarding the best or 
most expedient way to cope with the problem that the market is designed to tackle 
(Ford & Mouzas, 2010). Cognitive biases are frailties embedded in the human 
learning and decision making process which distort our views of the world and are 
often subconscious (Bazerman et al., 2001; Bazerman, 2006; Kahneman et al., 1982). 
In many cases, cognitive biases are triggered or exacerbated by uncertainty and act to 
impede market design and operation. Uncertainty based aspects of market design 
and operation are summarised in Table 29 and then analysed in turn.
Problem uncertainty in C 0 2 market design and operation relates to uncertainty 
regarding the best or most expedient way to cope with mitigating Climate Change 
(Ford & Mouzas, 2010). This problem uncertainty runs to the very core of C 0 2 
markets. For example, as discussed in section 2.5.3, the United Nations states that 
C 0 2 markets are designed to stabilise C 0 2 emissions at a level which prevents 
dangerous human interference with the climate system (Meze-Hausken, 2008; 
UNFCCC 2005). The complexities of modelling Climate Change therefore result in
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problem uncertainty regarding Climate Change’s future affects and the suitable level 
o f C 0 2 reductions to target.
Table 29: Uncertainty based aspects of C 02 markets
Uncertainty based aspects
Problem
uncertainty - Technical complexities of modelling Climate Change cause uncertainty regarding its future affects.
- Future price of C 0 2 is inherently uncertain within a market.
- Regulatory uncertainty regarding the future developments in 
C 0 2 markets beyond 3-8 year timeframe.
Cognitive
biases - Low availability: C 0 2 is invisible, odourless and has no direct health impacts.
- Distorted views of others: EU seeks global replacement for 
Kyoto Protocol before committing to the most stringent 
version of their 2020 C 0 2 reduction target. The USA adopted 
a historically protectionist stance, refusing to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol due to the absence of China and India. The 
developing world emphasises developed world responsibility 
for Climate Change as a reason to follow, rather than lead 
Climate Change mitigation efforts.
- Negative framing: United Nations presents Climate Change as 
a threat at least equivalent to that posed to humanity by war. 
Leading Climate Change NGOs have names such as ‘Stop 
Climate Chaos.org’.
Furthermore, from the perspective of business participants in C 0 2 markets, another 
type of problem uncertainty is the challenge of building the future price of C 0 2 into 
investment appraisals, these challenges were observed in all of the cases and in the 
literature (Conejero & Farina, 2003; Levy & Kolk, 2002; Okereke, 2007, Shi et al., 
2008; Sutherland, 1991). Firsdy, the future price of C 0 2 is inherently uncertain 
within a market. Secondly, in 2010 the timeframes of C 0 2 markets extended from 
between 3-8 years into the future, beyond which there was uncertainty whether the
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particular market would continue. These timeframes, combined with uncertainty 
regarding the price of C 0 2, meant that C 0 2 markets didn’t give the certainty required 
for C 0 2 costs to influence businesses’ investment decisions.
Cognitive biases during C 0 2 market design and operation are now discussed. 
Cognitive biases are frailties embedded in the human learning and decision making 
process which distort our views of the world and are often subconscious (Bazerman 
et al., 2001; Bazerman, 2006; Kahneman et al., 1982). In many cases, cognitive biases 
are triggered or exacerbated by uncertainty and act to impede market design and 
operation. Cognitive biases which are proposed as influencing C 0 2 market design 
and operation are the availability heuristic, parochialism, egoism and negative 
framing. The availability heuristic suggests that people weigh risks by the ease with 
which examples of resulting harm can be visualised or recalled (Kahneman et al, 
1982; Sunstein, 2006; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Therefore, the nature of C 0 2 as 
being invisible, odourless and having no direct health impacts means that the low 
availability of problems caused by Climate Change may be impeding C 0 2 market 
design and operation. The availability heuristic is flagged in the literature as being a 
cause o f the lack of action on Climate Change. The empirical findings are consistent 
across the United States (Boykoff, 2008; Jamieson, 1991, 2006; ICellstedt et al., 2008); 
the European Union (Dunlap & Saad, 2001; Hersch & Viscusi, 2006; Poortinga & 
Pidgeon, 2003); and the developed world as a whole (Leiserowitz, 2006; Lorenzoni & 
Pidgeon, 2006; Oreskes, 2004). The availability heuristic could be part of the 
explanation that in all case studies the C 0 2 markets were led by regulators, rather 
than by pressure from end customers and consumers.
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The cognitive biases of parochialism and egoism lead to distorted views of others, 
affecting C 0 2 market design and operation. Parochialism is a cognitive bias which 
leads actors to favour their group at the expense of outsiders (Baron, 2006; Schwartz- 
Sliea & Simmons, 1991). Egoism is a cognitive bias which leads actors to prioritise 
their self interest over that of the wider range of stakeholders (Bazerman, 2006; 
Farber & Bazerman, 1987; Markovits, 2004). In the examination of negotiations to 
extend the Kyoto Protocol in case one, the descriptions given by the European 
Union, the United States of America and the developing world showed biases of 
parochialism and egoism. The European Union set two levels of target for C 0 2 
savings by 2020 and was only prepared to accept the more stringent target if a global 
replacement to the Kyoto Protocol was agreed. Furthermore, the United States of 
America had historically taken a protectionist stance that emphasised the potential of 
C 0 2 markets to damage the economy. During the original negotiations over phase I 
of the Kyoto Protocol, the United States focussed upon India and China’s failure to 
ratify the Kyoto Protocol as a reason not to ratify it themselves. This was despite the 
consideration that the United States was the largest emitter of C 0 2 in the world. 
Furthermore, the developing world emphasised developed world responsibility for 
Climate Change as a reason to follow, rather than lead C 0 2 reduction efforts. Even 
though all parties acknowledged the basic science that Climate Change is cheaper to 
mitigate than to adapt to, the cognitive biases of parochialism and egoism have been 
found to be impeding the design and operation of C 0 2 markets.
Finally, the cognitive bias of negative framing is an important aspect of C 0 2 market 
design and operation in a number of ways (Bazerman, 1984; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Negative framing of decisions, regarding losses,
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prompts risk-seeking behaviour that avoids, rather than tackles, the issues at hand 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). One example of negative framing in the case of C 0 2 
markets is the presentation of the United Nations of Climate Change as a threat at 
least equivalent to that posed to humanity by war. A second example is that leading 
Climate Change Non-Governmental Organisations have names such as ‘Stop 
Climate Chaos.org’ and ‘Climate Crisis.net’. These negative frames impede C 0 2 
market design and operation, by encouraging participants to disengage from the C 0 2 
markets and manage them as a threat rather than as an opportunity.
Having examined the macro-level aspects of C 0 2 market design and operation, the 
chapter now closes with a brief conclusion. The discussion then moves on to the 
conclusions and implications of the research in chapter twelve.
11.6 Summary
This chapter has confronted the six case studies with the conceptual framework for 
the study of market design and operation that was proposed at the end of the 
literature review. The first section reviewed the research questions posed. The 
second section presented the actors involved during C 0 2 market design and 
operation. The third and fourth sections then analysed the network and macro-level 
aspects o f C 0 2 market design and operation. The discussion now moves on to 
examine the conclusions and implications of the research.
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12 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
12.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the conclusions and implications that can be drawn from the 
research presented in this dissertation. Section 12.2 provides a summary of the 
findings of the research. Section 12.3 discusses the theoretical contributions and 
implications of the research. The policy implications of the research are discussed 
in section 12.4. Managerial implications of the research are then discussed in section 
12.5. Finally, section 12.6 reviews the limitations of the research and proposes some 
directions for future research.
12.2 Summary o f findings: The failure o f C02 markets to significantiy 
influence businesses’ behaviour
This section provides a summary of the findings of the present research. These 
findings explain why C 0 2 markets have failed to significantly influence businesses’ 
behaviour. The findings are based upon an examination of the design of C 0 2 
markets, as compared to their actual operation. The discussion in this section is 
structured using the proposed conceptual framework for the study of C 0 2 market 
design and operation that can be found in Figure 4 on page 73. Network-level 
aspects of C 0 2 markets were examined as exchange, representational and 
normalising practices, plus the translations which link them (Kjellberg & Helgesson, 
2007a). Macro-level aspects of C 0 2 markets were examined as technical, temporal 
and uncertainty based considerations. The remainder of this section summarises the 
research findings, following the structure and content of Figure 28.
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Figure 28: C 02 market design and operation- summary of findings
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- Complexities o f climate modelling cause uncertainty regarding future affects
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- Low availability: CO2 is invisible, odourless and has no direct health impacts
- Parochialism and egoism: Distorted views o f others, e.g. USA’s refusal to 
ratify the Kyoto Protocol unless China and India do too
Negative framing: United Nations presents Climate Change as a threat at least 
equivalent to that posed to humanity by war. Leading Climate Change NGOs 
named £Stop Climate Chaos.org’ or ‘Climate Crisis.net’
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Exchange practices relate to the economic exchanges taking place within the market and 
their supporting activities. Exchange based aspects of markets were captured by 
translations of interests and measurements’. Interests are stakes, or involvement in an 
undertaking, which drive exchange practices and inform efforts to influence a market’s 
representational and normalising practices. This research identified conflict between the 
interests of C 0 2 market regulators and participants. The primary interest of regulators 
was to achieve absolute reductions in C 0 2 emissions at the least cost to society. In 
contrast, business participants in C 0 2 markets saw their interests as being to maximise 
profit, manage the reputational impact of C 0 2 markets and achieve C 0 2 market 
compliance. These differences in interests became embedded in the measurements of 
0 O 2 markets, which are now discussed. Measurements are descriptions of exchange 
which influence how actors see the market and respond to it. Regulators’ measurements 
of C 0 2 markets were found to be the absolute cost of CO, in $ / tonne for the Kyoto 
Protocol, €/tonne for the European Emissions Trading Scheme and £ / tonne for the 
United Kingdom’s Carbon Reduction Commitment. Regulators’ measurement of 
absolute COz costs were aligned with their interests in achieving C 0 2 reductions at the 
least cost to society. In contrast, business participants measured C 0 2 costs as a 
percentage of their annual energy expenditure, with the result that businesses did not 
recognise CO, markets as a strategic concern. The reasons for this are explored below, 
in a discussion of findings which relate to representational aspects of C 0 2 markets.
Representational practices aim to depict markets and how they work. Representational 
practices were captured by translations of ‘results’ and ‘descriptions’. The results of 
measurements drive exchange practices by influencing how actors view the outcome of 
their exchanges. Tliis research found that the results of regulators’ measurements of
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C 0 2 markets were ~$20/tonne C 0 2 for the Kyoto Protocol, ~€2-l5/tonne C 0 2 in 
phases I and II of the European Emissions Trading Scheme, an unknown future price 
within phase III of the European Emissions Trading Scheme and £12/tonne C 0 2 in 
phase I of the Carbon Reduction Commitment. In contrast, the results described by 
businesses expressed C 0 2 costs relative to energy expenditure. Businesses’ results were 
C 0 2 costs of 0.15% and ~1.1% of energy expenditure in phases I and II of the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme, an unknown percentage in the future phase III 
of the European Emissions Trading Scheme and 0.77% of energy expenditure in phase 
I o f the Carbon Reduction Commitment. These results influenced descriptions of C 0 2 
markets in a number of ways. Descriptions drive normalising practices by informing 
participants’ representations of markets. Regulators described C 0 2 markets as 
introducing a price for C 0 2 emissions which incentivised capital efficient C 0 2 
reductions and made C 0 2 a strategic concern for businesses. In contrast, businesses 
described C 0 2 costs as being insufficient to drive strategic decisions. C 0 2 markets were 
described by businesses as a risk management and compliance issue. The following 
section now discusses the affects of these representations upon the normalising 
practices of C 0 2 markets.
Normalising aspects of markets were captured by translations of ‘rules and tools’ and 
‘measures and methods of measurement’. Rules and tools are used to perform and 
influence exchange practices. The rules and tools set by regulators determined: which 
organisations should participate in C 0 2 markets, how C 0 2 permits were allocated, how 
C 0 2 emissions were reported and traded, how participants’ compliance was verified and 
enforced, and the fines incurred for noncompliance. Although businesses 
acknowledged and complied with the regulator’s rules, these rules did not drive
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businesses decisions. Businesses’ responses treated C 0 2 markets as a compliance issue 
and prioritised profit maximisation as the overarching rule. Furthermore, there were 
often corporate policies in place which prohibited speculation in non-core business 
activities. These anti-speculation policies forced businesses to simply buy the C 0 2 
permits required for compliance and undermined the intended operation of COa 
markets. The second element of normalising practices in markets is measures and 
methods of measurement. Measures and methods of measurement influence 
representational practices by setting what aspects of markets are measured and how 
measurements are made. Measures and methods of measurement employed by 
regulators related to the C 0 2 prices and volumes which market participants had to 
account for. In all C 0 2 markets, except the practice phase of the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment, the COa price was set by a market. The C 0 2 volumes to be accounted 
for were calculated using each participant’s energy consumption, plus the regulator’s 
conversion factors which defined the C 0 2 content of each fuel. Businesses 
acknowledged the measures and methods of measurement imposed by the regulator and 
calculated the relevant C 0 2 prices and volumes. However, businesses’ responses to 
C 0 2 markets were primarily driven by measures which revealed C 0 2 costs to represent a 
very low percentage of energy expenditure, plus measures of the reputational impacts of 
C 0 2 markets. These measures meant that C 0 2 markets failed to significantly influence 
businesses’ behaviours and that businesses responded to C 0 2 markets in the mode of 
compliance and risk management.
The previous discussion gave an overview of the network-level aspects of C 0 2 markets 
that were identified by this research. The discussion now turns to an examination of 
findings which relate to macro-level aspects of C 0 2 markets. Macro-level aspects of
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C 0 2 markets were examined as technical, temporal and uncertainty based 
considerations, each of which is now discussed.
Technical aspects of C 0 2 markets are proposed as technological’ considerations and 
those due to public goods and resource limits’. Technological aspects are immutable 
physical laws, or the limits of today’s knowledge and capabilities. The first technological 
consideration is that C 0 2 is a widely dispersed pollutant, having sources across many 
parts of the economy and society. The dispersed nature of C 0 2 emissions was reflected 
by the broad coverage of C 0 2 markets across industries ranging from aluminium 
production, the retail sector and electricity production. This dispersed nature of C 0 2 
emissions means there is no simple target for C 0 2 reductions. Furthermore, many 
heavy manufacturing processes are inherendy energy and C 0 2 intensive and there are 
few substitutes for these processes. In addition, expertise regarding C 0 2 reduction 
opportunities was often found to be weak inside organisations, reducing the ability of 
businesses to respond proactively to C 0 2 markets. Technological considerations were 
also found to be impeding businesses’ C 0 2 reporting. The expertise required to convert 
raw energy data into equivalent C 0 2 emissions was often unavailable in-house and many 
businesses initially lacked the data systems and records required for C 0 2 reporting. The 
second category of technical aspects relates to environmental constraints upon C 0 2 
markets. Public goods were found to be important aspects of C 0 2 markets, since any 
actor can release C 0 2 into the atmosphere and doing so does not stop another from 
doing the same. Resource limits were important, due to the finite nature of the 
atmosphere and its inability to absorb increasing rates of C 0 2 emissions. Regulators 
acknowledged C 0 2 as a public good and the atmosphere as a scarce resource. 
Considerations of public goods and scarce resources were the drivers behind regulators’
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efforts to create and subsequently extend the coverage of the global C 0 2 market of the 
Kyoto Protocol.
Temporal aspects were examined as ‘windows of opportunity’ and ‘lock ins’. Windows 
of opportunity result from the consideration that markets ate often responding to a 
problem or need which can only be met within a certain timeframe. In the case of C 0 2 
markets, projections of ‘business as usual’ growth in C 0 2 emissions will lead to 
dangerous atmospheric levels of C 0 2 within the next 20-30 years. Therefore C 0 2 
markets are subject to a 20-30 year window of opportunity within which to incentivise 
businesses to reduce their C 0 2 emissions. This research emphasises that the 
development of C 0 2 markets is a time bound challenge that is not open ended. This 
window of opportunity is not often discussed in other treatments of C 0 2 markets, 
despite it being key to C 0 2 markets’ success or failure to mitigate Climate Change. The 
second temporal aspect relates to decisions which have long-term impacts due to the 
lock ins which they create. Lock ins are decisions which have an extended and 
irreversible impact. One lock in for C 0 2 markets is the 50 year atmospheric lifespan of 
C 0 2. This atmospheric lifespan makes C 0 2 emissions cumulative and effectively 
irreversible when viewed within the 20-30 year window of opportunity for the 
mitigation of Climate Change. This lock in, due to the atmospheric lifespan of C 0 2 
emissions, removes the opportunity for C 0 2 markets to reverse Climate Change. C 0 2 
markets can only mitigate Climate Change and each emission of C 0 2 ratchets up 
atmospheric C 0 2 concentrations to a new level that cannot be reversed. The second 
lock in is that C 0 2 intensive capital investments typically take a 10-20 year timeframe. 
Once these long-term investment decisions are taken, businesses are keen to avoid 
writing off their assets prematurely. For example, convincing a utilities company to shut
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down a 5 year old coal fired power station would either be extremely difficult, or 
expensive. These temporal aspects of C 0 2 markets mean that decisions taken today will 
have a significant impact on the outcome of the Climate Change mitigation efforts 
embodied by C 0 2 markets. This research highlights that it is important to acknowledge 
windows of opportunity and lock ins during the design and operation of C 0 2 markets, 
since these temporal aspects threaten to undermine the ability of C 0 2 markets to 
mitigate Climate Change.
Uncertainty based aspects of C 0 2 markets were examined through ‘problem uncertainty’ 
and ‘cognitive biases’. Problem uncertainty relates to uncertainty as to the best way to 
cope with the problem that a market is designed to tackle. The study has examined the 
United Nations’ statement that C 0 2 markets are designed to stabilise C 0 2 emissions at a 
level that prevents dangerous human interference with the climate system. The United 
Nation’s approach faces uncertainty regarding the future affects of Climate Change, plus 
the uncertainty of a subjective judgement on the definition of ‘dangerous human 
interference’. In addition, the inherendy variable price of C 0 2 is another type of 
problem uncertainty in C 0 2 markets. Furthermore, there is also uncertainty regarding 
the political longevity of C 0 2 markets. In 2010, regulators had failed to guarantee each 
C 0 2 market’s operation beyond 3-8 years into the future. The uncertainty surrounding 
the level and longevity of C 0 2 costs was found in all cases to be hampering businesses’ 
efforts to factor C 0 2 costs into their investment decisions. The second uncertainty 
based aspect of C 0 2 markets presented by this research is cognitive biases that distort 
our views of the world and are often subconscious. In many cases, cognitive biases are 
triggered or exacerbated by uncertainty and can act to impede market design and 
operation. Cognitive biases which were found to be influencing COz market design and
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operation were the availability heuristic, parochialism, egoism and negative framing. 
The availability heuristic suggests that people weigh risks by the ease with which 
examples of resulting harm can be visualised or recalled. The low availability of 
problems caused by Climate Change may be impeding CO, market design and 
operation. This low availability is due to the nature of C 0 2 as being invisible, odourless 
and having no direct health impacts. Furthermore, the cognitive biases of parochialism 
and egoism lead to distorted views of others, affecting C 0 2 market design and 
operation. One example of the action of parochialism and egoism is the United States’ 
refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, due to it not including India or China. This was 
despite considerations that the United States was the largest emitter of CO, in the world 
and that Climate Change is cheaper to mitigate than to adapt to. Finally, the cognitive 
bias of negative framing was an important consideration during C 0 2 market design and 
operation. Negative framing of decisions prompts risk-seeking behaviour that avoids 
the issue under discussion. Examples of negative framing relating to C 0 2 markets were 
the presentation by the United Nations of Climate Change as a threat at least equivalent 
to that posed by war, and the names of Climate Change Non-Governmental 
Organisations, such as ‘Stop Climate Chaos.org’ and ‘Climate Crisis.net’. It is argued 
that these negative frames encourage businesses to disengage from C 0 2 markets and 
manage them as a threat, rather than an opportunity.
This section has provided an overview of the findings of the research, discussing why 
C 0 2 markets have failed to significantly influence businesses’ behaviour. The next 
section discusses the research’s theoretical implications.
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12.3 Theoretical implications for C02 market design
The primary theoretical contribution of this research has been to challenge traditional 
theories which underpin the design of C 0 2 markets. These challenges arise from 
examinations o f the actual operation of C 0 2 markets, which show that C 0 2 markets 
have so far failed to significantly influence businesses’ behaviour. As such, this research 
raises doubts regarding the efficacy of CO, markets as a method of mitigating Climate 
Change. This section first reviews the traditional theoretical underpinnings of C 0 2 
market design. Next, the influence of a practice based perspective upon the present 
research is discussed. This leads into the location of the present research within an 
emerging body o f work that challenges traditional theories of C 0 2 market design. 
Finally, network-level and macro-level theoretical implications for C 0 2 market design 
and operation are discussed.
The present research has shown that existing theories which are used to explain the 
design o f C 0 2 markets provide only a restricted understanding of the real world 
operation of C 0 2 markets. Examples of such existing theories of C 0 2 market design 
and operation can be found in the work of Barrett (2007), Bebbington and Larrinaga- 
Gonzalez (2008), Coase (1960; 1988), Comes and Sandler (1986), Dales (1968), 
Demsetz (1966), Groves and Ledyard (1977), Hardin (1968), Kolk et al. (2008), 
Lohmann (2009), MacKenzie (2009), Olson (1965), and Stem (2006). A typical 
theoretical explanation of C 0 2 markets focuses upon externalities, property rights, 
incentives and their economic design, for example: “Facilities with high abatement costs buy 
pollution rights from facilities with lower abatement costs, saving themselves money. Facilities for whom 
reductions come cheaper could meanwhile make money by cutting pollution and selling the unused 
pollution rights thy were thus enabled to stockpile. The system would reward both sellers and buyers
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and result in reductions being made where they ivere least expensive. ” (Lohmann, 2009: 504). The 
present research challenges such economic theories which underpin C 0 2 market design. 
While it is acknowledged that the economic reasoning behind the design of C 0 2 
markets is logically sound, the present research has shown that this economic logic is 
failing to translate into successful real world application. These challenges to theories of 
C 0 2 market design were developed through the adoption o f a practice based 
perspective that emphasised the examination of the actual operation of C 0 2 markets.
The practice based perspective adopted by this research views C 0 2 markets as networks 
o f actors that are engaged in exchange, representational and normalising practices 
(Hagberg & Kjellberg, 2010; Kjellberg & Helgesson, 2006, 2007b, 2007a). This practice 
based perspective is useful because it advocates the description of real life practices in 
C 0 2 markets as a means of providing insight into the efficacy of C 0 2 market designs. 
The descriptions by this research of C 0 2 markets in operation, or ‘in vivo’ as Callon 
refers to them (2009), provide a rich view of the challenges faced by C 0 2 market 
designers. The six case studies developed by this research illustrate in detail how C 0 2 
markets are operating in the real world, as summarised in section 12.2, providing a 
contribution to knowledge by answering contemporary calls for more accurate 
descriptions of what is actually happening in C 0 2 markets: “Carbon markets are an 
exceptional field for furthering our understanding of the ...forms of... economic, political and scientific 
activities [that constitute the market], their mutual relations and the challenges they are designed to 
meet” (Callon, 2009: 546). As such, the case studies provided by this research aim to 
help answer a call to reconnect markets and marketing, providing a new perspective on 
C 0 2 market design (Araujo, 2007; Araujo et al., 2010; Kjellberg & Helgesson, 2007a).
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This research contributes to a body of literature that challenges traditional theories of 
C 0 2 market design, by identifying a number of significant failures of C 0 2 markets to 
influence business behaviour (Engels, 2009; Spash, 2010). Engels presents a case study 
showing that some companies ignored the European Emissions Trading Scheme all 
through the mandatory 2 year practice phase and entered phase II of the scheme with 
no strategy or structures in place to make decisions regarding C 0 2 trading. These 
observations are consistent with the conclusion that: “the reality of [COJ market operation is 
fa r removed from the assumptions of economic theoty and the promise of saving resources by efficiently 
allocating emission reductions” (Spash, 2010: 169). The findings of the present research 
provide further insights on the challenges faced by C 0 2 markets.
The research was guided by the development of a conceptual framework for the study 
of C 0 2 market design and operation which is shown in Figure 4 on page 73. This 
conceptual framework also provides the structure for the summary of research findings 
which is given in Figure 28 on page 318. The proposed conceptual framework for the 
study of C 0 2 markets is based upon network-level and macro-level aspects of C 0 2 
market design and operation.
Network-level aspects of C 0 2 market design and operation were captured by exchange, 
representational and normalising practices, plus the translations which link them. The 
network-level aspects of COz markets discussed in this research build upon work by 
Kjellberg and Helgesson (2006; 2007b; 2007a). This approach was useful, as it offered a 
wider perspective of COz markets than the narrow economic focus which is typically 
adopted. While economic aspects of C 0 2 markets were found to be important, the 
examination o f representational and normalising practices in C 0 2 markets also delivered 
significant explanatory insights. Furthermore, the examination of the translations which
328
C 0 2 Market Design and Operation
linked the market practices provided a way of examining how the different practices 
influenced each other. Exchange based aspects of C 0 2 markets are discussed 
throughout this section, as they correspond to the traditional theories of C 0 2 markets. 
Theoretical implications of representational and normalising aspects of C 0 2 markets are 
now discussed below.
Representational implications of this research arise from the finding that businesses do 
not share the regulators’ representations of C 0 2 markets. Regulators represent C 0 2 
markets as introducing a price for C 0 2 emissions which incentivises capital efficient 
C 0 2 reductions, making C 0 2 a strategic concern. However, the present research has 
shown that results of businesses’ measurements of C 0 2 markets were C 0 2 costs 
representing around 1% of annual energy costs. Businesses described C 0 2 markets as 
introducing costs that were insufficient to drive strategic decisions. C 0 2 markets were 
therefore described primarily as a risk management and compliance issue. These 
findings are aligned with theoretical findings that representations are not uniform or 
stable and that there are multiple versions of markets, due to different representations 
developed by different actors (Finch, 2007; Ford et al., 2003; Henneberg et al., 2006; 
Leek & Mason, 2010; Weick, 1993, 1995). Regulators and other CO, market designers 
must take into account that representations “have a certain normative power” (Henneberg et 
al., 2010: 358). C 0 2 markets will not achieve their objective of incentivising reduced 
business C 0 2 emissions before businesses have been convinced to change their 
representations of C 0 2 markets.
Normalising aspects of C 0 2 markets were also found to be important in explaining the 
operation of C 0 2 markets. Regulators and other C 0 2 market designers have defined
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detailed rules and tools which were designed to deliver C 0 2 reductions at the least cost 
to society. However, within the business community these rules were subordinated to 
the over arching rule of profit maximisation as the driver of decision making. No 
businesses broke the rules of the C 0 2 markets. Yet the C 0 2 market objectives of 
Climate Change mitigation were not met, as the costs introduced by CO, markets were 
too low to significandy affect profits. These low costs meant that businesses saw no 
need to engage C 0 2 markets on any level other than compliance and risk management. 
This research shows that examinations of C 0 2 market design and operation should 
acknowledge the normalising aspects of C 0 2 markets (Kjellberg & Helgesson, 2006; 
2007b; 2007a), which are also called market constitution by Mouzas and Ford (2009). 
This is because the economic logic underpinning C 0 2 market designs is currendy being 
overridden by the rules which guide the decision making of profit seeking public 
companies.
Macro-level aspects of C 0 2 markets are now discussed. This research highlights that 
attempts to improve upon current C 0 2 market design and operation will need to 
acknowledge technical, temporal and uncertainty based aspects of CO, markets. 
Technical aspects of C 0 2 markets have been identified in this research as technological 
aspects and considerations relating to public goods and resource limits. There is a well 
developed literature which explores the technological challenges faced by CO, markets. 
For example, the technological challenges of accurately determining and reflecting the 
cost o f environmental damage caused by C 0 2 and other pollutants (Bond & Houston, 
2003; Engels, 2005; Watts et al., 1999). Furthermore, other researchers have provided 
examples of the types of technological challenges which prevent the development of 
new technologies such as renewable electricity generation (Teppo, 2006; Tsoutsos &
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Stamboulis, 2005; Walawalkar et al, 2007), cars powered by Liquid Petroleum Gas 
(Steenberghen & Lopez, 2008) and lower C 0 2 technologies in general (Okereke, 2007; 
Shi et al., 2008). The other type of technical challenge faced by C 0 2 markets relates to 
the elimination of externalities and the challenges of providing public goods (Barrett, 
2007; Coase, 1960, 1988; Cornes & Sandler, 1986; Dales, 1968; Demseta, 1966; Groves 
& Ledyard, 1977; Hardin, 1968; Olson, 1965; Peattie & Ratnayaka, 1992). These 
theories are at the core of the current design of C 0 2 markets and were discussed by this 
research for completeness as they are still important considerations during C 0 2 market 
design and operation.
Temporal aspects of C 0 2 markets have been identified in this research as windows of 
opportunity and lock ins. C 0 2 markets are subject to a 20-30 year window of 
opportunity within which to incentivise businesses to reduce their C 0 2 emissions. The 
important consideration is that two lock ins which affect C 0 2 markets are of 
comparable timeframes. C 0 2 has an atmospheric lifespan of around 50 years and C 0 2 
intensive investments by businesses typically take a 10-20 year timeframe. As such, this 
research highlights that changes are required in the design and operation of COz 
markets, in order to acknowledge the windows of opportunities and lock ins which 
threaten to undermine the ability of C 0 2 markets to mitigate Climate Change. This 
makes Climate Change mitigation through C 0 2 markets effectively a £one shot’ 
challenge. Theoretical developments of C 0 2 market design must acknowledge that 
decisions taken in the next 5-10 years will most likely lock us into the final outcome of 
efforts to mitigate Climate Change.
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Uncertainty-based aspects of C 0 2 markets have been identified in this research as 
problem uncertainty and cognitive biases. Problem uncertainty has impeded the 
development of C 0 2 markets due to uncertainty regarding the future affects of Climate 
Change, price uncertainty that is inherent in a market based approach and regulatory 
uncertainty whereby current C 0 2 markets are only fixed in law for the next 3-8 years. 
These uncertainties make C 0 2 difficult to build into businesses’ economic decisions and 
also contribute to the action of a number of cognitive biases which bias and Skew 
decision making processes, further impeding the development of C 0 2 markets (Baron, 
2006; Farber & Bazerman, 1987; Hopwood, 2009; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 
Kahneman et al., 1982; Schwartz-Shea & Simmons, 1991; Sunstein, 2006; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973).
Certain elements of C 0 2 market design and operation which are discussed above may 
seem alien to business research. For example, public goods and resource limits sound 
more like environmental concerns than issues for business. However, the research 
community is starting to recognise that such issues are central to businesses’ long-term 
sustainability. These developments in research agenda are observable in recent and 
upcoming special issues on Climate Change and Sustainability. The first example is a 
2009 special issue on ‘Accounting and Carbon Markets’ in the journal of ‘Accounting, 
Organizations and Society’ (Braun, 2009; Callon, 2009; Cook, 2009, Engels, 2009, 
Hopwood, 2009; Lohmann, 2009; MacKenzie, 2009). The second example is an 
upcoming special issue in the ‘Journal of Management Studies on The Foundations of 
Sustainability’ (Floyd et al., Forthcoming). Furthermore, there is also an upcoming 
special issue in ‘Organization Studies’ on ‘Climate Change and the Emergence of New 
Organizational Landscapes’ (Wittneben et al., forthcoming). The research presented in
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this dissertation has contributed to these new developments by showing that C 0 2 
market design and operation is best understood when viewed as a challenge that not 
only encompasses economic aspects, but also representational, normalising, technical, 
temporal and uncertainty based considerations. Furthermore, this research has shown 
that the championed benefits of C 0 2 markets, namely capital efficiency through market 
flexibility, are not being achieved by current C 0 2 markets and may not even represent 
the most important concerns with regards to Climate Change mitigation. This research 
supports the argument that a C 0 2 tax would bring more benefits in terms of certainty 
than would be lost in terms of market efficiency, especially when the desired market 
efficiency has not been achieved in the real world operation of C 0 2 markets (Wittneben, 
2009). An argument could also be made for a C 0 2 tax to be supported by mandated 
targets for C 0 2 performance that would acknowledge the short window of opportunity 
for Climate Change mitigation and the need to avoid lock ins caused by decisions taken 
today (Apaiwongse, 1993). Furthermore, it has been shown that a more balanced 
perspective on C 0 2 market design is required. Current theoretical underpinnings of 
C 0 2 market designs portray the regulator as being the primary, perhaps the only, 
decision maker. It is recommended that future work on C 0 2 markets acknowledges the 
interdependence of regulators upon market participants and vice versa, for example, by 
acknowledging the insights of the Industrial Marketing and Purchasing (IMP) Group 
who would argue that regulators cannot assume the role of arranging the incentives 
faced by passive C 0 2 market participants. (Hakansson & Johanson, 1992; Hakansson & 
Snehota, 1995; Hakansson & Ford, 2002; Hakansson et al., 2009). Finally, the division 
between C 0 2 market design and operation adopted by this research was used to 
highlight that C 0 2 markets have a life beyond the drawing board. This is where the 
practice based perspective has demonstrated the need to take an empirical view of what
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is happening to C 0 2 markets in the real world. It is argued that this approach could 
further help to bridge the gap between C 0 2 market design and operation, while at the 
same time answering calls to reconnect markets and marketing, providing a new 
perspective on C 0 2 market design (Araujo, 2007; Araujo et al., 2010; Kjellberg & 
Helgesson, 2007a).
Having discussed the theoretical implications of this research, the following section 
discusses the research’s policy implications.
12.4 Policy implications: COz markets versus C02 taxes or mandates
This section examines the policy implications of the present research. The discussion 
challenges the efficacy of a market based response to Climate Change by comparing it 
with the alternatives of CO, taxes or mandates.
The traditional justifications for the preference of C 0 2 markets over taxes or mandates 
are summarised in Table 30. C 0 2 markets are typically presented as the most suitable 
policy measure for Climate Change mitigation for two reasons. Firstly, C 0 2 markets 
offer the theoretical potential to minimise the costs borne by industry during Climate 
Change mitigation efforts. Secondly, the design of C 0 2 markets allows regulators to set 
quantifiable targets for C 0 2 reductions from the outset (DEFRA, 2007, MacKenzie, 
2009).
In contrast, a tax on C 0 2 can neither minimise the costs borne by industry, nor fix a 
target level of C 0 2 reductions. A mandate can fix a C 0 2 reduction target, but still fails 
to minimise the costs borne by industry. The ability of C 0 2 markets to achieve cost
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efficiency and enable target setting are the standard explanations as to why C 0 2 markets 
are the most suitable policy response to Climate Change. These ideas were discussed in 
more detail in section 4.6. Accordingly, C 0 2 markets have been defined as “markets in 
permits to emit CO2gases or in credits earned by not emitting them” (MacKenzie, 2009: 440). The 
previous definition leaves implicit that the ability o f the regulator to set targeted C 0 2 
reductions arises from their control over the num ber o f C 0 2 permits which are 
allocated each year.
Table 30: Traditional justification for design of C 0 2 markets
(summarised version o f Table 8 on page 130)
Cost borne Tonnes C 0 2 
by industry saved
1) TAX > min possible
cannot be 
predicted
2) MANDATE > min possible
fixed by 
regulation
3) C 0 2 MARKET minpossible
fixed by 
regulation
The present research’s examination o f CO, markets challenges the conventional C 0 2 
market designs discussed above in two ways. Firstly, the examination o f network-level 
aspects o f C O , markets has shown that they are not yet significantly influencing the 
decisions o f CO , market participants. As such, C 0 2 markets are failing to deliver C 0 2 
reductions, meaning that ambitions to minimise the costs bom e by industry and to set 
C 0 2 reduction targets at the outset are undermined. Secondly, the examination o f 
macro-level aspects o f  C 0 2 markets has exposed significant weaknesses which relate to 
the influences o f time and uncertainty. These challenges are summarised in Table 31, 
which revises Table 30. The findings presented in Table 31 are discussed below, where
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C O , markets are again compared to their alternatives o f a tax or mandate, but in light o f 
the findings o f this research.
Table 31: C 0 2 m arkets in practice
(Revised version o f I able 8 and Table 30 in light o f findings o f present research)
Cost borne Tonnes C 0 2
by industry saved Tim e U ncertainty




2) M ANDATE > min possible
fixed by 
regulation Fast Low








Reference to columns two and three in Table 31 shows that the present research has 
challenged the ability o f CO, markets to minimise the costs borne by industry and to set 
targeted CO , emission reductions from the outset. CO, markets have so far failed to 
significantly influence businesses’ behaviour. For example, businesses do not recognise 
the costs introduced by CO, markets as material. At 2010 prices, C 0 2 costs represented 
approximately 0.5% to just over 1% of the annual energy expenditure o f C 0 2 market 
participants. Accordingly, it was found that businesses interactions with CO , markets 
were driven by risk management and compliance concerns. Furthermore, large 
businesses often have corporate policies which prohibit speculation on non core 
business activities. To a certain extent, these policies prohibit the possibility of 
businesses making CO, reductions beyond what is required for compkance and selling 
the surplus into the C 0 2 market. The low costs o f CO, when compared to energy costs 
and businesses’ anti-speculation policies provide significant challenges to the intended
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capital efficiency of C 0 2 markets through market mechanisms. These findings have 
influenced the scoring of the first two columns in Table 31. Taking just these two 
columns into account, in light of the present research, C 0 2 markets are joint with taxes 
as the least attractive policy measures for Climate Change mitigation. Mandates are 
more attractive, due to their ability to target specific levels of C 0 2 reduction from the 
outset. As such, the present research has shown that the prioritisation of C 0 2 markets 
due to their theoretical capability to minimise the costs borne by industry and to set 
targets upfront cannot be justified by the present examination of C 0 2 markets in 
operation. In addition, as discussed below, an examination of macro-level aspects of 
C 0 2 market design and operation raises further concerns regarding the prioritisation of 
C 0 2 markets over the alternatives of taxes or mandates.
Reference to the last two columns in Table 31 shows that temporal and uncertainty- 
based considerations provide further challenges regarding the efficacy of C 0 2 markets 
in mitigating Climate Change. This research has shown that that the temporal and 
uncertainty-based aspects of C 0 2 markets are important factors for Climate Change 
policy. In terms of time, it was discussed in section 12.2 how policies designed to 
mitigate Climate Change must take into account the 20-30 year window of opportunity 
within which Climate Change mitigation is possible; plus lock ins due to the 50 year 
atmospheric lifespan of C 0 2 and typical business investment timeframes of 10-20 years. 
In other words C 0 2 markets face a tight window of opportunity within which to 
influence business decisions and decisions taken today may lock us into outcomes which 
are hard to undo later. C 0 2 markets are relatively slow when compared to taxes or 
mandates, because C 0 2 markets introduce incentives which follow a complex cham of 
events before an incentive is realised. This chain of events runs through target setting,
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market development and C 0 2 trading before a business sees an incentive to change their 
behaviour. In contrast, a mandated reduction, such as to match the United Kingdom’s 
ambition to cut C 0 2 emissions by 80% by 2050, can be implemented immediately, as 
can a C 0 2 tax of £50 per tonne C 0 2 for example. It is for these reasons that C 0 2 
markets are ranked below taxes and mandates in terms of their ability to respond to 
Climate Change mitigation within the timeframes required. Furthermore, this research 
has shown that uncertainty-based aspects of C 0 2 market design and operation have 
important implications for Climate Change policy. As discussed in section 12.2, 
regulators’ 3-8 year timeframes for C 0 2 markets were not long enough to influence 
businesses’ investment decisions, which typically take a 10-20 year timeframe. This 
long-term uncertainty regarding the future of CO, markets was further compounded by 
the uncertainty built into a market based approach to C 0 2 regulation. Businesses 
struggled to recognise future costs of C 0 2 in their investment appraisals, since the 
market price of C 0 2 is inherently unpredictable. Uncertainty was found to be high in 
C 0 2 markets, while a mandate gives certainty regarding the target which must be hit and 
a tax gives price certainty for C 0 2 emissions. Because of this, a C 0 2 tax and mandate 
were shown in Table 31 to be associated with less uncertainty than a C 0 2 market. 
Again, these findings suggest that a tax or a mandate may be better placed than a C 0 2 
market to foster efforts to mitigate Climate Change.
The present research highlights significant policy implications by questioning the near 
universal reliance upon C 0 2 markets as the primary policy mechanism for mitigating 
Climate Change. These research findings have acknowledged how C 0 2 markets are 
operating in practice and have examined the challenges of cost minimisation, target 
setting, meeting the short timeframes of Climate Change mitigation and the need to
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avoid uncertainty, as summarised in Table 31. At an incremental level, if Climate 
Change mitigation efforts continue to prioritise a market based policy response, then 
future policies will need to tackle the challenges of low C 0 2 prices, corporate policies 
banning speculation and macro-level aspects of time and uncertainty. At a more 
fundamental level, this research challenges the rationale that is traditionally used to 
justify a market based response to Climate Change mitigation. This research concludes 
that, in order of preference, mandated C 0 2 reductions may be the best placed policy 
mechanism to deal with Climate Change mitigation, followed next by CCb taxes and 
finally by C 0 2 markets. These conclusions are of relevance to the upcoming 
replacement o f the C 0 2 market of the Kyoto Protocol in 2012 and decisions by national 
governments as to how to regulate for Climate Change mitigation. Having discussed 
the policy implications of the research, the following section examines the managerial 
implications o f the research.
12.5 Managerial implications
This research has attempted to achieve high standards of academic rigour, while 
m a i n t a i n i n g  relevance to the practitioner community. This balance o f objectives has 
been managed in two ways. Firstly, the researcher has attempted to maintain a highly 
empirical approach to the research, describing what was happening, ratner than what 
should, or could, have been happening. This ought to mean that the empirical findings 
are recognisable and relevant to practitioners. Secondly, the proposed conceptual 
framework, shown in Figure 4 on page 73, gives practitioners a checklist which is 
intended to be a form of shorthand for the range of concepts and empirical examples 
which were discussed in the research. It is hoped that the comprehensive nature of the 
conceptual framework will help practitioners to develop more complete analyses of C 0 2
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market design and operation than would otherwise have been achieved. The insights as 
to the challenges currently faced by C 0 2 markets are now presented for C 0 2 market 
participants.
From the point of view of businesses, C 0 2 markets represent an emerging regime which 
is currently closest to a compliance type of activity. At 2010 prices, C 0 2 costs 
represented approximately 0.5% to just over 1% of annual energy expenditure. So C 0 2 
markets are not yet delivering the cost incentives which would be required to 
significantly change the behaviour of businesses. However, C 0 2 markets have been 
found to be an important business matter for four reasons. Firstly, C 0 2 markets are 
backed up by ambitious longer-term government targets for C 0 2 reductions. One 
example is the European Union’s ambition to achieve an 80% reduction in C 0 2 
emissions by 2050. Secondly, the reach of C 0 2 markets is spreading. Phases I and II of 
the European Emissions Trading Scheme covered approximately 10,500 sites, the third 
phase will extend this to an estimated 12,000 - 15,000 sites and the United Kingdom’s 
Carbon Reduction Commitment brings another C 0 2 market to an estimated further 
5,000 smaller organisations, or 25,000 -150,000 sites. Furthermore, there are significant 
fines which reinforce the need to comply with C 0 2 markets, especially when combined 
with the reputational impact of failing to comply. Finally, although current C 0 2 costs 
are low, the general trend is that they are rising. Phase I of the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme traded at an average price of around € 2 /tonne C 0 2, this rose to around 
€15/tonne C 0 2 in the second phase of the European Emissions Trading Scheme. Early 
stages o f CO, markets, such as phases I and II of the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme, worked by allocating the majority of C 0 2 permits for free and leaving 
participants only to buy any shortfalls on the C 0 2 markets. Phase III of the European
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Emissions Trading Scheme introduces the auctioning of permits, so that over time, 
participants will have to buy 100% of their C 0 2 permits. This 100% auctioning of C 0 2 
permits will also be employed by the upcoming Carbon Reduction Commitment. These 
developments point to C 0 2 markets becoming increasingly important for businesses in 
a 5-10 year timeframe. There is a case to be made for the development of C 0 2 
accounting and reporting tools which ensure compliance with the current forms of C 0 2 
markets and provide a platform that could underpin a robust response to future 
developments.
The discussion of implications of C 0 2 markets for businesses should also acknowledge 
two further considerations. Firsdy, unless businesses choose to take a proactive role, 
the future o f C 0 2 markets really lies with regulators, Non-Governmental Organisations 
and Consumers. This is because business objectives of profit maximisation are at best 
indifferent to whether C 0 2 markets will emerge or not. Secondly, there is a growing 
community of practitioners within the business world who believe that a proactive 
response to Climate Change will be good for long-term business sustainability. The 
proposed conceptual framework for the analysis of market design and operation may 
help this proactive community to understand and tackle the very real and significant 
challenges faced by C 0 2 markets.
Having discussed the managerial implications of the research, the following section 
describes limitations of the research and proposes directions for fhture research.
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12.6 Limitations and directions for future research
This research has proposed a conceptual framework for the study of C 0 2 market design 
and operation and developed six case studies which describe business responses during 
C 0 2 market design and operation. The limitations of this conceptual framework and 
some further sources of data are now suggested as potential avenues of further research.
Firsdy, the geographical scope of this research could be extended. This research has 
drawn upon the discussion and analysis of six case studies which describe business 
responses during the design and operation of the C 0 2 markets of the Kyoto Protocol, 
the European Emissions Trading Scheme and the United Kingdom’s Carbon Reduction 
Commitment. Collectively, these represented over 98% of the 2009 C 0 2 market by 
value (Kossoy & Ambrosi, 2010). This research was European-centric, as C 0 2 markets 
have their origins in Europe. However, as C 0 2 markets become more global, it would 
be sensible to extend the coverage of the cases to Australia and the United States of 
America. A case study could be developed to examine the development of the United 
States’ Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). The Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative is a pilot C 0 2 market between ten states that caps the C 0 2 emissions of the 
electricity generation industry (RGGI, 2010). The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
accounted for 1.6% of the global value traded on C 0 2 markets in 2009 (Kossoy & 
Ambrosi, 2010). A second case study could also be developed to examine the 
Greenhouse Gas Reduction Scheme that was developed by the state of New South 
Wales in Australia (GGAS, 2010). The Greenhouse Gas Reduction Scheme represented 
0.1% of the global value traded on C 0 2 markets in 2009 (Kossoy & Ambrosi, 2010). 
These two markets are small in scale and local, rather than national, C 0 2 markets. As 
such, they were comparable in scale to the United Kingdom’s Carbon Reduction
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Commitment, which was covered by this research. For reasons of data access and scale 
of importance it was decided to focus the case studies upon the Kyoto Protocol, the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme and the Carbon Reduction Commitment. 
However, examining these two extra C 0 2 markets would give a broader perspective of 
C 0 2 market design and operation.
Secondly, a number of the case studies could be extended to reflect recent 
developments. There is potential to provide an update for case one, which examined 
early negotiations to extend the Kyoto Protocol beyond 2012. As phase I o f the Kyoto 
Protocol draws to a close, there is the opportunity to examine the current efforts to 
extend the Kyoto Protocol into a second phase. Furthermore, the United Kingdom’s 
Carbon Reduction Commitment has recently been converted into a tax which 
represents C 0 2 costs of approximately 8% of energy costs. This announcement was 
made in October 2010 and the changes will be enacted in the second phase of the 
Carbon Reduction Commitment which starts in 2013. This change to the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment seems to tackle some of the challenges faced by C 0 2 markets 
which were identified in this research. A new case study could explore the rationale 
behind the changes and businesses’ responses to the updated Carbon Reduction 
Commitment.
Furthermore, the wider applicability of the proposed conceptual framework could be 
tested through its application to the analysis of the design and operation of other 
markets. The conceptual framework for the study of market design and operation has 
been developed within the empirical domain of C 0 2 markets. Potential areas of 
application include the development of markets for other environmental goods such as
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fishing quotas, biodiversity trading or a historical review of sulphur dioxide trading. In 
wider terms, the conceptual framework could possibly also be extended to the analysis 
of the design and operation of markets outside of the environmental sphere. As 
previously discussed, there is already research on market design and operation for the 
provision of. parking spaces during planning applications, radio frequency bandwidths, 
kidney transplants, and even school places (Barter, 2010; Carmona et al., 2010; Coase, 
1960, 1988; Conejero & Farina, 2003; Dales, 1968; Demsetz, 1966; Engels, 2005; 
Hurwicz, 1973; Levy & Kolk, 2002; MacKenzie, 2009; McMillan, 2003; Meinshausen & 
Hare, 2008; Moser, 2010; Myerson, 1979, 1983; Okereke, 2007; Roth, 2008; Sultanian & 
Van beukering, 2008; Vaughan et al., 2009). The conceptual framework could be 
developed by investigating some of these markets, or historical cases presented in the 
literature listed above.
Finally, due to the contemporary nature of C 0 2 markets, this research has drawn upon a 
diverse set o f literature. There is still other literature to explore and incorporate. One 
field is that o f network pictures and cognitive views. This literature could help in the 
development o f representational aspects of the conceptual framework (Geiger & Finch, 
2010; Henneberg et al., 2006; Henneberg et al., 2010; Leek & Mason, 2010; Mouzas et 
al., 2008). Furthermore, a brief treatment of a number of theories of environmental 
governance was given. These seem to map onto the exchange, representational and 
normalising aspects of markets which were examined. However, future developments 
of this research will draw upon a more detailed examination of research on international 
markets for environmental governance. This research describes a ‘war of position’ 
based upon ‘material’, ‘discursive’ and ‘organisational’ pillars (Levy & Newell, 2002; 
Levy & Egan, 2003); ‘regimes’ as persistent and connected sets of rules and practices
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that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity and shape expectations (Keohane et 
al., 1993) and ‘clusters of norms, rules, principles and decision-making procedures’ 
(Krasner, 1983). This literature would most likely bring another perspective that would 
help to challenge and develop the conceptual framework for the study of C 0 2 market 
design and operation.
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APPENDIX 1: Sample research agreement
RESEARCH AGREEMENT
Manufacturer Alpha and the research led by PhD Candidate Gareth Veal of Lancaster 
University Management School, agree to the following in the conduct of the research 
project with Manufacturer Alpha. Gareth Veal and his PhD supervisor Dr Stefanos 
Mouzas will conduct research with the management and staff o f Manufacturer Alpha, 
focusing upon how C 0 2 markets are influencing the strategic planning activities and 
processes (hereafter referred to as cthe process’) of Manufacturer Alpha. This will 
involve conducting multiple interviews, attending team meetings, observing team 
members, being given copies of documentation relating to the teams’ activities, and 
administering questionnaires, together with other procedures, during the period from 
January to June 2009 inclusive. The research period will be extended if deemed 
necessary through agreement by both parties.
Data collection
Data will be collected through participant observation, interviews and document 
collection as follows:
Company participants
People to be interviewed will be management and staff of Manufacturer Alpha, 
including:
• General Managing Director
• Other senior and middle managers
• Other team members at production sites
All respondents will be asked to sign a Statement of Informed Consent at the beginning 
of their onsite interviews.
The research team will have ongoing telephone access to interview respondents in order 
to:
• confirm the accuracy of the transcript and / or interpretations
• clear up puzzling aspects of the interviews
• test their general interpretations and findings by soliciting respondent feedback. 
Document sharing
Company respondents will be encouraged to provide the research team with any 
documents pertaining to or illuminating the process, including:
• documents that outline the plans for, conduct and anticipated outcomes of, the 
process
• documents that communicate thoughts, actions, effects and outcomes related to the 
process
• flipcharts, notes and/or transcripts from the meetings
• any documents generated by respondents that are pertinent to the process, including 
letters, memoranda, e-mails, reports, speeches, meeting agendas and personal notes.
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Data ownership
The research team will retain all data, including transcripts and documents. In the case 
o f documents, those designated with ‘read and return’ status will be returned (including 
any copies) to the company no later than the presentation of the final report.
Assurance o f participant anonymity and confidentiality o f commercial and 
security-sensitive information
All interviews will be rendered stricdy anonymous in order to protect the identity of 
individuals and groups and, where necessary, quotations taken from individual 
interviews will be deliberately disguised in order to fulfil this objective.
Manufacturer Alpha will be given the opportunity to vet all publications from the 
research, in order to screen out any commercial or security-sensitive information. 
However, the research team will retain full editorial control of all other aspects of the 
form and content of each publication. A maximum of two weeks from the date of 
submission to the organization will be given for approval in the case of each article.
In addition, the research team will not identify the Company or respondents on 
recorded, transcribed, or other data; instead, they will use a pseudonym for the 
Company and assigned numbers for each of the individual respondents.
After the research is completed, the research team will provide Manufacturer Alpha with 
the following:
• An Interim Report of insights to date
• A Full report and verbal presentation detailing the research findings
• In addition, respondents will be provided with a single copy of transcripts of their 
own interviews upon request, they may share these with others at their own 
discretion
Research timeframe
Manufacturer Alpha agrees that their participation in the data collection phase will be 
concluded by approximately the end of June 2009, a period that may be extended, if it is 
regarded that this will be o f benefit to both parties.
Interviews will be scheduled in accordance with the timeframe of the process as planned 
and implemented by Manufacturer Alpha.
Agreed and approved:
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APPENDIX 2: Sample statement of informed consent 
STATEMENT OF INFORMED CONSENT
Dear Participant:
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study o f how C 0 2 markets are influencing
strategic planmng activities and processes. The research will focus upon how company
actions have been influenced by your recent Carbon Trust Energy Efficiency report and
the influence o f European and National CO, markets. The aim is to draft a paper to
present at the 25 Industrial Marketing and Purchasing Conference in September 2009.
This research will also form a case study for Gareth Veal’s PhD thesis and will
eventually be published, in a suitably anonymised form, in management research 
journals.
At the end o f the study, I will share general observations with the management of 
Manufacturer Alpha, your business area and with other study participants. These 
observations will be general in nature and not specific to any individual or team.
As a participant, you may be asked to engage in several informal interviews over the 
course of the study. In addition, I will observe and record meetings in which you may be 
a participant. At some future time, I may also ask if you would be willing to respond to a 
survey or instrument that will help us further understand your thinking about the 
response to CO 2 markets at Manufacturer Alpha.
Your participation is entirely voluntary and you may terminate your involvement at any 
time. All data from your participation will be kept anonymous and confidential. I am 
happy to provide you with a transcript of any of your interviews upon your request.
If  you have questions about the research or wish to discuss your participation in the 
study, you are encouraged to contact the research team at any time, as follows:
Gareth Veal 
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APPENDIX 5: Publications and conference papers
Material from this dissertation has been published in two journal papers and 
presented at a num ber o f conferences. This work and any assignments o f copyright 
as part o f the publication process are summarised below.
Journal publications




1. Learning to 
collaborate: A study of 
business networks 
(Veal & Mouzas, 2010b)

















• Accepted Sept. 
2010
responses to new 
regulation
(Veal & Mouzas, 2011)
•Figure 19 




Title Involvement Location Date
1. Doctoral Consortium: 
IMP 2007
— Presentation o f research 
questions and methods.





— ‘Barriers to collaboration: 
The problem o f Climate 
Change’
(Veal & Mouzas, 2007)




3. IMP Journal Seminar: 
M anaging in Business 
Networks
— ‘Mechanism Design as a 
Response to the Problem 
of Climate Change’




4. Conference: — ‘Mechanism Design as a Uppsala 4-6/09/2008
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IMP 2008 Response to the Problem 
of Climate Change’
(Veal & Mouzas, 2008a)
University
5. Conference:
Action research to 
promote the social 
stewardship of 
Ecosystem Services





-  ‘Business network 
development under 
legislated change’













-  “Barriers to market 
formation: A study of 
emerging markets for CO2’






-  “Barriers to market 
formation’




10. Doctoral consortium: 
JMS /  SAMs






JMS /  SAMs
‘The foundations of
sustainability’
-  ‘Market-based responses to 
sustainability: A study of 
barriers to CO2 market 
formation’




12. Presentation to the 
Institute for Sustainable 
Energy and the 
Environment
— Barriers to Market 
Formation: A Study of CO2 
Markets
University of 
Bath
07/12/2010
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